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SUMMARY OF THE CONTENT 
 
Between the end of the 1960s and the beginning of the 1970s, under the aegis of “Community 
Development” (CD), the Dublin inner city subaltern community struggles raised implicit and 
explicit political questions which differed substantially from those previously raised by the 
‘official’ republican and socialist left. These questions concerned the lives of miscounted 
people, their place in the city and the resources available to them. They developed in 
unprecedented forms of political organization, which, for not being concerned with entering 
the domain of representative state power, kept themselves at a subjective distance from it. 
However, this independence had a short life. From the 1980s CD projects began to be 
rearticulated and ‘depoliticised’ under a bureaucratic framework of funding streams, 
management, expertise and service delivery. The prevailing emphasis on state defined 
concerns, concepts and modes of organization, as well as the decline of the original 
intellectual independence from the state apparatus, has progressively led to the present, 
paradoxical situation in which the taking away of state funds- officially justified by the 
financial crisis, and part of wider austerity measures imposed by the Irish state - is 
experienced by CD groups as their death knell.  
Through concepts of ‘post-party politics’, as formulated by contemporary sociological and 
political theory, I evaluate CD’s original political approach. After analysing CD’s history as a 
‘political sequence’, I give an in-depth overview of present institutional tendencies, drawing 
from oral contributions by activists, state agents and policy makers, participatory methods 
and ethnographic observation . As a provisional conclusion, I point to possible future 
scenarios and provide some recommendations for an eventual re-construction of CD’s 
independency, which, in my view, can only be achieved by returning to the ephemeral events 
and the spontaneity of life shaping Dublin’s inner city popular neighbourhoods. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
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This thesis is about popular protests that erupted in the inner city of Dublin during the second 
half of the 1960s and that subsequently evolved in independent grassroots organisations 
under the aegis of Community Development (CD). More concretely, I examine the way in 
which from around 1966 these struggles raised implicit and explicit political questions, which 
differed substantially from those previously raised by existing political formations including 
the republican and socialist left. These questions concerned the lives of ordinary – to put it 
with Ranciere (1999:32) - “uncounted” people and developed in unprecedented forms of 
political organisation. Not being particularly concerned with entering the domain of 
representative state power these organisations emerged at a subjective distance from it. 
Central to my argument is the idea that, contrary to what most literature gives to understand, 
and despite its name, what is called “CD” in Dublin did not develop as the continuation of an 
existing project or tendency among social and political movements. I also argue that - 
although it is usually analysed from the point of view of a state type of logic, as if it was a 
state process, and despite its name -  CD did not develop from an intrinsic evolution of state 
apparatuses, or from a bureaucratic type of logic (a scheme), as the present situation would 
suggest. Instead, it developed in the context of an historical rupture with previous modes of 
political thought and organisation; a rupture that opened an unprecedented space of political 
creativity and innovation. 
These original experiences and their distance from the state and state-oriented forms of 
political organisation1 have been challenged through the years. Especially from the 1980s 
there has been a tendency among CD projects to be rearticulated under a bureaucratic 
framework of funding streams, management, expertise and service delivery. The prevailing 
emphasis on state oriented concerns, concepts and modes of organization, as well as the 
                                                          
1
 I.e. organisations whose aim is to seize state-power through different means. 
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declining of the original “intellectual” independence from the state apparatus, has 
progressively led to the present, paradoxical situation in which the taking away of state funds 
- officially justified by the financial crisis, and part of wider austerity measures imposed by 
the Irish state - is experienced by CD groups as their death knell.  
My purpose here is not that of presenting a comprehensive historical account of these 
processes. Whenever I could, I tried to rely on the (surprisingly little) historical research done 
by others. Rather, my intention is to reflect on the political significance and consequences of 
these original experiences, which I interpret as resonating with ‘macro-processes’ taking 
place at global scale. Although these ‘inventions’ in the field of CD politics and organisation 
have been intermittent and precarious, having experienced processes of depoliticisation, they 
have nevertheless left an indelible mark in political thought and praxis. Furthermore their 
depoliticisation highlights ambiguities and ‘weaknesses’ whose analysis is fundamental for 
the eventual development of new and more consistent experiments in this field.  
1.1 New forms of politics and Marxism’s epochal crisis  
Map of the inner city of Dublin. The norh and south side are divided by the river Liffey. 
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In Dublin, so called “community” activism is rooted in a phase of ruptures and unprecedented 
innovations in politics at global scale, which is usually referred to as “1968” – corresponding 
to the year of their maximum expansion worldwide. In reality this ‘1968 sequence’ lasted 
from the mid-sixties to the end of the seventies. Its course being shaped by disparate themes 
such as decolonization and national liberation struggles, students’ uprisings, anti-capitalist 
revolt, counterculture, new political energies and initiatives in the Socialist world - which 
produced events like the Cultural Revolution and the Prague Spring - and so on. It was in 
Connery’s (2009:184) words “the foregrounding of a new time, a time toward futurity”; a 
time in which new emancipatory movements were coming into being, often in antithesis to 
the ‘orthodox’ left and its traditional modes of social and political organisation.  
As we know, these dispersed, heterogeneous and experimental struggles did not coagulate in 
forms of thought and organisation capable to literally ‘revolutionise societies’ – although they 
introduced many fundamental changes at various levels. Ideologically, they failed in 
producing a unitary and coherent agenda for transformation - to the extent that (after the 
failure of state-Marxism/socialism) the problem of the re-founding of a large scale 
emancipatory agenda (meaning a “universal” plan for the emancipation of humanity) is 
nowadays still open. The lack of such a unifying agenda reflected in the still “unconsolidated 
ideological nature of early 21st century politics” (Coombs 2011:138). Whereas the existence 
of the traditional left was based on - and legitimised by – its supposed historical role (the fact 
that it viewed itself as the agent of a progressive historical process ), after the 1960s and 
1970s political movements and events “no longer have a floor nor a horizon that gives 
historical validity to their battle” (Ranciere 2012). Which is an issue they constantly find 
themselves dealing with. 
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My study develops from a point of view that is internal to that epochal fracture in the field of 
political thought and organisation. This perspective implies a radical rethinking of categories 
on which politics has traditionally relied; and this, I will illustrate, is something that social 
sciences are not always keen to do.  
It should be noticed that Marxism constitutes the epicentre of this fracture. As Alessandro 
Russo (1998) observes “one can trace back to the 1960s and 1970s a growing uncertainty, not 
only about actual political value, but also about the cultural substance of historico-social 
categories such as class, class struggle, modes of production, the state, equality, political 
parties, and so forth” (Russo 1998:180). Indeed with the advent of the sequence that we 
usually indicate with “1968” an entire network of common referents for politics lost its 
consistency at various levels. According to Russo (ibid. p 180) although this contested body 
of knowledge is intrinsic to Marxism’s conceptual apparatus, it is not limited to it. It has 
affected all those fields in which Marxism constituted an “essential factor of cohesion” (ibid. 
p 180).  
One of these fields corresponds to Social Sciences. Michel Foucault was the first to diagnose 
the danger that this disciplinary body could ‘collapse’. Indeed in Les mots et les choses, “The 
Order of Things” (2004) - first published in 1966 -, after describing the central role human 
sciences played in modern episteme, he concluded that their crisis could lead to an eventual 
collapse of this unitary network of knowledge – of which ‘Man’ constitutes the centre, i.e. 
what needs to be conceived and known. In this space, which is essentially a space of 
conscious as well as unconscious representation, human sciences found their ‘precarious’ 
homeland. In this perspective, Foucault (2004:422) poetically warned that man could be 
“erased like a face drawn in sand at the edge of the sea”.  
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Marxism has been a central “factor of cohesion” for social sciences - not just because it 
integrated them as they were still unstable end evolving disciplines. Paradoxically, 
Marxism’s structural contribution to the consolidation of social sciences was also related to 
the harsh reactions that it sparked amongst scholars. In other words, the process of 
constitution of (for example) sociology as a unitary discipline, found in the polemics against 
Marxism an essential propulsive and cohesive factor (Russo:2008). Russo elaborates this idea 
offering examples from Weber and Durkheim. These two modern founders of sociology 
developed a consistent part of their thought in opposition to Marxism. For example, one of 
Weber’s starting points is the refutation of the materialist conception of history – as he 
develops it in his “Protestant Ethics” (Russo:2008). In his view, who played the main role in 
historical development were the material vicissitudes of the Calvinist doctrine of 
predestination, not class struggle. On the other hand, the point at stake in Durkheim’s 
“Division of social labour” (Russo:2008) was that the modern forms of labour division 
should be regulated by ‘organic solidarity’, not by ‘revolution’. These ‘reactive’ (in relation 
to Marxism) positions by founders of modern sociology are symptomatic of Marxism’s 
(active and passive) centrality in the body of knowledge of that discipline.  
Beyond social sciences Marxism has played a central role in the entire modern episteme - of 
which, again, it was not just a component amongst others. Indeed, although it “played a 
sourly critical and even threateningly apocalyptic role” (Russo 1998:180), it also constituted 
“the ideological orientation of that network of knowledge” (ibid. p180). Marx, in other 
words, is the author of ideas that shaped the destinies of modernity. His vision of politics was 
intertwined with science and history, to the extent that Marxism professed to represent “all of 
modern historico-social rationality” (Russo 1998). Indeed it became a highly elaborated 
discipline (‘scientific Marxism’) that was capable to dispute at all levels of knowledge and 
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thought – and that at the same time was addressing the masses as the only subject capable to 
break the bourgeois state machine.  
At least from 18482, state systems developed also as a reaction to Marxism and to the danger 
that its embodiment in poor people’s organisations and struggles could bring. Examples of 
institutional forms of the state that have been influenced by Marxism in their development are 
state-party systems. Without the constitution of workers parties and their legalisation in the 
last decades of the 19th Century – a concession that was evidently aimed to their containment 
and normalisation – the spread of parliamentarianism would not have happened as it did and 
mass political parties would not have evolved as the nucleus of sovereignty (Russo 2008).   
The advent of new forms of politics and the crisis of Marxism’s conceptual apparatus have 
had long lasting consequences at various levels. I do not just refer to the collapse of state-
Marxism and of the main Communist Parties worldwide after 1989, but also to the end of the 
‘geopolitical’ balance of which Marxism constituted a sort of cornerstone. The disruption of 
this balance corresponded to the triumph of liberal democracy, as well as to the beginning of 
its permanent destabilisation. On the other hand, as I mentioned above, the new forms of 
emancipatory politics that emerged from the 1960s did not achieve to fully replace the old 
ones - especially in terms of a universal referent, that previously was to be fund in history (as 
history of class struggle). This failure has relegated emancipatory/egalitarian politics into a 
sort of limbo, where a new sequence is still to be borne and where “the cramped, besieged 
experimentalism of a few groups” (Badiou 2008:42) is seeking ways to achieve this. As 
Antonio Gramsci (1972:276) highlights “the crisis consists precisely in the fact that the old is 
dying and the new cannot be born. In the interregnum a great number of morbid symptoms 
appear”.  
                                                          
2
 1848 was the year of the European Revolutions known in some countries as the Spring of Nations or 
Springtime of the Peoples. This revolutionary wave began in France in February and spread to many European 
countries and parts of Latin America. 
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1.2 Post-party politics 
 
Although the “1968 sequence” did not manage to produce a coherent and ‘universal’ 
‘agenda’ for egalitarian change, that does not mean that it failed to present common themes 
and tendencies that have been identifiable in most of its expressions in different contexts. 
One of these themes – a fundamental one in the analysis of CD and nevertheless central to the 
crisis of Marxist politics – is the rejection of the ‘party’ as a form of political organisation. 
This was a huge rupture in a historical phase where the party model constituted the 
cornerstone of politics - both in the revolutionary field (revolutionary Marxist parties and 
national liberation parties) and in the governmental field (parliamentarian multi-party systems 
like liberal democracies and single-party systems such as Socialist States). The ability to re-
thinking politics outside the party frame was a core achievement of the 1968 sequence. 
In this perspective I describe CD’s original approach as experiments in ‘post-party politics’, 
or ‘politics without party’ - as this idea has been developed by contemporary sociological and 
political theory - among others by Badiou (2005), Wang (2006), Ranciere (2006), Neocosmos 
(2009) and Russo (1998). Post-party politics “means that politics does not spring from or 
originate in the party. It does not stem from that synthesis of theory and practice that 
represented, for Lenin, the Party” (Badiou 1998:113). Politics without party springs from real 
situations, from what ordinary people can think, say and do in those situations. Therefore in 
this perspective “there are political sequences, political processes, but these are not totalised 
by a party that would be simultaneously the representation of certain social forces and the 
source of politics itself” (Badiou ibid. p113). As Alessandro Russo (1998:181) puts it, the 
problem that the fading of the historical function of the parties and the advent of post-party 
politics posed “is how to reflect on each political situation as singular and endowed with its 
own proper mode of political thinking, not simply as belonging to what we could call the 
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modern political episteme, or to the space of modern political and historical knowledge”. 
According to Judith Balso (2010:26), post-party “politics proceeds of its own”, meaning that 
it finds its own referents in itself, in the singular contexts in which it develops. “Its thought – 
says Balso -  most be intrinsic to itself, (…) it is not a matter of objective analysis, but is only 
possible from a perspective of a new political space that has been instituted at a distance from 
the state” (ibid. p26). 
Since the 1960s all the most marking political experiences have developed outside and 
sometimes even explicitly against the party representative model, which up to that stage had 
monopolised modern politics. This model started to be criticised because of its 
bureaucratising and depoliticising tendencies. Many activists came to the conclusion that, as 
John Holloway (2005:174) puts it, “control of the state tends to become control by the state”- 
with tremendous depoliticising consequences as witnessed in parliamentarian democracies 
and real existing socialism. In socialist context, the Chinese Cultural Revolution (CR) can be 
considered as representative of such a shift towards post-party politics. Especially during 
CR’s first phase (1966-1968), workers and students organised in a multitude of independent 
formations outside the ossified Communist Party, which in China – same as in other socialist 
states - was the only admitted source and locus of politics. So “the crucial content of those 
political disputes was the basic condition of politics itself, of its organisational conditions” 
(Russo 2009). CR broke with the idea that political organisation should be acting as a 
separate body, within the state and ‘on behalf of the people’ (or ‘the nation’, the ‘working 
class’, and so on), suggesting that it should instead blend with people’s lives and be part of 
their own struggles for emancipation.  
The explosion of creative energies which shaped the horizon of post-party politics “was 
entangled with the epochal closure of a network of political culture” (Russo 2006:273): a 
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culture for which the party (independently from its ideological orientation) was the 
fundamental political space. As I will illustrate, from the late 1960s in Dublin this shift made 
independent political organising and therefore CD possible.   
Relevant to this post-party disposition in Ireland was a process of transformation that affected 
the republican movement and which lead to the 1969 split between ‘Provisional’ and 
‘Official’ IRA. Indeed, after the unsuccessful Border Campaign (1956 – 1962) many 
Republican activists had come to the conclusion that their elitist approach was out-dated – it 
did not reflect the spirit of the time. They understood that in the name of taking established 
truths to the people, they had have often cut themselves off from the new facts and creative 
thinking of the time. As Holloway (2010:63) writes “any form of organisation that focuses on 
changing society on behalf of the workers (the poor, the people, whoever) will tend, whatever 
its declared intentions, to weave acts of rebellion back into the social synthesis of capitalism. 
The state is the most obvious example of such organisation”. Thus Republicans’ emphasis 
shifted from vanguardism and military/clandestine struggle to more genuine and open 
political activity. This translated into open support for popular protests, especially those 
related to housing, which were spontaneously taking place in many urban areas. I will refer to 
the Dublin Housing Action Committee DHAC (see Chapter 3) as a key example of this post-
party configuration in Dublin. Although it involved people from republican, socialist, 
feminist, catholic (and so on) backgrounds, DHAC’s political subjectivity is irreducible to the 
sum of these components. Its brief but intense experience contributed to the opening of a 
political space in which CD was subsequently able to consolidate.  
1.3 Primacy of politics over organisation/institution  
 
As I previously argued, from the second half of the 1960s the expansion of post-party/CD 
organisations in urban Ireland was mainly the outcome of growing mobilisations claiming 
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social control of housing, services and local institutions. This draws the attention on one idea 
which (being tightly related to that of ‘post-party politics’) is central to this thesis: namely, 
the idea that moments of political intensity are not ‘artificially’ created by formal 
organisations or institutions. On the contrary, as Piven and Cloward (1979:xxi) highlight, it is 
“the sheer excess of political energy among the masses, which itself breathes life” into the 
idea that “organisations can be developed and sustained”.  
So the Idea that I will put forward here is that political organisations/institutions are the 
controversial outcome, the consequence of subjective emancipatory processes, not the 
opposite. They constitute the attempt to preserve and give consistency (a stable form) to 
subjective political energies, which are perceived as being ‘spontaneous’, and therefore 
precarious and evanescent. But it is just the existence of these energies that makes an 
organisation “political”.  
The case of CD is revealing. What I define (Chapter 5) as CD forms of alternative 
institutionality trigger from political processes, or situations of conflict, and not from an 
agreement with the state or a ‘social contract’. However, as long as those subjective processes 
and energies have weakened almost to the point of exhaustion, the organisational forms that 
they themselves had generated and sustained also started to undergo a process of decline, 
which is on-going, and of which is difficult to foresee an end. I will argue that the necessity 
to always balance organisation with political subjectivity is something that those who are 
concerned with CD’s fate should keep in mind. 
As I illustrate in the theoretical section (chapter 2), politics in this thesis is defined as a form 
of subjectivity that operates outside institutional legitimate areas. It consists in the opening of 
new possibilities that are overlooked, or considered to be impossible from the point of view 
of existing structures. CD politics consists in addressing issues which are excluded from the 
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agenda of both the state and formal, state-oriented, representative political organisations (no 
matter if internal or external to the parliament), and advocates people’s power to control their 
own lives.  
This does not mean that such politics is unorganised. It rather means, according to Badiou, 
(2005:122) “one organised through the intellectual discipline of political processes, and not 
according to a form correlated with that of the State” – for this latter form is depoliticising. 
So talking about CD in Dublin is not like referring to a model of organisation that can be 
applied or imposed to a specific situation – as literature gives to understand. Its main feature, 
in the words of Aine, a Dublin based activist, is that it develops “organically”, out of people’s 
inventions and practices in-situation.   
As Kelleher & Whelan (1992:26) describe this approach “it all starts with a need for action in 
a particular locality or issue. This can be expressed in general or particular terms, i.e. 
‘something has to be done’ or ‘something has to be done about’; once the need for action is 
articulated, the direction of what happens subsequently is influenced by the vision motivating 
individuals involved”. CD’s original re-inventing of particular forms of collective action, for 
being performed in informal contexts of social relations, is ‘light’ by nature. It is fluid, 
temporary and intermittent. It contrasts with the formalistic rigidity and rituality of formal 
organisations.  
* 
In the light of this broad political meaning that I ascribe to CD as well as of its location in a 
specific historical phase I will analyse its depoliticisation, which, as I said, goes until the 
present. Indeed CD’s initial independence from the state had a short life, although it was 
intermittently reactivated for short periods of time along the following decades.  
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In 2004, at the time of writing their seminal work on CD in Ireland (the most detailed work 
that has been written on this subject), Powell and Geoghegan (2004) posit that the sector was 
faced with a choice between two approaches, the first being “rejectionist” and based on 
alternative models of development seeking to reclaim “civil society” for “democracy”, and 
the second being based on a cooperation in the “New Economy” and therefore in a 
partnership with state and capital. For the time being, with the rise of so-called financial crisis 
and the hostile attitude the state is showing towards CD organizations, the range of ‘choices’ 
seems to be changed substantially. On one hand the state and capital are not showing any 
interest anymore in continuing the partnership relation with the ‘community sector’– at least 
not in the terms in which it had been established. On the other hand, although a rejectionist, 
uncompromisingly independent stance has become mandatory, ‘civil society’ and 
‘democracy’ are evidently too politically vague and saturated concepts to become guiding 
principles for political thought and action. Indeed at the moment ‘civil society’ and 
‘democracy’ are used almost interchangeably to point to a neo-liberal model, which is being 
imposed on a worldwide scale. On one hand ‘democracy’ is the key-word of this consensus 
and, as Alain Badiou (2005) argues, it has become a sort of “authoritarian opinion” (p. 78). 
To the extent that “it is forbidden not to be a democrat” (ibid. p78). On the other hand, as 
Collins (2002:93) argues, civil society should be seen as part of the State apparatus – even if 
not government or statutorily driven. It is therefore important to articulate political 
perspectives for CD’s future, which go beyond the rhetoric of democracy and civil society. 
An inventive attitude is required from CD. One that is up to the challenges of the present. 
However, such a heuristic attitude should be also sustained by a return to CD’s political 
‘tradition’, and the original experimentations it involved.  
1.4 Chapters’ outline 
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In the next chapter (nr 2) I will discuss some philosophical questions around which the 
theoretical approach of this thesis rotates. Discussion will mainly address the categories of 
politics and the state.  The ontological distinction between politics and the state, which is not 
always taken for granted in social sciences, constitutes a central theoretical knot in my 
analysis. Drawing on Badiou’s theoretical apparatus I will illustrate how the state constitutes 
the ontological prerequisite of every historical-social situation. State power is constant. It 
consists in the unequal distribution of places and functions; in a way that groups individuals 
in relatively fixed and clearly identifiable categories. On the contrary, politics is not a 
permanent fixture of society. Being subjective, it has a sequential and intermittent nature, 
which constantly exposes it to its own exhaustion. It can only find some continuity “at a 
distance from the state” (Badiou 2008:650); otherwise it tends to depoliticise and to assume a 
form which is correlated with that of the state (state-politics). Based on these theoretical 
remarks I will advance the idea that today, a way to find a solution to CD’s crisis is to 
reinvent its politics at a distance from the state.  
In Chapter 3 I will reconstruct CD’s political path from the 1960s to nowadays. In the first 
part, historical reconstruction develops from the point of view of the singular inventions that 
CD groups were capable of in Dublin. Here I will give concrete examples of the idea of post-
party politics at a distance from the state – as I introduced it from a theoretical perspective in 
Chapter 2. Particular emphasis will be put in the political significance of these experiments 
and in the unprecedented possibilities they have opened. In the second part I will take into 
analysis the process of depoliticisation of CD, which achieved its peak during the Partnership 
Governance phase. I will illustrate how from that stage the movement has tended to give up 
its independence towards a more formal and institutional conception of CD as a ‘sector’ of 
the state. 
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Chapter 4 is devoted to the methodological approach that informed the present study. I will 
first give a brief account of what does “methodology” mean and its purpose in the field of 
social research. I will emphasise the fact that a critique of current methodological practices is 
necessary if one wants to critically address the question of the present and future possibilities 
of social sciences as a free form of enquiry. I will also discuss the fact that most of this 
research refers to a present in continuous and rapid evolution which compels the researcher to  
not just refer to what happened but also to what could eventually happen. The category of 
‘possibility’ is central to the field of politics. It has been nevertheless omnipresent in the 
accounts of those who have been involved in this research, in the form of prescriptions, 
predictions or just simple hopes. Finally I will enter into details of the tools, mainly in depth 
interviews and ethnographic observation that I used to collect ‘empirical data’.  
Chapter 5 will be the first of three chapters entirelybased on collected empirical data 
(although some data have also been used in the historical section) where current tendencies 
are analysed. Here I will deal with CD’s position vis à vis the state. Notions of 
bureaucratisation and statification will be central to the analysis of CD’s depoliticisation from 
different points of view. In the first part I critically discuss the problem of funding. In 
particular I criticise the consensus that exists among activists and scholars that funding is the 
main cause of bureaucratisation and therefore depoliticisation. Indeed, although there are 
certainly funding-related dangers that activists should be constantly aware of, there are 
nevertheless examples of groups that receive funding from the state and yet do not 
depoliticise. On the other hand one should notice that in (capitalist, neo-liberal) urban context 
a complete financial independence from state and capital is virtually impossible. I will 
advance the idea that CD groups should treat funding as a ‘secondary contradiction’ and 
attempt to pursue autonomy at a political level rather than finance-wise.  
21 
 
In the second part of Chapter 5 the case of Community Response, a CD group operating in 
the south inner city will be taken into analysis in order to evaluate the complex ways in which 
bureaucratisation affects CD projects in terms of professionalization, i.e. the imposition of 
expert, technical knowledge as the principle ruling a situation. Expert knowledge has the 
capacity to abstracts issues (heroin epidemic in the case of CR) from the socio-political 
context and conditions which alone give them meaning. So these issues acquire a life that is 
separated from that context and can be managed by the state and its technocrats. To be 
accessed by ordinary people and democratised (which is CD’s mission), these issues need to 
be re-politicised and their technical quality shown to be, at best, only partly independent of 
socio-political content. 
In Chapter 5’s last section I will address a tendency that CD groups had since the beginning, 
which is that of creating community institutions. On one hand I will show how these 
alternative forms of institutionality have been at the same time experimental, innovative, 
strategic and rooted in the socio-historical texture of the neighbourhoods in which CD 
developed. On the other hand I will argue that, for being easily articulated to state procedures, 
this institutional tendency has constantly exposed CD organisations to the risk of 
bureaucratisation and professionalization.  
The aim of Chapter 6 is to analyse the (still existing) potentialities of CD in terms of 
autonomy and independent politics. In the first section I will introduce the notion of ‘organic’ 
– as it emerged in my fieldwork. According to many community activists, ‘organically’ is the 
way in which CD should relate itself to a situation. ‘Organic’ means that CD is not a model, 
something that can be imposed to a situation by outsiders (or by the state) but something that 
develops intrinsically to it; it is the result of people’s creativity and capacity to independently 
organise and take a lead in the solution of their problems.  
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In the second part of the chapter I explore the case of mutual support groups, as they have 
been developing with the support of Community Response in the south inner city of Dublin. I 
consider mutual support groups as an interesting experiment in CD, since it constitutes an 
attempt to counter bureaucratisation and to return to an ‘organic’ approach. A similar analysis 
is done in relation to public consultation meetings, or assemblies. Their potentialities are 
explored through the analysis of the case of ‘Community First’, which I consider to be a rare 
and interesting example of micro-processes of community re-politicisation from the bottom 
up. I conclude by arguing that an important way to push autonomy as far as possible is that of 
working in order to create an environment that is more favourable to it. 
In chapter 7 I address a problem that in my view is at the root of the crisis affecting CD at 
present: the politicisation of young people and the lack of a new generation of activists 
devoted to the cause of CD. In the first part of this chapter I address the problem of the failure 
to emerge of a new generation of CD activists and leaders, despite the fact that young people 
have always been a central focus in CD. There are several answers to this question related to 
the professionalization of CD and to the powerful personalities of the old leadership. 
However, I think that at present a key factor is CD’s ambivalent approach to youth, which is 
ideologically condensed in the idea ‘anti-social behaviour’. This approach, I will argue, 
prevents the construction of a meaningful relation between activists and underprivileged 
young people and thus the reproduction of CD as a political subject. In the second part I will 
investigate the places in which CD concretely relates itself to young people, including youth 
projects and so called Community Policing Fora (CPF). I will show how in both cases the 
approach to youth is informed by an ‘anti-social’ behaviour ideology, which tends to 
criminalise young people and to articulate the question of their development in terms of 
‘management’, (crime) prevention, diversion and control. The CPF case is of particular 
interest to this thesis because it constitutes a partnership version of previous forms of 
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community self-policing which were independent and constituted as a challenge to state-
policing. In their practice the idea of anti-social behaviour was absent; it did not make sense. 
CPF’s and youth projects’ policing/security approach involves formal collaboration with the 
police, which is problematic in my view. Indeed underprivileged neighbourhoods in Dublin 
are shaped by a particularly tense (not to say antagonistic) relation between youth and the 
Gardaí – with young people being targeted, harassed and racialised in their day to day life. In 
the third part of this chapter I will illustrate how this discrimination and targeting of 
underprivileged young people works. Among various ideas I will focus on the use of the 
notion of ‘scum’, which has racialising effects on working class (especially young) people, 
playing – together with ‘anti-social behaviour’ - a central role in dismissing them as 
meaningful actors. “Scum” is synonymous with ‘racaille’ (in French) which in 2005 was used 
by Sarkozy to tag young people living in underprivileged neighbourhoods in the outskirts of 
Paris. This was eventually followed by the Banlieue unrests of winter 2005. In section 7.4 
episodes of juvenile insubordination such as those which in Dublin culminated with the 2006 
Riot are interpreted as a response by youth to injustice and discrimination. To conclude I will 
critically address the ineffectiveness of CD to meaningfully deal with such events - and more 
in general with young people’s rage and latent desires. I will suggest that in order to 
overcome its impasse (which is in large part ‘generational’) CD should return to its ‘organic’ 
approach and get meaningfully involved in ordinary people’s struggles – like for example 
those informally carried out by underprivileged young people (youth riots). 
To conclude, I will point to possible future scenarios and give some political 
recommendations for a possible re-politicisation of CD, which, in my view, can only be 
achieved by returning to the micro-events shaping life in Dublin’s inner city popular 
neighbourhoods’.  
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2. STATE, POLITICS AND THE DEPOLITICISATION OF COMMUNITY 
DEVELOPMENT   
26 
 
In this chapter I will discuss some philosophical questions around which the theoretical 
approach of this thesis rotates. Some of the concepts that I introduce here are of a quite recent 
use in the field of social sciences. Others, despite being more familiar to scholars, are given a 
different meaning from the conventional one.    
Fundamental to this work are the categories of politics and the state. Interestingly enough, 
their distinction is not always clear or taken for granted in the field of social sciences, which 
still find it difficult to really think politics outside the (broad) domain of the state. As I will 
illustrate, the concepts of politics and the state tend overlap in the main sociological 
traditions. This ambiguity should be dissolved when it comes to analyse a movement such as 
CD. Indeed, excluding the initial phase of its existence in Dublin and other intermittent 
sequences, CD has always maintained an ambivalent position in relation to politics and the 
state. In my view, this ambivalence, this lack of a clear separation between politics and the 
state in the praxis and thought of CD is a key aspect of the impasse which this movement is 
experiencing at present. Although this crisis is consensually articulated in economic terms, 
along this thesis I will illustrate how money just constitutes a secondary element to it. The 
main reason of CD’s downfall is not just that it has been affected by austerity measures 
implemented by the state. Rather it has to do with its failure to reproduce itself as a political 
subject. This failure, I will argue, is due to the fact that CD politics have entered too much the 
field of the state - having lost that “distance” which, in the theoretical perspective outlined in 
this chapter is vital for politics. 
As I will show in Chapter 3 from a more historical and empirical point of view, were 
precisely these historical exceptions3, these moments of “intensification of an inexistence” 
(Badiou 2003:133), these moments of ordinary people’s subjectivation (i.e. moments where 
                                                          
3
 Here I refer to for example the anti-drugs movement (Concerned Parents Against Drugs), or the street traders 
movement, which both developed in the 1980s. See Chapter 3.  
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course of action did not just follow historical contingencies or objective conditions dictated 
by the “state-of-the-situation”) that allowed CD to become a key movement in Dublin’s 
political landscape. When those exceptional energies were reabsorbed or neutralised, the 
organisations and the institutions which they contributed to produce simply faded away. 
Where they managed to survive, it has been because “they [had become] more useful to those 
who control the resources on which they depend than to the lower class groups which the 
organizations claim to represent” (Piven & Colward:xxi).  
In the first part of this section (2.1) I will critically address the idea of ‘community’, which is 
intrinsic to the notion of CD, and which seems to be so fashionable in Ireland nowadays. I 
will argue that this consensus is due to the ambiguity of this concept, which tends to suit very 
different, frequently conflicting discourses. Theoretical investigation on the idea of 
‘community’ reveals its ontological links with the State. I will suggest that the 
disentanglement of CD from the field of the state is a necessary condition for the solution of 
its crisis.   
Reflection on the notion of community directly leads to the question of politics and the state, 
to which the main part (2.2) of this chapter is dedicated. Here I will address the ontological 
distinction between these two categories, which, as I said, is underestimated in Social 
Sciences and nevertheless constitutes a central theoretical knot in my analysis.  
Drawing on Badiou’s theory of the state, based on a set-theoretical approach, I will illustrate 
how the main feature of the state is to be constant. Indeed it constitutes the ontological 
prerequisite of every historical-social situation. State power is based on the fact that it 
operates as a principle of distribution of places and functions; in a way that groups human 
beings in relatively fixed and clearly identifiable categories. On the contrary, politics is not a 
permanent fixture of society. It has a sequential and intermittent nature, which constantly 
28 
 
exposes it to its own exhaustion. It can only find some continuity “at a distance from the 
state” (Badiou 2008:650); otherwise it tends to depoliticise and to assume a form which is 
correlated to that of the state (state-politics). 
Finally, in order give a background to what I think is the singularity of CD in Dublin, in 
section 2.3 I will explore some of the political novelties which were introduced during the 
1960s and 1970s on a worldwide scale. I will theoretically justify why I think that CD might 
be considered part of that historical rupture, where traditional political concepts and forms of 
organisation entered in an irreversible crisis, for they ended up restricting politics to the 
terrain of the state.   
2.1 Deconstructing the notion of CD  
 
Framing the notion of CD in Ireland is particularly complicated, not so much because of the 
complexity and fluidity of those realities which in common language go under the name of 
CD, but because in Ireland this notion designates (and tangles) a variety of subjects, which 
are frequently contrasting and irreducible to each other. However, although the concept of 
CD designates forms of organisation and historical processes which do not coincide, 
literature, including the academic one, and the great majority of activists keep referring to it 
as if it was something unitary (“the community sector”); as if every institution which goes 
under the aegis of Community Development shared some common roots or the same spirit. 
As I will illustrate along this thesis this is not really the case, because the intricate 
constellation which today is still referred to as ‘sector’, or ‘pillar’ of the Irish civil society, is 
crossed by “horizontal” and “vertical” lines or gaps which disrupt its supposed uniformity 
and harmony. 
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‘Horizontal’ gaps are historical. They separate realities to which in different epochs the 
designation Community Development was given. The deepest among these gaps is situated in 
the late 1960s dividing political organisations that emerged during and after those turbulent 
years, especially in urban context, from previous experiences. Although pre- and post-‘1968’ 
CD organisations are referred to with the same name, differences are so substantial and so 
self-evident, that to consider them as being coextensive, or even in some way politically 
related, is inaccurate.  
For example, the oldest ‘tradition’ of CD in Ireland is represented by Muintir na Tire, a 
movement which saw community development as an end in itself: the development of a 
unified, self-determining and caring community in a parish or other self-contained locality. 
This traditional voluntary form of organization was predominantly rural, originating in the 
first half of the last century and strongly influenced by Catholic social teaching, exposing the 
virtues of neighbourliness, self-reliance and independence from the state (Collins 2002:96). 
Nevertheless, it used to work in an essentially conservative way, drawing its leadership from 
the clergy, teaching and medical professions (Lee 2003:49). It had little in common with 
‘post-1968’ organizations which were inspired by the innovative ideas and organisational 
forms displayed by workers’, students’, civil rights and feminist movements active on a 
global scale. Therefore, I find it also inaccurate to speak about a “first” and a “second 
generation” of CD, as many authors (Geoghegan and Powell 2006, Collins 2002) do, because 
despite emphasizing a divergence between the two ‘generations’, the very notion of 
generation implicitly presupposes some sort of ‘natural’ continuity.  
On the other hand, vertical gaps refer to differences among groups that operate in the same 
historical period. The present situation is paradigmatic in this regard. There are groups that 
are directly rooted in the pioneering experiences of 1960s and 1970s, groups which were born 
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afterwards but which assumed the spirit of that beginning and others that do not have 
anything to do with it. The spectrum includes sports clubs, youth projects, community 
policing fora, drug task forces, charities, movements campaigning for justice in urban 
regeneration, NGOs and so on.  
The use of the same name to designate such different ‘objects’ is obviously puzzling, but 
since activists like to refer to themselves indistinctively as ‘community developers’ or 
‘community activists’, seeming to be really attached to this nomination, it would be pointless 
to invent a new name for this ‘second generation’ - just for the sake of using it in my 
dissertation. Therefore, considering that ‘Community Development’ stands for a fuzzy 
assemblage of different types of experiences, it is worth to make clear that here I am focusing 
on what is normally referred to (inaccurately on my view) as ‘second generation CD’, with a 
particular emphasis on its urban, autonomous and political expression. 
A central aim of the first part (Chapters 2 and 3) of this thesis is therefore to theoretically and 
historically ‘define’ this object, which  in my view can not be taken for granted under the 
generic name of CD. I find this important not just for a matter of academic/historical 
accuracy, but also because central political issues are at stake here. On one hand I think it is 
important to emphasise the originality of these ‘experiments’ in poor people’s self-
organisation. Although this originality is hardly perceptible today (because it has been 
muddled by processes of normalisation, and because the current ideology strongly negates 
people’s independent capacity to self-organise) it constitutes a historical fact. Its study can 
benefit a much needed re-foundation of CD. On the other hand, to be critical (‘to discern’ in 
Greek) is central to the activity of researching. And contrarily to what advocates of 
‘researcher’s neutrality’ argue, to be critical is to take a position and break with ambiguity 
(see section 2.5 and Chapter 4), and this is something I should do in relation to CD. Finally, 
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the very notion of community, as I am about to illustrate, is ontologically linked to the State. 
The disentanglement of CD from the field of the state is a necessary condition for the solution 
of its crisis.   
2.1.1 The problematic concept of ‘community’ as source of misunderstanding regards the 
positioning of CD in relation to politics and the state 
 
An aspect that generates at the same time ambiguity, misunderstanding and consensus around 
CD as a form of organisation is the very notion of ‘community’. This word is quite 
fashionable nowadays. In recent years, according to Robson (2001:221), “it has acquired a 
profitable currency which, resulting from the frequency of its use, has effectively masked a 
discreet influence”. ‘Community’ seems to have a special significance to people in Ireland 
(Tovey & Share 2000:335) – much more than ‘society’ for example. Recently, Andreas Hess 
(2007:25) noticed that a quick Google search under the keywords ‘Ireland’ and ‘community’ 
numbers around 45,000,000 results, while ‘Ireland’ and ‘society’ just 23,300,000. Although 
results produced by a web browser can not be considered as representative of a country’s 
‘culture’ or linguistic preferences, the numeric disproportion between the two results is 
striking.  
In my view, in Ireland there is consensus around the idea of ‘community’ because it suits 
almost every type of discourse, ‘from the left to the right’. It is profusely used by the state, by 
policy makers, by the excluded, by minorities, by conservative people who see it as the 
cornerstone of social order and stability, by romantics who consider ‘community’ to be the 
antidote to modernity’s illnesses, by utopians who imagine emancipation as the constitution 
of a ‘community of equals’, and so on. Community is a word that given its apparent neutrality 
and the fact that everyone has its own idea of community can be applied to a broad variety of 
situations without hurting people’s feelings. Therefore it is legitimate to suspect that a 
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reference to ‘community’ can also be suitable to all those populist discourses that to some 
extent want to keep themselves in this ‘safety zone’ of consensus. As Hess (2007:11) 
highlights – “hardly a day passes without a politician, social scientist, or public intellectual 
referring or appealing to some sense of community”. 
Notions of community are definitely ambivalent. On one hand a sense of security, of 
‘belongingness’ and solidarity are essential for the existence, or for the ‘development’ of a 
‘community’. Communitarian rhetoric promotes the “return to an immediacy and unspoiled 
authenticity where there is no social distance between humans” (Hess 2007:17). However this 
is not always the case. For example, ‘security’ and ‘authenticity’ sometimes can only be 
achieved through the exclusion of others; “the ‘belongingness’ associated with solidarity may 
be constituted through the not-belonging of others; significance may actually signify the 
reproduction of unequal roles and relations (…), shared values amongst members of one 
group may result in the segregation of or even violence towards another (Shaw, 2007:28).  
In this sense ‘community’ also entails a nihilistic facet: “it is as if authentic community - 
highlights Zizek (2009) - is possible only in conditions of permanent threat, in a continuous 
state of emergency” (pp. 23). This is because the construction of a communitarian type of 
‘association’ involves also a certain degree of separation: community versus community. 
Moreover, a community cannot exist on its own, “one can always encounter, even in 
community based thinking, the vision of a larger entity, a public that either consists of other 
communities or a larger humanity” (Hess 2007:19). So each community is always in a need 
of something bigger than (or very different from) itself in order to make sense. This need 
makes the idea of a ‘cosmopolitan community’ absurd and the existence of each community 
paradoxical. Indeed, each community’s identity derives from an ‘act of faith’ to a precedent 
and external ‘truth’ (a sort of master, totem or a communal substance), which can not be 
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called into question. In this sense the notion of community (and its related practices) entails a 
primordial element, a sort of irrationality, which is difficult to rationalise. Of course this is 
not just a linguistic/conceptual problem. It has repercussions on the contexts to which the 
idea of community is articulated. 
Philosopher Alain Badiou has put new light on this concept. As I will illustrate below, In his 
ontological perspective the state is a communitarian ‘meta-structure’ where communities are 
‘parts’ or ‘subsets’ of the state; which he defines as the operation that prevents the break-up 
into pieces of the parts – i.e. the subsets of what is presented – interdicting disorder.  
In the light of this meaning of community I will ask, to what kind of community does the 
notion of CD refer? Is the objective of CD that of building or reinforcing communities in the 
sense of subsets of the state? 
2.2 Politics and the state: an ontological distinction  
 
A theoretical assumption of this thesis is that the categories of politics and the state should be 
considered as separate. On the one hands the state is not capable of genuine politics. It just 
produces what we may call “state-politics” (Badiou 2009; Holloway 2010; Neocosmos 2007), 
a type of activity that subdues politics to the objectivity of the state-of-the-situation (Badiou 
2007) and its management. 
One should notice that in the sociological tradition, politics and the state are usually viewed 
as virtually equivalent. In the perspectives of two founders of modern sociology such as Marx 
and Weber for example – beyond the obvious differences between their theories – the 
investigation of social stability and change is mainly based on the fact that there is no 
principle of distinction between politics and the state (Russo 2008). In the Marxist categories 
of “history of class struggle” and “revolution” politics and the state are indistinguishable: 
34 
 
they almost completely overlap. Weber is even more drastic; according to him politics is 
nothing more than the conquer and distribution of state power (Russo 2008). However a main 
concern in my thesis (and in the theoretical approach that informs it) is how to describe 
emancipatory and egalitarian politics (and the change it produces) starting from the 
heterogeneity of politics and the state. 
Indeed, despite these overlaps in the sociological tradition a basic difference should be 
stressed here. “Politics is intermittent, whereas the state, despite the incessant historical 
mutations of its particular forms [socialism, parliamentarianism, fascism, centralism, 
governance etc.], is a structural invariance” (Russo 2006:675). This point is fundamental. 
Politics, according to Alain Badiou (2005, 2007, 2008), has a sequential nature: it is not a 
permanent instance of society. In other words “there is no politics in general, only specific 
political sequences” (Lazarus quot. by Neocosmos 2009:287), which entail a starting and an 
ending point. On the contrary the state is constant; it is the ontological prerequisite of every 
historical-social situation. 
For being constantly exposed to its own exhaustion, i.e. not entailing any guarantee of a 
mechanical continuity (as normally the state, as a structural invariance, does), politics always 
needs to be sustained by certain subjective engagement and creativity; otherwise it tends to 
turn into state-politics and depoliticise. Moreover, during the gaps separating each sequence, 
politics almost needs to be reinvented from scratch. This is because, in this perspective, each 
political sequence is something unique and unrepeatable - and after one ends, many of its 
‘tools’ (such as forms of organization, analytical concepts, declarations and so on) become 
obsolete and ineffective.  
In other words, on the one hand the ‘normality’ and ‘stability’ of any type of state depend to 
certain extent by the absence or tight control of politics. On the other hand political 
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dynamism can only find expression “at a distance from the state” (Badiou 2008:650) – as 
something that can not be reduced to objective conditions.  
According to Badiou the state is a structural automatism functional to the preservation of a 
status. It is in its nature to prevent the development of ‘independent’ forms of organisation 
and subjectivity. This is because it conceives politics as “an exclusive sphere to which only 
authoritative sources have access, and in relation to which the public is very much on the 
Outside” (McAleavey 2012). For example parliamentarianism, through the electoral 
procedure, produces a class of ruling politicians who are provided by parties. This process 
transforms the “plural subjectivity of opinions on government into a functioning unity 
founded on consensus” (Neocosmos 2009: 289). The fundamental principle of 
parliamentarian politics is therefore not that ‘people independently think’ – i.e. that they 
dispose of the capacity to critically reflect and act upon the situation - but rather that they 
have opinions regarding the government (Lazarus quot. by Neocosmos 2009:288). 
Citizenship is thus relegated to a disempowering deadlock: “if ordinary citizens have no 
handle on state decision-making save the vote, it is hard to see what way forward there could 
be for an emancipatory politics” (Badiou 2008a:31). Indeed emancipatory politics is 
“independent” to the extent that it “is not an opinion or a consciousness [regards to what 
exist]; it is a thought which fixes new possibilities” (Badiou quot. by Neocosmos 2007:66) 
However, attempts to produce independent forms of politics, no matter how meaningful and 
pacific they are, tend to meet state repression. As the case of the 15M movement in Spain is 
currently showing (spring 2011), people’s attempts to institute permanent assemblies in 
public squares – claiming independent decisional power upon the situation – are being 
repeatedly targeted by police repression. This is because 15M is a movement that responds to 
a fundamental idea of independent politics: “that of the power possessed by those to whom 
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no particular motive determines that they should exercise power, that of the manifestation of 
an ability which is that of any one” (Ranciere 2012). However, politics is just admitted by the 
state as state-politics; as an activity that does not involve people’s thoughts and desires but 
just that they let themselves be represented within the domain of the state.  
Above I introduced the idea that the state structures reality according to a communitarian type 
of system. Let us now see more in detail what this means. 
2.2.1 The constitution of the state and the state's constitution of its objects  
 
The state-in-itself (beyond the specific forms it has assumed historically), “is an objectivity 
without norm. It is the principle of sovereignty, or coercion, functioning separately, essential 
for the collective as such” (Badiou 2005:83). The idea of separation is of a central 
importance to understand the way in which the state works. The state is separated to the 
extent that it does not entail a direct relation with or a correspondence to the situation, i.e. 
with the infinite elements that compose it. Instead there is a principle of mediation between 
every social situation and its state, consisting in a mechanism which is essentially 
representative. In this perspective the state is nothing but the distributive principle that 
regulates social life according to “communitarian predicates or predicates of subsets” (Badiou 
2005:83). Indeed it is typical of the State not to admit subjectivity, but to be oriented 
exclusively toward ‘parts’ or ‘communities’, towards the sub-grouping of individuals in 
infinite subsets of which it constitutes the principle of unification. Ranciere (2006) would 
describe this process as “distribution of the sensible”, meaning the distribution of places and 
functions amongst the various elements that compose the situation. This separation gives to 
the state a structural effect superpower with regard to the situation, i.e. to what is simply 
presented. Badiou’s (2007) theory of the state is the outcome of a philosophical elaboration 
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of Cantor’s4 set theory. Due to the mathematical complexity of this theory I will here 
introduce a simplified version of it, which might be visualised in Fig.1. After a technical 
introduction of this theory I will give a more illustrative explanation of Badiou’s approach. 
Fig 1.: the structured presentation α (Situation) and its metastructure β (the state of the 
situation). 
 
According to Badiou, if every situation (set α) is presentation of itself, of the people that 
compose it and of the elements that belong to it – every situation is also given as State (β), 
that is, as the internal configuration of the parts or subsets – therefore as re-presentation. The 
state (β) does not recognize the single elements as independent; but it just includes them as 
belonging to multiple sub-groups (or sub-categories).  
The authority of the State (β) over the simply presented situation (α) is based on the 
mathematical law that there are always more parts (subsets) than elements. This is to say that 
                                                          
4
 Georg Cantor 1845-1918 was a German mathematician, best known as the inventor of set theory, which has 
become a fundamental theory in mathematics. 
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the representative multiplicity of the state (β) is always of a higher power than the 
presentative multiplicity (α) of the situation. 
So, to do an example, the elements of the Irish national set can be grouped in the same way 
according to the subsets of tax payers, registered voters, employed workers, teachers, 
unemployed, single mothers, students, HIV positive people and so on. Of course then, an 
individual can belong to several of these subsets: for example one can be an unemployed, 
Dublin 1 born, single mother. These are all predications that the State uses to categorise 
individuals – to hierarchically dispose them in sub-groups - to include them or to exclude 
them (as illegal migrants, or asylum seekers for example). However, these predications do not 
say anything about the substantial complexity of any individual (say any single mother) as a 
living, thinking person. Badiou argues that also in situations where someone is called into 
question as an individual by the state, whatever the circumstance, “this individual is not 
counted as ‘him’ or ‘herself’, he is considered as a subset. (…) Not as Antonie Domblase – 
the proper name of an infinite multiple [a pure becoming] – but as {Antonie Domblase}, an 
indifferent figure of unicity constituted by the forming-into-one” (Badiou, 2007). 
Peter Hallward (2003:86) offers a useful visual illustration of how this Cantorean model 
works. Take a page of print: one can not say how many ‘objects’ there are on it. Unless he 
knows whether to count letters, words, sentences, lines, etc. The first necessary operation 
would be to specify the range of definitions (subsets) distinguishing letters, words, sentences 
and lines, before counting the elements that fall under each definition – say the number of 
words beginning with a, the number with e, the number with 3 letters and so on. An 
extensional approach would accept the validity of any sort of “combinatorial” approach to 
collection, no matter how arbitrary it is. In this case the page would be the operation of 
making one of an infinite amount of subsets. Likewise the State follows the logic of a 
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‘superpower’ which is infinitely superior to the situations as infinitely superior is the number 
of subsets over elements. The defining condition of the State is therefore to exert power pure 
and simple through this arbitrary grouping, not only over those individuals who fall under its 
jurisdiction (under its counting into parts), but even and especially over those outsiders who 
do not (for example illegal migrants).  
As Hallward (2003) highlights, a set theoretic ontology of the state confirms as a fundamental 
law of being a central insight of the Marxist analysis of the state: the state business relates not 
to individuals per se (the elements) but rather to groups or classes of individuals (ibid. p96). 
So the Marxist assumption that “the state is always the state of the ruling class” means that it 
represents or arranges the existing elements of the situation in such a way as to reinforce the 
position of its dominant parts; independently from the qualitative attributes of these parts 
(ibid. p96).  
The state does not present things, nor does it merely copy their presentation but instead, 
through an entirely new counting operation it re-presents them in a way that groups them in 
relatively fixed, clearly identifiable categories (Badiou 2007). These categories constitute the 
criteria according to which the state recognises individuals.  
It could be argued that this mechanism of distribution works as a sort of multiculturalism – 
“one of the offshoots of human rights discourse today” (Neocosmos 2007:55), which was so 
smoothly taken over as an ideology and a form of organisation by western societies. Zizek 
(199:216) defines multiculturalism as a “racism with a distance” to the extent that it promotes 
‘respect’ for “the Other’s identity, conceiving the other as a self-enclosed ‘authentic’ 
community towards which the multiculturalist [state, or intellectual] maintains a distance 
made possible by his/her privileged universal position” (ibid. p216). Moreover, through its 
celebration and reproduction of cultural/communitarian authenticities and differences, 
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multiculturalism has the capacity to articulate (and thus depoliticise) any social issue as a 
simple matter of identitarian and symbolic (cultural, linguistic etc.) confrontation and 
negotiation between subgroups or communities. This is precisely what happened in Northern 
Ireland where universal political issues raised by the civil rights movement (issues that could 
concern both the catholic and protestant ‘communities’) have been articulated in terms of 
identitarian/ethnic conflict- where politics is overshadowed in favour of technocratic 
management.   
In Neocosmos’ (2007:40) view, “the state systematically evacuates politics from state life in 
favour of technique (…) it systematically transforms a pre-existing emancipatory politics into 
a technical process to be run by professionals (planners, economists, lawyers, judges, 
administrators, etc.) under its ambit within bureaucratic structures and subjectivities”. A 
research hypothesis put forward by some young scholars I have been discussing with recently 
is that 1960s Northern Irish political movements depoliticised for they did not manage to 
keep a political distance in relation to the state and so they ended up reproducing the 
(multiculturalist) categories imposed to them by the system.  
What Badiou (2007) aims to illustrate through this set –theoretical approach is that the state 
does not deal with individuals as subjects who are capable to think, but only as members of 
specific communities or subgroups which are somehow included in its count of the parts. 
This means that the state is not organised on the basis of the principle of equality – according 
to which each individual should be counted as one. For example, in a public debate on the 
new migration bill recently organised in Dublin (27/10/2010) by a group of students, Luke (, 
a young Dublin based African activist, describing its relation with the Irish State argued that 
“instead of dealing with people, it deals with categories”; meaning that the state just accepts 
to dialogue with him and his colleagues under the condition that they speak as members or 
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leaders of a specific subgroup or community. For being a ‘migrant’, Luke is not supposed to 
be speaking as an independent citizen, but just as a member, or a spoke person of the 
Zimbabwean or African community in Dublin. Thus he is considered from the deterministic 
point of view of his supposed cultural/communitarian belonging, that is to say from an 
element that is precedent and external to him. It is just from that identitarian point of view 
that Luke’s words are taken into consideration by the state.  
A similar example has to do with the “Surprise Conference” which was recently organized by 
a group of independent NCAD5 students and hold as a form of protest in the garden adjacent 
to the Department of Education in Dublin. Their demand to be admitted into the department 
in order to talk with the minister was declined by her arguing that she would just negotiate 
with officially elected representatives of the student body, i.e. the Student Union. This, again, 
is an example of how the state does not recognise ‘independent subjectivities’ as its 
interlocutors; it does not deal with people’s thought, but it just deals with representatives of 
recognised categories or subgroups (students in this case). It is in this sense that unions (no 
matter how ‘radical’ they are) might be considered as being apparatuses of the state. They 
depoliticise workers’ (students’) politics by taking it away from their control and translating 
it in partial claims to be articulated and managed within the terrain of representation, i.e. of 
the state. 
Genuine politics is the opposite. It exists only in the claims and  actions of those who have no 
‘place’, no justification. Thus according to Neocosmos (2009:284) “emancipatory politics is 
universal and not linked to any specific interest, it is 'for all' never 'for some'”. It is in this 
sense that for Badiou emancipatory politics does not ‘represent’ anybody: “Politics begins 
when one decides not to represent victims (...) but to be faithful to those events during which 
                                                          
5
 The National College of Art and Design is located in Dublin. I was present at the event, that  took place the 
1/12/2011. Some might be found at the following link http://wsm.ie/c/students-occupy-department-education-
surprise-conference  
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victims politically assert themselves (...) Politics in no way represents the proletariat, class or 
nation (...) it is not a question of whether something which exists may be represented. Rather 
it concerns that through which something comes to exist which nothing represents, and which 
purely and simply presents its own existence” (Badiou, quot. by Neocosmos 2007:64). 
It is essential to repeat and clarify that by talking of the state and the (anti)politics it 
establishes, we include ‘civil society’ which, even in the apparently oppositional roles it 
might assumes, is part of what is counted.  Discussions with grassroots activists (and what 
CD activist have to say about this matter is particularly significant) help us to understand how 
civil society organisations often end up playing a key role in depoliticising conflicts by 
jumping in with ‘capacity building’ and ‘education’ interventions that are designed not 
primarily to strengthen the oppressed in their own struggles but to bring them into order and 
to play according the rules and expectations of the dominant order by teaching them to be 
better 'stakeholders' (Butler & Ntseng 2008). A community activist (quot. by Butler & Ntseng 
2008) from the Eastern Cape NGO Coalition argues: “having observed social formations and 
their politics, I have this question to ask: Why is it that every time the Poor come together, 
NGOs and Leftists jump in and take over?  In their conventional praxis they provide capacity 
building. Whereas my observation is that capacity building demobilises people, it takes them 
away from their original agenda”.  
At the end of the day NGOs and civil society in general “are not only funded by government, 
but operate on the basis of the same subjectivity and technicism, and in fact precisely 
undertake state functions (Neocosmos 2009: 270). They defuse political anger and dole out as 
aid or benevolence what people ought to have by right. They alter the public psyche. They 
turn people into dependent victims and blunt the edges of political resistance...It’s almost as 
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though the greater the devastation caused by neo-liberalism, the greater the outbreak of 
NGOs” (Roy quot. by Neocosmos 2009:273). 
As a last example of this idea, think about how all over the world the ethnic/communitarian 
notion of ‘immigrant’ “has in fact served, in a consensual manner, first to conceal and then to 
drive out the [universal] word ‘worker’ from the space of political representations” (Badiou 
2005:121). This brought to a further fragmentation in labour (which made it more 
manageable) and frequently to ‘ethnic conflicts’ between workers, such as those that in 2009 
took place in Britain where workers strike in protest at the use of migrant (Italian in that case) 
labour. Protests caught by surprise up to 17 refineries and power plants all over the country. 
Many placards directed their fury at Prime Minister Gordon Brown, who at the Labour party 
conference in September 2007 had promised: “This is our vision: Britain leading the global 
economy . . . drawing on the talents of all to create British jobs for British workers”. The 
saying ‘to govern is to divide’ certainly seemed pertinent as in this case.  
Politics, when it exists, presents itself as a rupture with representative/ distributive 
procedures. It does not consist in the plurality of the opinions and (communitarian/cultural) 
points of view, but in the prescription of the possibility of a rupture with what there is, i.e. the 
hierarchical and communitarian distribution of places and functions. “The fiction of political 
representation, in pretending to advance the interests of others, must therefore be swept aside 
in order to make way for the reality of political processes, for it is only then that a singular 
political sequence can begin to take shape. Political unbinding is therefore the creative act 
whereby subjects, in renouncing any outside interest (…), break with routine and begin to 
empower themselves as collectives. (Badiou 2005:xxiii)” 
In other words, ontologically, if the state-in-itself is nothing else than the distributive 
principle that regulates social life according to “communitarian predicates or predicates of 
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subsets”, as I will illustrate below, unlike and against the state, egalitarian politics is what 
interrupts this distribution in terms of deterministic categories, hierarchy, social status and so 
on. Notions such as “‘Immigrant’, ‘French’, ‘Arab’ and ‘Jew’ cannot be political words lest 
there be disastrous consequences. For these words, and many others, necessarily relate 
politics to the State, and the State itself to its lowest and most essential of functions: the non-
egalitarian inventory [décompte] of human beings” (Badiou 2005:94). 
Now, does CD means to build or to reinforce communities in the sense of subsets of the 
state?  
As I will illustrate in the historical section (Chapter 3) of this thesis, although most of 
literature analyses CD from the point of view of the state, as if it was part and parcel of state 
processes, this is just a partial truth. Today community development definitely refers to 
something nebulous, state-dependent and fairly depoliticised; something that is fragmented, 
specialised, professionalized and bureaucratised. However things have not always been like 
that, or at least not for everybody. For now, based on the theoretical perspective outlined in 
this chapter, we can advance the idea that the ambiguity in which CD is currently prisoner is 
nothing less than a lack of separation in its praxis and thought between politics and the state. 
This lack is depoliticising. However, it is not possible to resolve this ambiguity with a 
(Hegelian) dialectical synthesis, for the fact that politics and the state are not two faces of the 
same coin. The hypothesis that I will advance in this thesis is that to overcome this impasse a 
sort of recommencement is necessary.  
2.2.2 A politics of emancipation/resistance at a distance from the state 
 
As we have seen, according to a set-theoretical perspective, the state is basically the endless 
management of the differences of the subsets of what is presented in a situation – it is the 
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infinite ‘communitarian’ distribution of places and functions. If this counting of 
communitarian differences constitutes the objectivity of the state-of-the-situation, in what 
does a politics at a distance from the state consists? In the following pages I will argue that 
such a politics should be (1) egalitarian and therefore (2) it should not follow the agenda of 
the state.  
(1) Politics at a distance from the state transcends communitarian and cultural 
differentiations; it transcends all those identitarian connotations that are pre-existent to each 
individual.  As Badiou (2001:25) says, “the whole ethical predication based upon recognition 
of the other must be purely and simply abandoned. For the real question - and it is an 
extraordinarily difficult one — is much more that of recognising the Same”. Sameness, more 
than difference, is therefore a concept to which egalitarian politics should be oriented. 
Politics – to put it in Ranciere’s terms - , consists of a set of practices guided by the 
supposition that everyone is equal and by the attempt to verify this supposition (Ranciere 
1992:58).  
By addressing the category of ‘equality’ one should recognise that nowadays it is somewhat 
obscure, its positive values being nevertheless uncertain. The idea of equality carries with 
itself the discredit of a bureaucratic and disciplinary vision which has been imposed during 
the 20th century assuming two different –frequently opposed – facets.  In the first version, 
deriving from the socialist tradition, equality has represented the obligation to be ‘the same as 
the others’, a kind of disciplinary standard to which every citizen had to adapt. In the second 
version, deriving from a liberal/ social-democratic tradition, ‘equality’ has represented the 
‘starting line’ on which individuals had to be brought into alignment, in order to be able to 
‘equally’ participate to the big existential ‘race’, which only ‘the best’ could win. 
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It is time however to subtract this notion from its bureaucratic, substantive and identitarian 
articulations, which condemned it historically. As a maxim for political action, equality 
should thus not be linked to any form of particularity or difference, but it should intervene in 
any circumstance in which difference is formulated as domination or discrimination. In this 
perspective ‘difference’ is not a political matter but the ordinary stuff of human life (Power & 
Toscano 2009:42), it is something internal to individual subjectivity itself, to its continuous, 
inevitable becoming other, to its being excessive to all forms of categorisation. As Badiou 
puts it with philosophical precision “there are as many differences, say, between a Chinese 
peasant and a young Norwegian professional as between myself and anybody at all, including 
myself” (Badiou 2001:25-26). As I said, categorisation - the unequal counting of people 
based on identitarian attributes - is a state procedure. In opposition to it, politics needs to 
propose the idea that ‘sameness’ is also possible — the sameness of a political project, a 
shared commitment to a political goal outside historical constraints such as tradition, or 
national, cultural, racial, ethnic, religious or corporate bonds. The fact that people do this or 
that, that they come from here or anywhere else, that they speak this or another language, 
whatever their ‘culture’, are elements that do not prevent them to participate together to an 
egalitarian political process.  
(2) Speaking about egalitarian politics, I argued that it is just possible with a certain degree of 
autonomy. To be – as Badiou (2008:650) puts it - “at a distance from the state” means that a 
politics follows the rule of equality not being structured or polarized along the agenda and 
timelines fixed by the state. “Those dates, for example, when the state decides to call an 
election, or to intervene in some conflict, declare war on another state. Or when the state 
claims that an economic crisis makes this or that course of action impossible” (Badiou 
2008:650). These are all examples of what Badiou calls “convocations by the state”, i.e. 
where the state sets the agenda and controls the timing of political events. “Distance from the 
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state” means that a political procedure develops following its own references, independently 
from what the state deems to be important or not. “This distance protects political practices 
from being oriented, structured, and polarized by the state” (ibid. p650); ‘the state’ being 
understood in the broad sense that I introduced previously. 
This ‘distance’ is a crucial point to be taken in consideration when researching political 
organizations such as CD. Indeed the degree to which they ‘distance’ themselves from the 
state is indicative of their level of politicisation. Deprived of their distance from the State – 
political organisations tend to be absorbed into state dynamics. As I will elaborate in chapters 
5 and 6 a symptom of the lack of independence that CD is currently experiencing is the fact 
that after it has been affected by cuts it was just able to represent its own crisis in economic 
terms. However, in my view, the problem is not just to react to adverse state policies, but to 
produce powerful collective processes irreducible to any form of bureaucratic management. 
At least, this is how CD projects started to operate in the inner city of Dublin four decades 
ago.  
Lack of distance from the state does not just concern CD. It is a problem affecting many 
collective experiences at present. There are many other examples of movements that show a 
lack of ability to maintain this distance and end up polarising “along the agenda and timelines 
fixed by the state” attributing (more or less consciously) a central symbolic value to it. Think 
for instance about the recent student protests in Ireland (2010), whose content could not get 
beyond a condemnation of the cuts, and whose main expression was a sit-in staged in front of 
the Department of Finance, which was violently removed by the police. Or think about the 
protests organised by the unions against the cuts and the ‘right to work’ campaign.  Their 
weekly marching to the Dail had more or less similar outcomes to the students’ mobilisations 
(although with a lower attendance).  
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But also think about big international protests against the G8 or other world elites’ meetings, 
which from the 1990s have become theatre of demonstrations, riots, militarised cities, thrilled 
expectation of the event, ritualisation and so on. Central to these initiatives are the state and 
its power, which convoke people in their ‘domain’ imposing them to follow their agenda. To 
be clear, in each of these cases people’s indignation is legitimate. The courage and 
commitment of students, workers and activists should be honoured. And the state is 
nevertheless something that politics necessarily needs to deal with. However, this does not 
mean that politics should be submitted to a state agenda that dictates timing and modality of 
political events.  
At the end of the day the examples I just mentioned constitute attempts to hit state power at 
its ‘heart’ (the Dail, the Department of Finance the G8). However, this approach is bound to 
failure because as Umberto Eco argues, the State has no heart. Rather, the problem is to 
generate a collective ‘hearts’ and ‘thoughts’, which are subtracted from the “cold monster’s” 
(Foucault 2005) anesthetising power. 
This alignment with the state is a symptom of political weakness. Why instead of going to the 
Department of Finance – the economic heart of the state – students do not attempt to organise 
in a more decentred way inside their faculties, trying to generate more consistent and long 
lasting processes?  
‘Negation’6 – activists argued in the seventies, a phase that was much more turbulent than the 
present – should always be submitted to the movement’s positivity (Tiqqun 2003); meaning 
that to build one’s own independent politics should always be of a bigger concern to activists 
than organising ‘against’ something (the state, capital etc.). Badiou (2008) developed this 
same idea. According to him there is a need to search for “a new formulation of the problem 
                                                          
6
 Overt antagonism, clash with state and capital. 
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of critique and negation. (…) It is necessary (…) to go beyond the concept of a negation 
taken solely in its destructive and properly negative aspect. Contrary to Hegel, for whom the 
negation of the negation produces a new affirmation, I think we most assert that today 
negativity, properly speaking does not create anything new (…) it does not give rise to a new 
creation”. On the contrary, “the point where an instance of thought subtracts itself from the 
State, inscribing this subtraction into being, constitutes the real of a politics. And a political 
organisation has no other goal than to ‘hold onto the gained step that is to provide a body for 
that thought” (pp. 652).  
The reason why I consider CD (see Chapter 3) to be such an original experience is certainly 
for the subtractive7 capacity that this movement has shown -especially in the initial phases of 
its existence. Its distance from the state allowed CD to generate political positivity irreducible 
to negation – i.e. irreducible to the clash with the state. CD’s capacity to create forms of 
alternative institutionality (Chapter 5) is a significant expression of this instance.  
2.3 The 1960s, the invention of a new politics and CD. 
In the first part of this section I have analysed how the state, as a principle of sovereignty and 
coercion, simply constitutes the operation that prevents the break-up into pieces of the parts – 
i.e. the subsets of what is presented – interdicting disorder. I have also made clear that this 
principle is typical of the state in itself and therefore valid independently from the fact that it 
might be organised in a socialist or a parliamentarian way  – also independently from the fact 
that it might be ruled by one or more parties. I have also anticipated how since old tools and 
concepts of emancipatory politics (Socialism, nationalism, NLS, social democracy) became 
ossified in their overlapping with the state, the formulation of new concepts for a politics at a 
distance from the state and the detection of new forms of political subjectivity (or just their 
                                                          
7
 Subtraction is “a negation, but it cannot be identified with the properly destructive part of negation (…) what 
subtraction does is bring about a point of autonomy. 
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possibility) are tasks that urgently need to be undertaken. The problem of the “reinvention” of 
politics regards CD closely. As I have anticipated, a first political recommendation is that 
community groups which are interested in their renovation look back to their ‘roots’ in order 
to get some inspiration – rediscovering the spirit that at the time allowed them to break with 
an old (statified) conception of politics. In this section I will explore some of the political 
novelties which were introduced during the 1960s and 1970s on a worldwide scale and I will 
theoretically justify why I think that CD might be considered part of that historical rupture. 
A problem that I see as having been central to the events shaping the 1960s and 1970s on a 
world wide scale is that of the supposed emancipatory capacities of the state - which is tightly 
related to the problem of the seizure of power. Whereas before the 60s, 20th century’s 
politics were permeated by the conviction that progress consisted in organising collectively 
with the aim to seize and control the state - this was the case, “irrespective of whether the 
victory is insurrectional or electoral: the mental schema is the same” (Badiou 2008a:182) -  
the biggest discovery or invention of the 60s consisted in the possibility of a collective, 
independent politics, which is not properly aimed to the conquer of the state and its power, 
and which is not just organised around state political categories (state-politics). As I 
emphasised previously ‘the state’ here is not “conceived of as reduced to the government and 
its repressive and administrative institutions (police, army, justice)” (Balso 2010:28). It is 
rather conceived as state-of-the-situation (in Badiou’s sense), as something that “creates 
many different modes of organising people: parties, trade unions, associations, the media, 
votes, elections, public opinion” (pp. 28) and so on. 
Central to this discovery was certainly the fact that the experience of socialist states had 
shown for some time that far from withering away, state power continued, despite assuming a 
different form. The Communist Parties, which had been conceived as machines of liberation 
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from oppression became themselves bureaucratic apparatuses for state stability. Indeed whilst 
calling themselves socialist, states and related parties “hugely corrupted political will and 
subjectivity. In other words it [the socialist party/state] was not at all a neutral political space, 
nor was it easily neutralized, nor was it simply a space that one could take over with 
impunity. On the contrary, it increasingly appeared as the site specifically of a state politics, 
determined by its own normative principles, rules and values which were quite heterogeneous 
to the hypothetical assumption that it would wither away” (Balso 2010:27). 
Likewise, in many countries which had been liberated by popular movements from the 
occupation of colonial powers, the hope that the new state would provide more egalitarian 
life conditions for its people quickly revealed itself vain. In many post-colonial African 
countries, for example, analogous colonial practices were continued by the new state and this 
was justified by the need to overcome economic dependence. “The same coercive and 
exclusive politics against the working people were now justified in terms of building a nation. 
In very few cases were attempts made to free and encourage the creative possibilities inherent 
in the people. Not only did the state dominate development, it did so by subsuming popular-
national interests to western ones and thus reproducing neo-colonial structures and practices” 
(Neocosmos 2007:39). This reflected to certain extent the experience of the Republic of 
Ireland, where part of the colonial ‘machinery’ was taken over by the new independent state.   
So in socialist and post-colonial (and post-revolutionary) countries it became evident that the 
tendency of the state is to maintain inequalities in the name of national wealth, whatever the 
price to be paid for it. In this process the independent ‘creativity’ and organisational capacity 
of the people is suppressed in favour of bureaucratic logics. “The Stalinist party-state and the 
democratic state parties” argues Balso (2010:25) “are proof of the fact that party fuses with 
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state, and politics grows corrupt and criminal when it fuses with the state”. It was such 
context that 1960s’ movement rebelled on a worldwide scale.  
Obviously, the concrete contexts in which movements developed were heterogeneous, and 
the spectrum of issues at stake very broad. However, it is possible to argue that at the end of 
the day the content of the struggles and central political issues were analogous everywhere. 
For example, in China, given the mounting bureaucratisation and elitism shaping the ruling 
party-state, a ‘Cultural Revolution’ (from 1966) sparked with a myriad of independent 
political groups developing outside a Communist Party-State which could no longer be 
considered as the ‘vanguard’ of emancipatory politics. Self-organised workers and students 
(Red Guards) produced very original political experimentations destabilising party centralism 
for some years. 
In a similar fashion, the singularity of French May ‘1968 “was that it separated and 
distinguished workers and Communist Party, workers and trade unionism, and opened up the 
question of the [independent] political capacity of the workers” (Balso 2010:22). A capacity 
that was no longer possible to submit to the representation of official mass organisations 
(parties, unions), which finally played a defensive and reactionary role during the course of 
the events. This was evident in the way in which unions, in the name of the ‘working class 
unity’, made a huge effort in order to keep workers separated from students.  
In a similar fashion, with their slogan ‘the personal is political’ feminist organisations from 
all around the world unmasked mechanisms of oppression towards women, which official 
politics and the ‘patriarchal’ state tended to hide or to consider to be out of their jurisdiction 
and part of the ‘private’ sphere. 
In Northern Ireland civil right movements developed in the folds and outside the Republican 
movement, building alliances with the struggles of ordinary people and developing a though 
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critique of sectarianism and militaristic approaches. A similar process took place in the Irish 
Republic where, as I will illustrate in the next chapter, community organisations were created 
as a fresh arena for political activity, which did not reproduce the centralized management of 
the state, but offered unprecedented opportunities for spontaneous and independent action by 
poor people outside the frequently ‘elitist’ and representative field of republican and socialist 
party politics. 
Although these processes taking place on a worldwide scale were frequently articulated 
according to conventional political categories (as for example class, party, proletariat, nation 
etc.), they evidently constituted a rupture with them. They constituted the ‘demonstration’ of 
a new political capacity irreducible to state-politics. This brought to an end an epoch of 
quiescent political culture, and opened the possibility for a brand new conception of politics - 
which was not yet formally elaborated in a new collective approach, but which is reflected in 
many experimentations that took place between the 1960s and nowadays and of which CD is 
(was?) a pertinent example. The ‘incompleteness’ of the rupture with the ‘old’ and the advent 
of the ‘new’ is in my view the principal cause of the present impasse.  
Theoretically speaking, from about the 1960s a for long hegemonic conception of politics, 
according to which there is an ‘historical objective agent’ that carries the possibility for 
emancipation and that therefore just needs to be organised and synthesised by mass 
organisations  has progressively declined. The ‘working-class’, the ‘proletariat’, the ‘people’ 
can no longer be considered as being ‘subjects of history’, and neither can be new surrogates 
of class such as “the multitude” (Hardt & Negri 2004). Those new movements can not be 
conceptualized as the result of conflict between ‘classes’ or specific social groups, or of the 
pressure of ‘new productive forces’ on the background of old ‘relations of production’. They 
are not the outcome of ‘historical’ development – in a Marxist sense. “In fact there is no 
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subject of history, so much should be clear from the failure of the statist emancipatory 
experiments of the twentieth century. To think an emancipatory politics without thinking a 
historical subject is precisely what social theory must help us to achieve today” (Neocosmos 
2009:266). 
* 
In this chapter I have theoretically disentangled the categories of politics and the state, whose 
separation is not always taken for granted in social sciences. I also illustrated how a distance 
from the state - expressed as a rupture with the main categories (above all the ‘party’) of 20th 
century politics - has been central to the most significant 1960s and 1970s political 
movements on a global scale. In the following section I will focus on CD organisations, 
illustrating the concrete conditions under which their existence became possible in Dublin, 
and giving an account of how this initiatives have evolved along the decades, until nowadays.  
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3. THE POLITICS OF CD. A HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
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The argument that I will stress throughout this chapter is that between the end of the 1960s 
and the beginning of the 1970s, under the generic aegis of “Community Development”, the 
Dublin inner city subaltern struggles raised implicit and explicit political questions which 
differed substantially from those previously raised by the ‘traditional’ republican and socialist 
left. These questions concerned daily life issues confronted by ordinary people, and 
developed in unprecedented forms of political organisation, which, for not being concerned 
with entering the domain of state power, positioned themselves at a subjective distance from 
it. This distance from the state allowed them to continuously re-invent original forms of 
collective action in popular areas of Dublin. CD did not develop as the continuation of an 
existing project or trend, but developed in the context of an historical rupture with previous 
modes of political thought and organisation. 
During the last decades, however, this independence has being challenged leading to the 
present crisis that, despite what is usually thought, goes beyond economic factors. As I will 
illustrate, the depoliticisation of Community Development – as that of many other 
organisations and political projects that emerged internationally between 1960s and 1970s - 
consisted in the adjustment to a form correlated to that of the state (statification). On one 
hand this can be explained by the fact that CD projects ended up being ‘co-opted’ into 
governmental schemes which required from them a reconfiguration under a bureaucratic 
structure of management, expertise and service delivery. The state, I will argue, being 
concerned about the threat that these independent organisations constituted to its own 
stability, has attempted to bureaucratically incorporate and normalise them. On the other 
hand, however, a more ‘subjective’ analysis reveals the failure of CD groups to develop a 
serious self-critical consciousness, especially on what concerns their relation to society and to 
power structures as well as their ideological positioning in a broader (international) political 
landscape.  
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Nevertheless the prevailing of an emphasis on state-related concerns, concepts, and modes of 
organization8, as well as the declining of the original intellectual and political independence 
from the bureaucratic apparatus has progressively led to the present, paradoxical situation in 
which the taking away of state funds -officially justified by the financial crisis- is experienced 
by many CD groups as their death knell.  
As I said, in this chapter I will attempt a reconstruction of the historical unfolding of CD. 
However, one should be aware that in the multiplicity of experiences that go under this name 
the relationship between spontaneity and formal organisation, intuition and realisation had 
never a linear and logical progression. This lack of linearity affects the way in which one 
might situates events and processes in a unitary and consistent historical framework. My 
work here will not consist in giving an account of every single experience in the realm of CD, 
but to try and situate key sequences in a broad historical frame. 
I’ll start (3.1) by illustrating how dissatisfaction with representative and centralist forms of 
organisation affected the republican movement leading to the famous split between 
Provisional and Official IRA in 1969. Many activists felt the need to re-conceive organisation 
as something organic to ordinary people’s struggles, like those that in Dublin were taking 
place around the housing issue. I will then (3.2) discuss how, out of that shift the Dublin 
Housing Action Committee (DHAC) came up, an organisation that I describe as a 
quintessential post-party political formation, not interested in conquering state-power and 
aimed to link and organise people living in inadequate accommodation to squat vacant 
property, and to resist evictions. Along the line of the DHAC (which had a quite short life) 
                                                          
8
 The fact that we refer to community development as a “sector” is significant in this sense. One of the key 
features of the recent framework is the conversion of these large, unruly and challenging social movements into 
"sectors" (of the state) defined by policy, funding streams and institutional relationships. The 1970s and even 
the 1980s in Ireland saw a broader, sometimes chaotic but nevertheless fertile relationship between movements 
whose issues often ranged very widely. As we have become "sectoralised" we have lost track of what's 
happened to each other, and let the state define who and what we are – grumbling about it, but accepting the 
basic fact and trying to push our own organisational agenda – the small version – within their structures as best 
we can. 
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many other groups started mobilising around issues related to housing, education, health, 
informal labour and so on, opening the social/political space where CD started then to grow 
(3.3). Here I will analyse CD’s approach – also through the information that I collected by 
interviewing activists who have been involved since the 1960s – as a form of politics that 
springs from real situations; from what ordinary people can think, say and do in these 
situations. In the last part of this chapter I will illustrate how as long as those creative 
political energies have weakened almost to the point of exhaustion, the organisational forms 
that they had generated and sustained entered into a crisis. Indeed from about the 1980s CD 
projects began to be rearticulated and ‘depoliticised’ under a bureaucratic framework of 
funding streams, technocratic management, expertise and service delivery (3.4). The phase 
known as partnership governance has been the peak of this process of independency loss. It 
took to the present situation where the destiny of CD is undecipherable. 
3.1 Re-orientation of republican/socialist politics towards ordinary people’s concerns  
 
Community Development, as we normally intend this notion nowadays (i.e. self-activated 
local groups informed by a social justice and egalitarian ethos), emerged in the 1960s as a 
mode of independent political organisation inspired by the civil rights movement (Rolston 
1980), and more generally by the new political atmosphere characterising the second half of 
that decade. This means that CD in Ireland – contrary to what most literature gives to 
understand, and despite its name - did not develop as the continuation of an existing project 
or trend, but developed in the context of an historical rupture with previous modes of political 
thought and organisation. Indeed during the decade of 1960, workers’, students’ and ordinary 
people’s movements introduced powerful political transformations which affected societies 
on a worldwide scale. According to several authors (Badiou & Pozzana 2005; Wang 2006; 
Russo 2005), these events put into question the 20th Century’s entire political framework, 
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particularly challenging its representative nature. As I have reharsed in Chapter 2, a core 
feature of 1960s’ and 1970s’ movements was that they emerged outside a ‘traditional’ party 
type of framework, opposing the bureaucratisation affecting centralised political 
organisations and advocating people’s autonomous capacity to emancipate themselves. ‘No 
one can emancipate people on their behalf’ was a grounding assumption of social movements 
from the Chinese Cultural Revolution onwards. 
CD developed in this break with a representative, centralised conception of politics. Indeed, 
like in many other parts of the world in this decade also in Ireland there was a new radical 
mood expressed through social agitation, which brought dramatic splits and unexpected 
twists in existing political movements9. Influenced by crucial events taking place in various 
parts of the globe, activists’ perception was that very soon things would have changed 
profoundly and hopefully for the better. “There was a real sense”, as republican activist Tony 
Heffernan (quot. by Hanley & Millar 2009:95) remembers, “that we were on the verge of a 
sort of very profound change all over the world. With the arrogance and confidence that only 
18-years-olds can have, we were sure we were on the verge of revolution”. The Republican 
movement for instance, after the period of deadlock that followed the unsuccessful Border 
Campaign (1956 – 1962), recovered some of its lost political vigour by drastically redefining 
its approach. Source of inspiration for this change were ideas and desires that in the 1960s 
were inspiring workers and students in Europe and China, national liberation movements in 
Africa and Vietnam, civil rights movements in the U.S., revolutionary movements in Cuba, 
and so on. More concretely, the IRA shifted its emphasis from military/clandestine struggle 
to a more ‘genuine’ political approach, aimed to develop its action as openly as possible.  
                                                          
9
 This effervescence was facilitated by the fact that, as Acheson et al. (2004:85) observe, the 1960s were 
characterised by a decrease in emigration, with the consequence that social issues and conflicts were more likely 
to be addressed by younger generations at home, rather than abroad. 
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The failure of the border campaign had illustrated to leaders such as Cathal Goulding, 
Seamus Costello and Roy Johnston the “inability of the IRA to achieve its aims solely 
through the force of arms” (Hanley & Millar 2009:28). They had come to feel that the 
movement’s approach had been elitist, “its attitude towards the mass of people being that [in 
Goulding’s own words] ‘we didn’t care what these bastards want, we knew what is good for 
them’. Contrary to that attitude, they had come to the conclusion that “the demand for 
revolution should come from the people, not from a number of people sitting in a back 
room.” (ibid. p28).  
In my view this shift was central because it inaugurated a phase of critique and disaffection 
with the representative and centralist approach that the organisation had adopted up to that 
stage. On the other hand, this change of perspective fully situated (a part of) the Republican 
movement in what I should call a ‘1968’ type of disposition. For example by 1964, Roy 
Johnston, IRA director of education, was impressed by the example of Cuba where a broad 
based movement, urban as well as rural had ‘upstaged’ a narrow Moscow line Communist 
Party and carried through a popular revolution (article in united Irishman October 1964 - in 
Hanley & Millar 2009:38). In a similar fashion, Tony Gregory (1979) once said about his 
mentor (republican activist Seamus Costello) that during the 1960s he had come to realise 
that the challenge of emancipation “would not be won by a small though gallant band 
divorced from the vital social issues of the day (…). To make progress from military failure 
and disillusionment, it was necessary to involve the movement in the issues that affected the 
mass of the people, civil rights in the North and social equality in the entire country. To build 
that movement was their new task, their way forward”. And this would happen not just by 
“preaching theory”, argued Tony Gregory, but by organising “tenants associations, housing 
action committees, community pressure groups and so on (Gregory, 1979).  
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Also significant is the fact that during 1967 the United Irishman (Republican movement’s 
journal) had begun to take a more upfront line on the Vietnam War, having previously called 
for negotiations (Hanley & Millar 2009:95). To the point that in a document titled “Ireland 
Today” Roy Johnston argued that agitation in Ireland had to be kept up and the republicans 
had to become the driving force for a national liberation front – the same title used by 
Vietnamese revolutionaries (ibid. p116).  
Finally, in January 1969 the IRA outlined its policy in a major statement (ibid. p116) 
explaining that it was “no longer an elitist force divorced from the struggles of the people but 
a revolutionary army, whose role was to assist the people in what is THEIR liberation 
struggle”. The word “their” was deliberately written in capital letters so to emphasize the fact 
that the organisation had stopped seeing ‘the people’ as an abstract category that political 
organisation had to represent and act for, but as subjects which had to be protagonist of their 
own emancipation. Republicans rejected to be a force to certain extent ‘separated’ from the 
rest of society, and started articulating their existence to concrete processes which were close 
and real to the people: struggle for (the working class, the people, the nation etc.) suddenly 
turned into struggle with.  
Also typical of a ‘1968 disposition’ is the idea that (industrial) labour is not the only possible 
place where political struggle can be organised. New political organisations can always 
emerge out of social conflicts and contradictions. And this especially occurs in ‘hybrid’ 
situations, when people are not kept in their own place.  As Badiou says referring to his own 
experience of 1968 “we realized, without really understanding it, that if a new emancipatory 
politics was possible, it would turn social classifications upside down. It would not consist in 
organizing everyone in the places where they were, but in organizing lightning 
displacements, both material and mental” (Badiou 2010:60). In Ireland, as in many other 
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countries, struggles were not anymore concentrated in factories and other working places 
where traditional approaches wanted them to be restricted. “Work issues overlapped with 
issues that were key concerns of the community” (Kelleher & Whelan 1992:4). 
3.2 The community acts: the Citizen's Grievance Bureau and the Dublin Housing Action 
Committee (DHAC) 
 
The process of transformation experienced by the Republican Movement during the 1960s 
lead to a campaign of open support for (and integration to) ‘spontaneous’ dissent and daily 
struggles emerging in popular contexts. In Dublin, an important step in this direction was the 
creation of the Citizen’s Grievance Bureaux. The initiator of this project was Proinnsias De 
Rossa, then a young Republican activist and now Labour MEP who had gained some political 
experience in the inner city having previously campaigned for Sinn Fein. Inspired by the 
activities of Britain’s ‘Citizens’ Advice Bureaux’, he decided to create an Irish version of it in 
Dublin. “The November 1965 issue of the United Irishman carried the first advertisement for 
the Citizen’s Grievance Bureaux, which was going to hold “weekly ‘clinics’ for those with 
housing trouble” (Irish Times 1968:8). In a city where social services largely depended on the 
Catholic Church “the office was soon inundated with letters requesting assistance, 
overwhelmingly on the issue of housing” (Hanley & Millar 2009:130).  
Amongst the various issues around which spontaneous conflict was rotating at the time, 
housing was certainly the most significant in urban areas and especially in the inner city of 
Dublin. What is generally remembered as the ‘1960's housing crisis’ was fired by widespread 
abuses, by rack-rent landlords and the failure of the government to fund a local authority 
housing construction programme. Indeed Dublin’s population had grown from 1961 to 1965 
by a greater proportion than in any five years since at least 1900. Thousands of families were 
living in overcrowded housing, in near slum conditions, the north inner city resembling a sort 
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of “unknown world of crumbling tenements set against a jarring backdrop of opulent 
eighteenth century architecture” (Hanna 2010:1016). After dramatic incidents such as the 
collapse of two eighteen century tenements which killed 4 people in 1963, nearly 1200 
Georgian houses were evacuated for demolition as an emergency measure across the north 
and west inner city. However, these measures were not just dictated by safety concerns. The 
displacement of poor people from the city centre was also part of a long term project aimed to 
regenerate and gentrify that area of Dublin. As we will see in Chapter 5 the Dublin City 
Council has not given up yet with this agenda. Although after 198210 considerable resources 
were put into the provision of better quality homes for social housing tenants in the city, 
politicians and ‘stakeholders’ still consider the removal of the poor from the city centre to be 
a necessary measure for a city that aims to be attractive for global capital. Paradoxically, the 
financial crisis has been the excuse to move some steps forward in this project. 
Between the 1960s and 1970s, according to a CD activist operating in the north inner city 
(Lisa), residents started to recognise that key decisions that had a massive impact on them 
were taken elsewhere and that people who were affected by these decisions had been 
excluded from the decision-making process. The most dramatic of these decisions was that to 
remove them from the city centre11 by demolishing the Georgian houses in which they were 
living. As Lisa, remembers: “at that time the Dublin Corporation decided that they would 
remove all the local council estates around this area. They needed more space for business in 
the city centre12. Indeed, the north inner city had remained architecturally intact until the late 
1950s, when two policies were implemented by the Dublin Corporation13; namely the “road 
                                                          
10
 Gregory Deal, see below in this chapter. 
11
 Part of Dublin Corporation’s strategy was the construction of 7 fifteen-storey high-rises in Ballymun on the 
northern edge of the city housing nearly 20.000 people. First tenants moved in in 1966. The development was 
separated from areas of non public housing by a 12 foot concrete wall. 
12
 Plans were drawn up involving major motorway networks, office developments and car parks. There was little 
attempt to maintain the residential nature of the inner city (Kelleher & Whelan 1992:19) 
13
 Old name for Dublin City Council (DCC). 
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widening policy”14 (Hanna 2010), and, even more influential in the destruction of the fabric 
of the north inner city area, the “dangerous buildings policy” (see below). 
These were the first issues around which local people were campaigning. “The local authority 
said that these decisions were decisions for the good of the city, but they were totally 
ignoring the lives of people who were living in this area. And they started to say: we need 
your land now, and we are going to move you out of this area” (Lisa). People’s response was 
quick: “they basically said no, that that wasn’t fair. And that was the beginning of the housing 
action movement and the community leaders like Tony Gregory etc… they all came around 
that issue. And it was very much the beginning in this area.  People needed to mobilize so 
that they had some say in decisions which were made elsewhere” (Lisa) 
Conflict around housing had quickly escalated in August 1965 when homeless families living 
in Griffith Barracks (an old army quarters located in the south inner city) while awaiting 
accommodation barricaded themselves into the place as a form of protest. A total of 18 
families, 87 people in all, were housed in overcrowded and unsanitary barracks where men 
and women were segregated after 10 pm. There was barbed wire on the walls and soldiers on 
guard duty (Hanley & Millar 2009:43). Gardaí eventually moved in to remove the barricades 
and evict the homeless families who then marched across the city to Mountjoy Square where 
they set up homes in wooden shacks and tents on a derelict site. The encampment was 
adjacent to the United Irishman offices at Sinn Fein headquarters in 30 Gardiner Place, which 
eventually became the centre of much of the agitation (ibid. p43). After the IRA became 
embroiled in the struggle over evictions volunteers started distributing leaflets arguing that 
every town in Ireland should be the property of the people who live in it (Hanley & Millar 
2009:42-43). 
                                                          
14
 Which developed from a report on Dublin traffic submitted by Karlheinz Schaechterle to the Dublin 
Corporation in 1965 (Hanna 2010, 1020) which entailed “widening many of the principal streets within the (…) 
area and the demolition of their buildings”. 
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As a result of conflicts like the one that took place in Griffith Barracks, independent political 
committees were formed in many urban areas, gathering ordinary people together with 
republican and socialist activists. For example, this was the case of the Dublin Housing 
Action Committee (DHAC), which resulted from the work of the Citizens Advice Bureaux 
(republicans), the Irish Workers Party (and, even more actively, its new Connolly Youth 
Movement), the Irish Communist Organisation, and some local residents’ groups. An 
important ally of DHAC was Fr. Michael Sweetman, a Jesuit priest and one of the few 
radicals emerging from the Catholic Church at the time (ibid. p88).  
DHAC’s heterogeneous composition is central here because it reflects the political dynamism 
that at the end of the 1960s characterised many movements on a worldwide scale. As an 
organisation it was (to some extent15) independent, it developed in a decentralised fashion, it 
did nor claim to be representative of a class (in an orthodox Marxist sense), it did not 
organise action according to official and predefined ideologies, it acted politically in relation 
to concrete (daily life) situations, and it was not concerned with entering the domain of state 
power -“we agitate solely for the implementation of our 5 points plan16” declared Mairin De 
Burca (Irish Times 1968:8). These features make the DHAC a post-party organisation in 
every respect.  DHAC was the first independent organised group to take an active part in 
                                                          
15
 Of course, many key activists had a party-political background (indeed before the 1960s there was little 
activism outside party organisations). And of course, while organising independent committees such the DHAC 
these activists were still involved in party politics. However, my point here is not to illustrate a sudden radical 
shift in activists’ lifestyles. My aim here is to show and analyse the emerging of a new tendency in the field of 
political organisation; a tendency which broke with the 20th century’s left-wing ‘orthodox’ tradition and which 
has had crucial consequences on emancipatory politics. This historical shift is absolutely independent from 
individuals’ life courses. Likewise, the fact that afterwards many activists got involved in parliamentary politics 
on a full time basis, achieving in some cases power positions (like for example Proinnsias De Rossa who is now 
a Labour MP), does not change the fact that that historical process/rupture had actually taken place. The fact that 
in many countries there are well known 1968ers who in the following decades joined conservative parties or 
became rich bankers is certainly not enough to dismiss the historical relevance of “1968”.    
16
 The DHAC called for: 1. The declaration of a housing emergency and the adoption of emergency measures to 
provide adequate temporary family accommodation, by making all vacant accommodation available as living 
accommodation. 2. The introduction of byelaws to prohibit the demolition and conversion to other uses of living 
accommodation. 3. The repair of dwelling by Dublin Corporation where landlords refuse to do so. 4. an 
immediate halt to the building of prestige office blocks and the redirection of the capital and labour involved to 
the construction of family accommodation. 5. House loans of 100% for low income citizens, at low interest rates 
(Irish Times 1968:8). 
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struggles related to the housing crisis. Its campaign consisted in picketing landlord’s homes, 
demonstrating at Dublin City Council’s meetings demanding to build houses not office 
blocks, and eventually in the occupation of vacant property (Hanley & Millar 2009:89). 
In the first issue of “Squatter”17, the DHAC’s broadsheet, one can read: “we will report on the 
latest developments in Landlord racketeering, evictions, squatting etc., as well as publicising 
the numerous successful agitations we are waging on behalf of the homeless and rack-rented 
workers of Dublin. (…) The most politically advanced members of the DHAC have taken the 
ultimate step in the present housing agitation; they have squatted in some of the idle, surplus 
property owned by speculating Landlord parasites. (…) Actions speak louder than words and 
one homeless family squatting in some Rachman’s idle property is worth a bellyful of 
promises from the so-called Socialists of Fianna Fail or Labour” (DHAC, 1969). 
The campaign assumed a sort of ‘universalistic’ tone for it defined all families living in 
inadequate accommodation as homeless. As republican activist Sean Dunne saw it, “the main 
thing was to get the homeless involved, they did get involved and some joined the movement 
as well” (Hanley & Millar 2009). “Throughout 1968 and 1969, the DHAC was consistently in 
the press, for example, by helping families resist evictions resulting from Dangerous 
Buildings notices, hitting a member of Dublin Corporation in the face with a dead rat, and 
resisting office” (Hanna 2010:1031). In January 1968, in Inchicore, where the organisation 
had gained considerable notoriety, activists were aiding residents who had barricaded 
themselves inside their cottages rather than be relocated in Ballymun. When Gardaí 
attempted to break the barricades and evict the families, a riot erupted and 24 people 
including DHAC members (among which Sean Dunne, Proinsias De Rossa and Jim 
Monahan) were arrested (Hanley & Millar 2009). In an interview with the Irish Times 
                                                          
17
 The first issue of “Squatter” can be downloaded at http://cedarlounge.wordpress.com/2008/06/16/the-left-
archive-squatter-broadsheet-of-the-dublin-housing-action-committee-june-1969/  
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(1969:8) De Rossa argued: “we don’t set out to be respectable public figures. We want to 
force attention on the problem and force action on it. Ours is only a short term solution. But 
I’d like to emphasize one thing. Our gripe is not with the officials or the councillors or Dublin 
Corporation. Our battle is against conditions, against the system”. 
In 1969 DHAC activist Dennis Dennehy was imprisoned for repeatedly ignoring court orders 
to vacate the property he was occupying in Mountjoy Square. He went on hunger strike upon 
imprisonment, which led to a wave of violent protests across Dublin. During his incarceration 
there were nightly marches from the General Post Office to Mountjoy Prison, while on 
Saturday 20th of January, 1970, 400 people staged a sit down protest on O’Connell Street 
Bridge. Dublin ended up resembling Derry as chaotic protests filled the streets and violent 
conflicts with the Gardaí ensued (Hanley & Millar 2009). People’s Democracy, a civil rights 
movement en route from Belfast to the General Post Office held a meeting numbering 800 
people outside n.20 Mountjoy Square to protest about the housing situation in both parts of 
the island. The fiftieth anniversary of the First Dail that fell in January 1969 was also 
exploited by Dennehy’s supporters. They recalled the past highlighting the gap existing 
between the revolutionary aspirations of the founders of the state and the political and social 
achievement of their successors. Likewise, a group of students supporting Dennehy carried 
banners proclaiming “Evictions: English landlords, 1868; Irish landlords, 1968–69’ and ‘50th 
anniversary of homeless families and enforced” (Hanley & Millar 2009).  
Despite the declining of the DHAC from its peak of activity in 1967-1969, it had definitely 
opened a fundamental political space in Dublin; a qualitatively different one from that in 
which ‘pre 1968’ organizations used to operate. The DHAC constituted an experimental 
space where political ‘intellectuality’ and ordinary people tended to blend with each other. 
During the following two decades this space was repeatedly occupied and activated by non-
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party forms of political organisation. Many of these organizations are generally grouped 
under the CD banner. Under this name they are still operating in the inner city of Dublin. 
Along the decades their ‘untraditional’ approach has attracted at the same time support and 
suspicion from the political left.  
Indeed, since the beginning CD was influenced by articulations deriving from the emergent 
women’s movement, whose themes strongly contributed to the rupture with a centralised and 
vertical mode of organisation. Organising methods “emphasised consensus and democratic 
decision making in groups, linking the personal to the political, and emphasising the 
importance of self-determination and control over one’s life” (Kelleher & Whelan 1992:5). It 
also took advantage of this crisis of centralism and representation attracting a wide number of 
disillusioned activists and proposing a new reading of the problems affecting deprived areas 
in Dublin.  
3.3 The formation of community action groups in the 1970s    
 
In the early 1970s, two of the first community action groups, North Central Community 
Council (NCCC) and Fatima Development Group arose from tenant action groups in the two 
concerned areas. These affiliations of inner city tenants groups literarily “took up the legacy 
of the DHAC and campaigned on housing issues” (Kelleher & Whelan 1992:4). They also 
believed that people were not involved in critical decisions affecting them, that “the north 
inner city [in the case of NCCC] was not getting its share of grants, particularly amenity 
improvement grants and that grants coming into the area were controlled by outside 
agencies” (Kelleher & Whelan 1992:27) like for example the Catholic Youth Council which 
they also criticised for not having a bottom up structure and because it tended not to hire local 
people. Other groups followed in different parts of the city, such as Ballymun, Tallaght, 
Blanchardstown and the south inner city (Acheson et al 2004). These groups operated under a 
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range of different names and titles, such as ‘action group’, ‘community coalition’, 
‘community council’, ‘development association’. By directly mobilising affected people they 
confronted the consequences of national patterns of unemployment, educational 
disadvantage, lack of public services, uneven urban development and irresponsible planning” 
(Acheson et al 2004:89).  
Projects were initiated by activists and ordinary people who saw CD as a fresh arena for 
political intervention, offering unprecedented opportunities for spontaneous and independent 
action outside the elitist and hierarchical field of republican or socialist party politics. It also 
constituted a move away from a passive waiting for policy solutions towards more direct 
action where local activism had an agenda of structural change (Motherway 2006:11). This 
approach operated distinctly outside the state system and its laws. It was barely tolerated by 
the authorities, and strongly under-resourced. Its politics did not consist in the affiliation to 
existent parties or ideologies18, but in the uncompromised effort to articulate the day by day 
issues of people inhabiting the most deprived areas of the city. Movement leaders and spokes 
persons were normally born in those same neighbourhoods having known through their own 
lived experience the consequences of poverty and exclusion afflicting those areas. CD 
activists were people coming from the inner city and were brought up in conditions of acute 
poverty. Throughout their life they all tended to remain loyal to their working class roots. 
Some of them were people who had developed some previous political experience in trade 
unions or in left-wing or nationalist parties. However, having been disillusioned by that 
experience, they decided to quit and try with a different engagement which consisted in 
directly confronting real issues affecting disadvantaged people, without the mediation of a 
formal, representative body. As Damien, one of the ‘pioneers’ of CD in Dublin refers: “I was 
committed to the communist idea and committed to the party. And I wasn’t getting anywhere, 
                                                          
18
 Although this did not excluded the fact that members could be affiliated to parties and have a strongly 
ideological view 
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and the idea of selling to people an ideology, when what they needed was jobs was 
contradictory. And the politicians of the left could get out and complain that there were no 
jobs but it didn’t change anything so I got engaged with that way of working and I kind of 
dropped out of the Communist Party and I associated with this alliance around local issues”. 
Tony Gregory’s19 adherence to the DHAC first and then to CD was motivated by the same 
type of frustration with official politics. Since the age of 16 Gregory had been involved in 
left-republican party activism. From that experience he learned the basics of local 
campaigning. When he rejected the car bombing campaign being waged in Northern Ireland 
by the Provisional IRA and became disenchanted with the “ideologism” of the Official IRA 
in the early seventies, he decided to concentrate on local activism of a post-party nature such 
as CD. As his comrade Mick Rafferty (2010) remembers: “Tony got involved in community 
work, like many of us, coming from a republican or socialist background. In Tony’s case it 
was of course from both of these traditions that he emerged. In ways he was disillusioned not 
with republicanism but the feuding and the bitterness that plagued the movement. This 
bitterness would see his one time republican mentor, Seamus Costello, murdered around the 
corner from where Tony lived. (…) Likewise with the socialist parties, they had lost their 
radical momentum for the sixties and seemed remote from the struggles that Tony now 
wanted to embrace”. 
Nevertheless, this frustration with official, centralised and representative politics was not 
limited to the pioneering activists; also during the following decades it continued pushing 
people towards CD. People who in their private lives were struggling against authoritarian 
education, against the hierarchical management of their working place or union, against a 
social and familial model which was grounded on patriarchal domination and so on were 
certainly attracted by a CD model. For example, Aine, a (today) well-known south inner city 
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 Probably the most famous CD activist in Dublin 
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CD activist, who was frustrated with the male domination and bureaucratisation affecting the 
union and the factory where she was working at the end of the 1970s, decided to move to the 
Simon Community (SC). SC was a CD type of organisation established in Ireland in 1969, 
based on the twin principles of non-judgemental support for the homeless and campaigning 
for an end to homelessness. As Aine told me during a meeting we had at the family resource 
centre in Saint Michael’s estate, where she is currently involved, her frustration with the 
union reached its momentum after the boss of the factory where she was working decided to 
move the machines to the wall: “(…) and I told to the other women working there that we 
cannot accept this situation, we can’t work in these conditions facing a wall, and we have to 
bring the union in here. They agreed to bring the union in and there was a man who came and 
asked: give me a psychological reason why that wall affects you in your work, because the 
boss has the right to have the machines wherever he wants. And I just thought that’s the end 
of it, so I left and I moved to Simon’s”. (Aine) 
In some cases people became CD activists after experiences that heavily shaped the course of 
their lives pushing them towards that type of involvement. For example, Monica got involved 
in anti-heroin campaigns and addiction support initiatives since the 1990s after the problem 
had knocked at her own door. “My son was an addict and that situation devastated the entire 
family. We knew nothing about addiction and we couldn’t get information on the problem or 
help at all”. After her son committed suicide out of desperation, she joined CD projects who, 
with few resources were struggling against the drugs epidemic. 
As I mentioned above, the innovation introduced by CD consisted in the direct mobilisation 
of people around matters concerning their own lives. It consisted in the appropriation of 
emancipatory claims from party vanguards, from the state and from other related 
representative mechanisms, which, at the time, were perceived by many activists as being 
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politically exhausted – as Rita’s contribution makes clear. This approach bypasses the old 
leftist distinction between ‘reformist’ and ‘revolutionary’ politics (Neocosmos, 2009), to the 
extent that while it does not give up the idea of a grassroots emancipatory process, it is not 
concerned with the achievement of state power, neither through Revolution, nor through 
elections. And when state power is not at stake – highlights John Holloway (2005:173) - “the 
whole conception of struggle shifts”.  
So, community workers were people like Damien, Tony, Mick and Aine who started to 
engage in this type of activity which I describe as ‘political’, but not in the conventional 
sense of the word20. As Damien highlights it was “political with the small ‘p’ (…) It was a 
political activity but it wasn’t aimed at a political outcome [such as winning an election] (…) 
it was aimed at solving a particular problems now. My problem as a community worker is 
how we make real difference to people in their daily life”. As Mark – another early-stage CD 
activist – puts it, the point was “to tackle the issues that prevented them living life to their full 
potential”, that prevented people, in other words, to take control of their immediate 
conditions of existence. And this process could just start by addressing ordinary day to day 
issues, like “the conditions of peoples apartments, the collection of rubbish, (…) the window 
on flat 28 is broken: why isn’t it repaired, why does it take 3 months, etc.” (Mark).  
Of course local committees were not in the position to clean the streets and fix houses. But 
being their voice a collective one, they were able to impose those basic demands to the local 
authority. However, the aim was not simply to demand delivery by the state and turn people 
into passive service receivers. Community based initiatives also involved practices of auto-
didacticism, the production of pieces of action-research on people’s living conditions and the 
set-up of political campaigns on the most disparate day to day issues - from housing to street 
                                                          
20
 See theoretical chapter.  
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selling, from rubbish collection to after school support. In this scenery every minor issue 
could potentially become political. 
Although from a traditional leftist point of view this might sounds like an individualist – 
essentially apolitical - pursuing of mere individual needs, according to Felix Guattari (1984) 
(in a piece that by the way he wrote contemporaneously) emancipatory politics “should be 
something that redirects people’s demands, their natural understanding of things, and does so 
out of the simplest situations; [it] creates troubles out of events that common sense would say 
were quite unimportant – out of the problem of the housewife and the kitchen cupboard (…). 
Only by slow steps – though there are sudden startling leaps – can one work back from such 
situations to the key signifiers of capitalist power. (…) The social subjectivity becomes open 
to desire and at the same time continues to introduce the peculiar, the unpredictable, the 
nonsensical, into the coherence of political discourse” (pp. 202). 
Accordingly, while local committees were taking up day to day issues such as the ones 
described above, they were also setting the ground to discussing and addressing major 
political questions. A fundamental point, however, was the belief in the ability of ordinary, 
un-skilled and miscounted people to critically think and to consequently take action in order 
to change their own world.  
3.4 State responses to people’s independent organisations.  
 
I argued that the first phase of CD in the inner city of Dublin was related to the experience of 
urban popular movements such as the DHAC, being shaped by a subjective rupture with 
traditional forms of political engagement, by an uncompromised independence from the state 
apparatus and by a strong emphasis posed on proximity to ordinary people and 
experimentation. “Stand up with the poor instead of stand up for the poor” is a slogan coined 
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by South African slum-activists, which nevertheless articulates very well the nature of CD’s 
initial approach.  
However - as for Alain Badiou – political sequences are precarious by nature. They tend to be 
exposed to mechanisms of repression, normalisation and reincorporation into the state-of-the-
situation. As we have seen in Chapter 2, not only is there an ontological distinction between 
state and politics – in the sense that the first is “constant” and the second is “intermittent” 
(Russo 2006:675), and that the state in itself is incapable of politics – but whenever a political 
subjectivity comes into existence, its relation with the state is deeply problematic. The only 
type of ‘politics’ admitted by the state  is what Badiou would define as “state-politics”, a sort 
of political fiction which is devoid of any subjective dimension, just entailing a bureaucratic 
and ritual content, and which is basically aimed to the management of the situation. State-
politics is a political ‘fiction’ to the extent that it always comes down - in Badiou’s words - to 
ensuring “the continuation of what exists” (Neocosmos 2009a).  
In the context of CD the invention/discovery of this independent political space, as Rolston 
(1980:149) puts it, was not merely theoretical, or limited to the field of activist conscience. 
On the contrary, there was the practical evidence that such politics constituted a source of 
instability and could not be really integrated into the capitalist state, both local and central. 
The nature of this threat – highlights Rolston – “was seen not just by researchers, nor just by 
political activists eager to explore it, but also by the state, concerned to manage the working 
class” (p. 149); and concerned, I would add, to normalise forms of organization that were 
potentially undermining it.   
One should notice that the strategies that the Irish state put into place to control independent 
CD organisations differed substantially from the strategies it had adopted previously for other 
types of movements. For example during 1950s and 1960s, due to the general political 
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climate and the nature of the actions undertaken by the Republican movement, the state 
response was mainly police-oriented and based on the exercise of a military type of response. 
However, with the emerging of organisations of a new type in the course of the 60s, one can 
witness a qualitative change with respect to the state’s attitude. With the 1970s governmental 
attempts to interfere and control those unprecedented people’s self-organising experiences 
became more sophisticated and oriented to inclusion (statification) rather than just to 
confrontation/repression. As I will illustrate, instead of trying to literarily eradicate the 
movement – as it was the case when dealing with paramilitary organisations for example – 
the state was now trying to depoliticise it by taking it away from people’s independent 
control and rearticulating it as ‘service provision’ within the terrain of state bureaucracy. 
The ‘co-option’ of independent CD organizations into a community and voluntary sector – 
i.e. into a ‘pillar’ of the state - and subsequently the idea of ‘partnership’ are rooted in this 
inclusionary approach. The fact that, from the 1970s and especially in the 1980s “anti-
poverty strategy became a core feature of social policy” (Powell & Geoghegan 2004:113) 
constitutes an evidence of this shift.  
On the other hand CD did not just act as designated ‘victim’ of these processes. Some of its 
own features actually facilitated depoliticisation. To begin with, the very notion of 
“Community Development”, which (as discussed in Chapter 2) generates consensus and 
misunderstanding, can be easily manipulated and co-opted by the state. Furthermore the fact 
that these independent political organisations presented an unprecedented capacity to engage 
with marginalised people and generate alternative forms of institutionality (see Chapter 5) in 
areas “where the state and its agents were making limited and narrow inroads, posed an 
excellent investment in state building” (Collins 2002:98). “Ironically” – Collins remarks – “it 
was precisely because of its oppositional tendencies that CD proved so attractive to the state”. 
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In this perspective, it is not surprising that powerful players in the state apparatus became 
strongly supportive of notions of community and group action, for it was seen as a low cost, 
effective means of binding and reinforcing the social fabric, especially in areas that were out 
of their control.  
It should be clear that this is an attempt to describe some general tendencies that can not be 
considered as representing every singular (co-option) experience within the vast CD 
assemblage. For instance, this is not to say that from the 1970s the state stopped using its 
repressive and military apparatuses (courts, police) to contain political movements. In the late 
1970s for example, as street sellers vehemently opposed with mass demonstrations and civil 
disobedience their being banned from the north inner city of Dublin, the police did not 
hesitate to violently attack the crowd. And furthermore, when Tony Gregory and Christy 
Burke became spoke persons for those informal workers (mainly working class women), they 
themselves were jailed for two weeks. Tina, a community activist once noted that “one is not 
really a community development activist if she has not been arrested”. 
What I am trying to highlight here is that during that historical phase it has been possible to 
observe a tendency by many western states to adopt a less confrontational approach in 
relation to social agitation and to manifest unprecedented interest and support for issues 
related to poverty, marginality and disadvantage. This new ‘awareness’ (or ‘rediscovery of 
poverty’ as some like to describe it) can be interpreted in different ways. On one hand this 
could be seen as a sort of “democratic experimentalism” (Sabel 1996). In a geopolitical 
balance shaped by the Cold War, confrontation between the Soviet and the Capitalist blocks 
was not just carried out in military terms, but involved a sort of competition between two 
universalist models, each of which tried to affirm its superiority, also from the point of view 
of the implementation of egalitarian policies. “Beyond the enormous ambiguity this produced 
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and the encompassing glow of empty propaganda issued by both sides, the opposition 
brought an intrinsically civil element that ultimately concerned the question of which of the 
two systems was better equipped to bring about egalitarian conditions” (Russo & Pozzana 
2005:209). This was one of the reasons why military conflict between the two fronts 
remained only potential and confined to a series of localized wars. This competition between 
opposing conceptions of state-egalitarianism didn’t just interest the two opposed super-
powers, but strongly influenced many other areas of the globe, including Europe. After the 
collapse of the Soviet Union, liberalism remained the only game in town, not needing any 
longer to demonstrate its superiority in relation to rival social systems. This, as we know, has 
led to an erosion of social rights and egalitarian policies in western countries.  
On the other hand, as I mentioned above, from 1966 onwards the pressure operated by social 
and revolutionary movements became very strong, to the point of forcing many countries to 
confront issues related to redistribution of wealth, democratization of the education and 
equality in general. Many states took advantage of that situation to ‘incorporate’ dissent into 
their administrative machinery. In this process the seeds were planted for that reorganisation 
of society, which is known as neo-liberal governance - “a process in which  authoritarian 
institutions such as the government, the army, police, medicine, employment/training and 
housing authorities have begun to recognise the limitations of centralised state activities and 
advocate greater individual involvement and community control of policy implementation, 
policing, crime prevention, health promotion, employment, creation of estate management of 
local authority housing” (Cullen 1989:98) – measures which at first sight can be interpreted 
as equivalent to a CD approach. 
In Ireland this ‘rediscovery of poverty’ overlaps with the establishment of the National 
Committee on Pilot Schemes to Combat Poverty (1973). This operation followed the pathway 
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opened by the first EU poverty programmes and was closely linked to them. In other 
countries this agenda had already been implemented for some time. For example the “War on 
Poverty” legislation was first introduced in the US by Lyndon B. Johnson. Ten years later in 
this same country the 1974 Housing and Community Development Act established a new 
approach to funding community development programs based on local needs rather than 
national directives. In the UK community development projects were introduced in 1969.  
3.5 Poverty I and the co-optation of CD 
‘Poverty 1’ (1974-80; officially called National Pilot Schemes to Combat Poverty) can be 
considered as the starting point of a new governmental approach to deprivation in Ireland. 
This scheme funded over 20 projects in rural and urban areas, working with specific groups 
who were deemed to be powerless. Significantly, professional community workers (a concept 
which was introduced at that stage in Ireland) were employed for the first time and while 
some projects were contracted out, others were set up by dispatching workers to widespread 
localities to work with deprived communities (O’Cinneide & Walsh 1990:329). Cullen 
(1989:100) describes Poverty 1(P1) as a programme of community self-help initiatives which 
constituted “the first attempt by statutory authorities with the support of European funds to 
promote, resource and support the development of community organisations to tackle 
poverty”.  Poverty “was defined in structural terms” with attention being drawn on the fact 
that its elimination “would require redistribution of resources ad power in society” (Kelleher 
& Whelan 1992:7). P1 had 5 core objectives: 
1. to develop new and innovative strategies and techniques for dealing with poverty 
2. to provide greater participation of the poor 
3. to contribute to the evolution of effective long term policies against poverty  
4. to increase understanding and public awareness of poverty and its causes  
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5. to bring about practical intervention in areas of deprivation or among groups in need 
(Combat Poverty Agency, 1981:82). 
The programme involved the appointment of seven community development officers, who 
were entitled to provide training, information and support for local CD initiatives. Four pilot 
projects were envisaged, for which EU funding was sought, including a welfare right project, 
a home assistance project, a community action research project and a social service council 
project. In 1975 funding was granted by the EU for three of the projects, excluding the social 
service council project. Project workers adopted the mantle of local activists, hoping to 
initiate a movement for structural change in association with disadvantaged communities. 
They pursued two main activities: first, the setting up of centres to resource and empower 
poverty groups; second, the initiation of economic schemes which would encourage the 
development and marketing of local resources (O’ Cinneide & Walsh 1990). 
According to Powell and Geoghegan (2004:82), the P1 National Committee was composed 
both of statutory and community representatives with the aim of overseeing the programme. 
It declared to adopt community development as its main model of action, which it defined as 
“an education process which enables people to become conscious of the social, political and 
economic process that affect their lives and to take action to improve the quality of their lives 
and that of the communities in which they live”. The federating “of groups on common issues 
was also seen as central to the programme (Kelleher & Whelan 1992:7). Although this might 
sounds (and was certainly embraced) as an important achievement by CD, i.e. a sort of public 
recognition of its efforts and an attempt to provide it with a suitable institutional support, and 
although there are authors (Tovey & Share 2000:352) who insist in defending the 
‘oppositional’ nature of the programme, I argue that it constituted a first effort by the Irish 
state to put its hand on processes that were hitherto out of its control. Amongst the strategies 
which were put into place stand out the sharing of common notions (community 
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development, poverty, participation empowerment etc.), the framing of a sort of 
hierarchically structured umbrella organization (i.e. a basic representative body), and the re-
formulation of local activism as community work. 
In my view, the fact that P1 was a top-down initiative needs to be emphasised. This is evident 
in the way it was conceived as an organisation. For example, the national Committee itself 
had no autonomy of its own. As news magazine “Strumpet” (in Powell & Geoghegan 
2004:82) recorded, it “was always just an advisory sub-committee to the Department of 
Social Welfare. Its members sat in a voluntary capacity and had full time jobs elsewhere”. 
The assumption that the programme had adopted CD as its model of action was therefore 
contradictory. Indeed P1 was shaped by a strong representative and managerial imprint, 
which is contrary to the original understanding of self-activated local activism. Very soon 
these sort of internal contradictions ended up fragmenting the group and the project itself.  
Initially activists were attracted by the scheme because it seemed to put forward a CD type of 
philosophy. The provision of funding was nevertheless embraced as a sort of victory in terms 
of recognition. However, I have already mentioned the fact that sometimes, in the face of the 
threat of big popular agitations “elites may offer up concessions that would otherwise have 
seemed improbable” (Piven & Cloward 1979:xxi). This is why CD activists and their 
expectations “to work with people and not ‘for’ them” (Powell & Geoghegan 2004:83) were 
quickly to come into conflict with members of the committee who had totally different 
perceptions of the aims of P1. This caused a total breakdown in terms of communication 
amongst the parts involved.  
Indeed as Kelleher and Whelan (1992) argue, this rupture was due to the fact that at the end 
of the day “in the 1970s, the concept of local people organising to bring about change was 
treated as an illegitimate challenge by the established power structures”. Thus, the purpose to 
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turn this idea into governmental policy turned out to be an illusion and P1 entered in an 
irreversible crisis until it ceased to exist in 1980. 
It is important to highlight that the implementation of CD federations (as initiated by P1) was 
central to the depoliticisation and statification of CD in Ireland. Until then, voluntary 
organizations tended to function independently from each other – with no umbrella structure 
representing them as a unitary body. As Acheson et al. (2004) highlight, federating offered a 
number of advantages, especially on what concerned their relation to the state: “access to 
government, the opportunity to make the case to government for improved resources, sharing 
of knowledge and information, a place where well-established organizations could help 
newer smaller organizations to find their place and grow”. This, as Piven and Cloward (1979: 
xxii) highlight has a negative effect on independent organisations, “because in their search for 
resources to maintain their organisations [organisers are] driven inexorably to elites, and the 
tangible and symbolic support that elites [can] provide”. In our case these were the basic 
conditions of the constitution of CD as a ‘sector’.  
Again, by saying this it is not my intention to argue that in the 70s, with the introduction of 
Poverty 1, CD projects were suddenly co-opted by the state. This was just the (‘embryonic’) 
beginning of a process which reached its peak in the partnership phase. Indeed with 
partnership governance and the Celtic Tiger CD organisations gradually achieved what 
Rolston (1980:149) would describe as a “community intervention industry”. That is a new 
middle class of development professionals ‘colonising’ poor people’s struggles for equality, 
turning them into bureaucratic forms of state provision. 
3.6 The Gregory deal as part of the turn towards state politics 
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During the 1980s, these containment and inclusion strategies continued to be implemented by 
the state in order to respond to the rising socio-economic problems affecting Ireland, and the 
forms of radicalisation that these problems were generating.  
On one hand, “the recession which saw escalating unemployment levels, declining 
expenditure in public service provision and the re-emergence of a major emigration problem 
among young people in particular, had narrowed the scope of state intervention in working 
class (…) communities and given it a more manifestly coercive character. Numerous social 
surveys / ethnographic studies of such communities in this period drew attention to the 
increasingly hostile relationships between these communities and the state and its agents 
(Collins 2002:93). In this context community development was seen by state officials as a 
possible mechanism of mediation between the state and disaffected populations.  
On the other hand the economic and social problems of the 1980s gave rise to sequences of 
strong radicalization that the state had to manage in some way. These episodes had 
controversial outcomes as for instance, was the case for the ‘concerned parents against drugs’ 
(CPAD - next subsection) movement, and the (related) election of ‘community candidate’ 
Tony Gregory to Dail Eireann. Gregory, who suddenly found himself holding the balance of 
power in March 1982 “used this advantage to stream up to IR£200m in projects into the inner 
city, dramatically succeeding in redirecting resources where mainstream political 
representatives had failed” (Acheson et al 2004:89). This success was certainly of a powerful 
symbolic value for Dublin’s working classes. Tony Gregory, a man who was born and raised 
in the deprived north inner city suddenly became a national figure. For the first time the 
people who elected him experienced collective victory. Thereafter, “a new awareness of 
political processes and how they worked was developed in the area” (Kelleher &Whelan 
1992:29). As Lisa refers “Tony was elected and that was very much community politics and 
83 
 
community organization and he managed to get an agreement for new houses to be built in 
the area. It had a huge symbolic value for local people that sometime you can actually change 
things because I suppose many people before felt that there was no point in organizing”. 
However, if one evaluates this event beyond the conventional celebrations that go with it - 
and one does this according to the theoretical/methodological framework of this thesis - one 
can uncover some ambivalence. Indeed Gregory’s achievement also had depoliticising effects 
to the extent that it linked CD to elections, i.e. to state-politics (the idea of a ‘community 
candidate’ was introduced at that stage), where thought and action are delegated to one or 
more representatives. Moreover Tony Gregory’s victory restored faith in voting, a state-
procedure for which Dublin’s working classes used to have a sort of ‘natural’ rejection (that 
CD has not seriously explored yet), and which is not part of a CD philosophy. Finally, 
Gregory’s success also gave a great symbolic value to a leadership (him and his comrades) 
that has not yet managed to ‘reproduce’ itself21: The lack of a new generation of activists is 
an issue (explored in Chapter 7) with which community groups are struggling at the moment.   
Another critical point (this more familiar to a left-wing audience) is that Tony Gregory in 
order to be able to achieve the balance of power was forced to ally with and support right 
wing Fianna Fail government. The programme - originally called 'The Summerhill 
Agreement', later dubbed the 'Gregory Deal' by the press - finished when The Workers Party 
deputies, once the balance of power passed to them, voted the government out of office. 
Beyond the ambivalences of the Gregory Deal I find it important to highlight the fact that it 
was not just the outcome of a successful electoral campaign. It was rather the peak of a cycle 
                                                          
21
 It just reproduced itself at an electoral level where Maureen O’Sullivan presents herself as the ‘Gregory 
candidate’. However, her approach is very different from that of her predecessor, who did not just operate at a 
representative level but constantly campaigned for and with his people – having also spent some time in jail for 
the cause. On the contrary Maureen  does not believe in protest preferring a representative approach to a direct-
democratic one. 
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of poor people’s struggles that Tony Gregory had always supported in a ‘militant’ way. In 
this sense, in my view, even more significant than the Gregory Deal, is the wave of popular 
agitations around the heroin crisis that preceded it. This mobilisation generated an inedited 
solidarity amongst people living in affected areas, contributing to certain extent to the 
electoral success of Tony Gregory who was personally involved in that campaign. 
3.6 Reactivating CD: the Concerned Parents against Drugs (CPAD) in the 1980s 
CPAD developed in the early 1980's out of Hardwicke street flats in Dublin north inner city 
and Teresa's Gardens in the south inner city. The movement was initiated by local women 
concerned with the threat of heroin to their children. Indeed, despite the intensity and the 
human implications of the heroin problem affecting the inner city of Dublin at the time the 
response by the state was quite weak. According to Punch (2005:764), for much of the 1980s, 
“policies to deal with the social and community effects of the heroin crisis were weakly 
developed or absent, the main focus being on social control and crime issues”. There was a 
sort of unwillingness to officially recognise that there actually was a problem related to 
drugs. To the extent that Tony Gregory, who was active in the movement, argued that the 
goal of the police was to ‘contain’ the community, rather than preventing crime within the 
community (in “Meeting Room” a documentary on CPAD by Jim Davis, Brian Gray, 2010). 
They somehow tolerated open heroin dealing in deprived neighbourhoods, preventing it to 
spread to other areas of the city: “it was been ignored, and while it was been ignored you 
would have heroin drug dealers moving into inner city complexes exercising their trade” 
(John). The problem was well known by the authorities, indeed a report of the Special 
Government Task Force on Drug Abuse in 1983 made the link between drug abuse and 
“poverty and powerlessness” and recommended targeting investment in youth and 
community development facilities. However, no official government response followed, and 
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this inaction generated an angry critique on the ground (Punch 2005:765). This was not just a 
question of hiding the existence of a real problem: with this behaviour the state also denied 
the existence of people and communities who were naming that problem, and hence it can be 
seen as part of a broader reality in which these communities were rendered invisible by the 
state, considered not to be part of the citizenry. 
Initially “many of those who worked in the communities that were most affected were 
alarmed and made strenuous but vain attempts to raise the issue with the public authorities’’ 
(Cullen 1989:276). After these first unsuccessful attempts and because of the context of 
neglect and containment, intense levels of community-based action erupted and more 
concrete forms of intervention were developed by local activists, which converged in the 
CPAD campaign. The spectrum of strategies included collective street protests and mass 
gatherings of people who would march to a suspected dealer’s house and tell him to get out 
of the area. They would forcefully evict suspected dealers, making a line of people to remove 
the furniture so that no single person could be charged with any offence. Smaller groups of 
people (often from other areas to limit the possibility of revenge attacks) would call to the 
houses of suspected dealers and tell them they would have to leave. Posters with the 
photographs and addresses of dealers would be posted around the area locally. The 
communities would mount permanent vigil at the entry to their estates, preventing any 
suspected dealer or addict from outside the area from entry. These pickets were manned day 
and night and became a permanent fixture of inner city street life (Flood 2010).  
Although it developed in a ‘CD style’ - with people (mainly women) living in affected areas 
directly activating in order to resolve their problem without relying on the state, due to the 
threats of physical retaliation by drug dealers the movement soon came to be headed up by a 
mostly male leadership of whom the dealers would be more fearful (Flood 2010). After their 
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initial success in driving dealers out, the Irish state identified CPAD as a threat and 
considerable police resources were deployed to smash the organisation up including 
prosecutions in the non-jury Special Criminal Court of key activists (Flood 2010). According 
to Connolly (1997:67) “there is a good deal of evidence to suggest that the Gardaí would 
have been prepared to tolerate the activities of the CPAD up to a point. (…) the point came 
when violence was exercised by the organisation in evicting the drug dealers. As soon as 
violence was used, media and politicians put big emphasis on armed defence and 
involvement of the IRA. However the fact is that the police were persecuting members of the 
movement using  emergency powers of arrest and detention, “while you would have drug 
dealers dealing immune from prosecution, agitated communities even more” (John). Indeed 
the reality was that the work of the campaign was not that of a few paramilitaries ‘sorting the 
problem out’ – as mainstream media pictured them - but the mobilizations of hundreds of the 
people living in the affected areas (Flood 2010). Indeed a central output of this experience 
was the constitution of autonomous community self-policing systems “operating on terms not 
of the state but of the community” (Connolly 1997:67). Recently this ‘model’ was developed 
as Community Policing Forum, an institution which adopts a partnership approach to 
policing, and which due to its significance for this thesis and the present of CD will be 
analysed in depth in Chapter 7. 
The CPAD campaign represents a moment of strong activation whose consequences and 
memory are still alive in Dublin. Certainly the struggles engaged by Concerned Parents 
Against Drugs in the 1980s and more recently by the Coalition of Communities Against 
Drugs and City Wide Drugs Crisis Campaign have played a progressive role in Ireland for 
issues related to drug use, HIV and hepatitis.  In order to deal with these problems that have 
always been quite snubbed by the state (which for example for long time refused to provide 
neighbourhoods with needle exchange machines), community organisations had to generate 
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their own analyses and responses culminating in the creation of independent community 
institutions, which could provide an alternative to the state’s indifferent and exclusionary 
approach. The reason why the government gave the order to the Garda to infiltrate the 
movement and smash it was not just due to its violence. It was because, once again, inner city 
residents had shown outstanding self-organising capacities.  As John (activist, politician) 
argues “it was because the state recognized that that if this group of people can organize 
themselves like this over drugs, next week it would be jobs, the week after it would be rent, 
the week after it would be more local authority. And they tried for many years but they never 
broke it and they actually lifted the spirit and community representatives got themselves 
together, begun to organize and they started to identify issues that affected their areas”. 
3.7 Partnership and incorporation (bureaucratisation and professioanlisation) 
Beyond these moments of exceptional politicisation around local issues, according to 
Broderick (cit. by Motherway 2006:11) in the 1980s reform was the dominant theme in CD. 
This is evident in the emphasis on structure and bureaucracy which characterised the 
adaptation of local organisations to a “community intervention industry” model. As I 
mentioned above, in the mid-1980s, Ireland was in a precarious economic and social position. 
The level of unemployment had grown since the late 1970s from 90,000 to 250,000 with 
disadvantaged urban areas experiencing high concentrations of unemployed people. In this 
situation shaped by “fiscal disarray and chronic levels of emigration, the government turned 
to the idea of ‘partnership’ governance” (Powell & Geoghegan 2004). This system eschews 
any clear definition, describing itself as being horizontal, flexible, inclusive, decentralised 
and articulated in more fluid divisions of power between public, private and community 
sector. In this supposedly intricate set of actors, processes, regulations and power-relations to 
which so much literature has been dedicated during the last decade, local non-governmental 
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organisations are supposed to play a central role. However, the idea of governance is infused 
with neoliberal ideology. The system to which it points to, more than horizontal and equal, is 
concerned with the construction of a sufficient consensus around the (neo-liberal and 
inegalitarian) policies to be implemented. As the Community Workers Coop argued in 1989 
(Trucker 1989:42) referring to the situation of CD at the time, governance partnership “tends 
to mask the unequal relationship that prevails. Much could be accomplished by social 
partnership if local groups had a real say in policy and decision making. The reality however 
is more often one of confrontation and co-option. In the latter case many groups more or less 
accept the terms or dictates of the agency in order to obtain whatever support is available. 
(Trucker 1989:42)   
It is important to emphasise the idea that I started to put forward above, i.e. that the 
partnership governance era was preceded by a period of worsening relationships between the 
state and disadvantaged communities, which led to a growth in independent radical politics. 
Consequently, local partnership was embraced by the state as “a sophisticated process of 
State building” (Collins 2002: 99), allowing it to extend its control into marginalised 
communities in a less confrontational way. This was perceived much more benignly than 
previous contentious periods of straightforward police repression. As a CD activist who 
participated to an open meeting on Community Development (at Exchange Dublin 
04/11/2010) highlights: “you could use partnership as a term representing a new way of 
managing society that operated through mechanisms that were not very repressive but 
inclusive if you like. Mechanisms that tried to control situations by including them rather 
than by excluding them. Mechanisms oriented to systematically reproduce a depoliticised 
political situation”. Considering the loss of autonomy experienced by CD in the last decades 
this strategy has definitely been successful. Partnership governance is a state concept. And 
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the adhering of CD to this type of model has implied a depoliticising process of assumption 
of a form correlated to that of the state. 
According to some authors (Acheson et al 2004) social partnership established itself as a key 
theme of voluntary sector development in Ireland after the National Economic and Social 
Forum (1993) and matured as the fourth pillar of the national agreement in 1997. However, it 
would be wrong to portray partnership as something that suddenly came to existence in the 
1990s. Incipient partnership governance was evident in a number of situations some time 
before, as individual voluntary organizations where drawn into the bureaucratic process 
(Acheson et al. 2004). I already mentioned the National Committee on Pilot Schemes to 
Combat Poverty (Poverty1), dating 1974. In the 1980s, “taking a lead from the 1986 National 
Economic and Social Council report, A Strategy for Development 1986–1990, a series of 
state-facilitated ‘national agreements’ between ‘social partners’ — grassroots organizations, 
business representatives, trade unions and the state itself —ensued” (Powell & Geoghegan 
2006:848). These corporatist agreements were supposed to address issues of poverty and 
social exclusion being the role of the ‘community and voluntary sector’ “to represent this 
marginalized constituency” (ibid. p848). So from that stage CD groups have been 
increasingly delegated by the Irish state to compensate for its role in welfare provision, from 
which (in a neoliberal fashion) it progressively retreated prioritising financial and market 
related concerns.  
In order to concretely implement the idea of partnership governance the government 
established a variety of partnership companies which were aimed to support and include new 
and already existing CD groups. Think for example about the Community Development 
Programme (CDP). “Established in 1990, the CDP embraced community development as a 
purported means of tackling poverty and disadvantage. The CDP supports projects in 
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geographical areas affected by high unemployment, poverty and social exclusion, as well as 
supporting projects working with specific target groups (e.g. lone parents, Travellers, women, 
gay and lesbian). Initially, fifteen projects were funded. By 1999, there were eighty-three, and 
in 2005, they number in excess of 140” (ibid. p849).  
Another example of a partnership company is the Combat Poverty Agency, which was 
established in 1986 with the role of supporting and promoting CD. Its creation was an 
important development towards the implementation of a partnership relation between CD 
groups and the state, as it provided for a statutory support role for CD. The CPA participated 
in the second and third EC Poverty Programme. Given the Agency’s other statutory functions 
i.e. policy advise to the government, research and public education, their support for 
community development has been set in the context of arguing for a broad anti-poverty 
strategy within which community development is considered to be a central component. The 
idea of CD as a ‘sector’ or ‘pillar’ (of the state) is central in CPA’s ideology. As a last 
example, think about the Community Workers Coop (CWC). When it was established in 
1981, CWC was conceived as a large representative network in Ireland, recognized by the 
Irish state which has consequently provided core funding. Despite the fact that CWC was not 
conceived as a professional body, it conceived people involved at a local level, independently 
from the fact that they were paid or not, as ‘workers’. This, in my view, was an important 
step in the consolidation of the idea of community work as a profession.  
For in the 1980s the situation was affected by high rates of unemployment, the delivery of 
training schemes and work programmes became central to the evolving social partnership. 
According to O’Cinneide (1990:330) “the growth of community employment projects [was] 
dramatic; by 1987, it was reckoned that 300 community groups were active in local 
employment and training initiatives, drawn mainly from local authority housing estates 
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throughout the country”. These initiatives were seen by the state as a means to alleviate and 
contain the increasing tensions felt at household and neighbourhood level due to the growing 
inequalities which characterised the post-industrial, neo-liberal historical turn (Kelleher & 
Whelan 1992).  
CD employment initiatives were seen as suitable to be used by the state in such conditions, 
because they differed substantially from ‘traditional’ state-sponsored labour market 
programmes, which are purely concerned with job creation. In a CD perspective 
“employment and training work [are seen] as a means of tackling a wider pattern of 
community disadvantage. Unemployment is seen as raising social, educational and political 
issues, which call for a more general community development strategy with the participation 
of the unemployed” (O’Cinneide 1990:330). However, the enclosure of these alternative 
approaches into a partnership frame placed community groups in a new relationship with the 
state. This “resulted in their increased dependence on the state” (Kelleher and Whelan 1992: 
9), which finally tended to depoliticise them and to neutralise their political ‘effectiveness’.  
Indeed the becoming ‘official’ of CD in terms of recognition and support by the state played 
a central role in its “mainstreaming” (Meade, 2005). As a result of this shift, processes of 
state-building overcame emancipatory concerns. This allowed the state to “effectively extend 
its legitimacy in situations where legitimacy was strained” (Collins, 2002:91). Through the 
provision of funding, the introduction of a structure of local development initiatives and with 
efforts in implementing a coordination of community based provision, the central government 
created the illusion of a vibrant civil society that was accommodated within a supportive 
policy framework. However, this process has made it extremely difficult to distinguish 
between an ‘autonomous’ community organization and a state dependent ‘anti-poverty 
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agency, with the result that volunteers have been frequently drawn into bureaucratic 
structures which were often very different to what they claimed to be.  
After being included into partnership governance structures where the state plays a key role, 
CD activities became heavily scrutinised and to some extent manipulated by the state. As I 
will concretely illustrate in Chapter 5 professionalization is central to this process. The shift 
towards a business model in ‘community sector management’ has placed considerable 
emphasis on this idea. For instance the importance of performance indicators has been 
stressed. As a result community groups have been forced to engage in time consuming, 
complex consultative exercises, like demonstrating the efficient use of resources, 
commitment to achieving targets and the use of outcome measures in order to prove value for 
money (Geoghegan & Powell 2006:857). In the UK this is known as contract culture. Rolston 
(1980:161) calls it “cybernetic model”, a system which requires efficient feedback 
mechanisms on those projects where government money is given. It is in the context of these 
feedback institutions - argues Rolston - that the idea of ‘community leader’ (i.e. of a formal 
hierarchy internal to CD) became important, because it is to them that autonomy and funds 
are given and it is also them who sit on the committees which distribute the funds and 
provide feedback to the government. These are the kind of processes that lead to what 
Rolston (1980:163) defines as a “community industry”, a system that is antithetic to CD’s 
original approach. “The ability to read, assimilate and remain up to speed with the immense 
volume of material generated by programs of state intervention works against the principles 
of participation and bottom-up decision-making in which community activism has been 
grounded, as does the ability to write funding proposals, take part in committee meetings, 
manage high-speed work relationships and so on” (ibid. p163). 
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One could argue that in processes of bureaucratisation such as those experienced by CD, the 
state shifted its attitude from acceptance and support (through funding and formal 
recognition) to strict ruling and control. “The state – argues Meade - has mutated from 
generous benefactor to stern assessor and with its reconstruction of the terms of project 
funding has reminded community organisations of their own vulnerability’ (2005: 361). In 
the 1980s, for example, a grant of IR£8 million from the European Commission was refused 
by the government “as the commission required that the grant be administered, not by the 
central government, but by a local intermediary institution” (Kelleher &Whelan 1992:11). 
Here it is important to highlight that even though the state has created institutions that 
financially support CD groups, this does not mean that each funded institution respects the 
original ‘parameters’ of CD. In order to receive funding one has to respect state-defined 
parameters, which are frequently contrary to CD’s philosophy. On the other hand this 
ambiguity generates a situation in which the state becomes the authority who has the power 
to define (through funding provision) who ‘officially’ is a CD organisation and who not– 
with the result of creating a sort of hierarchy that atomise groups and puts them in 
competition with each other. Of course this process is not really smooth but encounters 
constant frictions at the ground level. The growing bureaucratic/financial dependency on the 
state experienced by CD during the 1980s is well articulated in a position paper drawn up by 
the central group of the Community Workers Cooperative (CWC), which describes the on-
going process as opposed to the grounding principles of CD: “the process of 
professionalisation is about gaining status (…) it is a search for power, money and control 
over the practice of community work” (O’Donovan & Valery, 1992:56). Previously Dobson 
(1988:2) had noted that “social work has become an increasingly exclusive activity to be 
practiced only by qualified professionals. Community work is seen as a method of social 
work to be undertaken by professionals”. Not only professionalisation and funding schemes 
94 
 
had the effect to produce competition between individuals and groups, but they ended up 
distracting them from their original aspirations, including self-determination and egalitarian 
change.  
As Seamus (Partnership worker) says: “the community sector has gone through a serious sort 
of fragmentation, part due to its own complacency if you like. Because we have gone through 
a period of big wealth and a lot of community organisations took their eyes off the ball in 
terms of what their reason to be was. We also had what I call the professionalisation of the 
community sector and you would have much more middle class people coming into the sector 
who would not necessarily have an empathy with the people with who they were actually 
working, nor understanding where the community sector emerged from, possibly loosing 
direction, been complacent and too comfortable”.  
The problems of bureaucratisation and professionalization will be extensively investigated in 
Chapters 5 and 6. What is important to highlight here is that these processes - that are 
generally indicated in terms of co-option by the state - have also a subjective facet of 
acceptance and participation by CD itself. In other words CD was not just victim of the 
inclusive action of the state. To certain extent it actively contributed to this shift. Indeed 
according to Seanie “the government adopted this partnership model and they put it to us and 
they asked: do you want to participate to it? And the dilemma we were then faced with was 
that for years we were in conflict with the state. And we didn’t make much progress. We had 
some money here, some money there, but not in substantial amount. And conflict didn’t 
work, so let’s try with this, let’s see where we go, let’s give it a shot and we got involved in 
it”. The subjective involvement of CD in its reform is a fundamental aspect to be taken into 
consideration when discussing ideas and strategies to get this movement out of its present 
crisis. As we will see in Chapter 5 it is not enough to condemn state austerity measures and 
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claim that cuts should be withdrawn. Indeed it is not a state designed scheme that is going to 
‘save’ CD from its collapse. A reactivation of CD’s political energies can just be the result of 
people’s subjective involvement at a distance from the state.  
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4 METHODOLOGY 
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In this chapter I discuss the methodological approach that informed the present study. I will 
first (4.1) provide some ‘biographical’ details giving an account of my personal experience of 
Dublin and its inner city, since I have been living there for more than three years for reasons 
that are not directly related to my research, but to more concrete day to day necessities. This 
situation has provided me a particularly insightful point of view on the studied context, which 
I will present here. In section 4.2 I discuss the role that ethnography plays in researching 
marginalised populations and the issues it raises, especially in relation to the interplay 
between structural determinations (the state of the situation) and subjective forms of 
resistance and conflict. 
This will lead me to address the problem of so-called method’s “performativity”, i.e. the fact 
that different approaches tend to literarily create different realities that they pretend then to 
“objectively” analyse.  I will argue that “ontological politics” (Law 2004:162) is something 
that researchers should be aware of, and that they should always make their position and 
values explicit. In my perspective research neutrality is just an ideological construction. 
Therefore reflection is needed on cultural and political meanings within the field of social 
science and on the way researchers situate their specific work in that context. 
After having discussed the epistemological basis of my methodological choices, in section 
4.6 I lay out exactly what concrete instruments (mainly in depth interviews and ethnographic 
observation) I used to collect ‘empirical data’, with whom  and over what period of time.   
To conclude I will discuss possibility as a methodological category. Indeed most of this 
research refers to a present in continuous and rapid evolution which compels the researcher to 
not just refer to what concretely ‘happened’ but also to what could eventually happen. 
‘Possibility’ is central to the field of politics. It has been nevertheless omnipresent in the 
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accounts of those who have been involved in this research, in the form of prescriptions, 
predictions or just simple hopes. 
4.1 Research, objectification and my subjective experience of Dublin inner city  
 
This research is based on a fieldwork conducted for more than one year between 2010 and 
2011. However, having been living in a key researched area for around three years at the 
moment of writing (July 2011), one could say that collection of data started well before at 
informal level. I find it important to open my methodological remarks with this consideration, 
because many of the ideas that I developed in this thesis derive from my personal experience 
and subjective interpretation of studied places, people and processes. This might sound like 
obvious. However, the fact that I have been sharing a house in a particularly poor area of the 
inner city of Dublin was not just a choice dictated by research related intentions. In my case it 
was also due to economic constraints. Indeed, whoever lives in Dublin knows that rents are 
exaggerated, to say the least. On the other hand, with just a PhD scholarship one student can 
not afford to live in an independent apartment, or to rent a decent room in a middle class area. 
So, in order to be able to save some money and get an equally confortable room, one has to 
be content with less ‘trendy’ locations such as for example Mountjoy Square, Summer Hill, 
Drumcondra, the North Circular Road and so on which are the places where Dublin’s 
working classes traditionally live. These populations include now many migrant workers (like 
me) and their families who have come to Dublin during the last 15 years.  
At personal level, the fact that I have felt home in this neighbourhood, not just for choice but 
for necessity, has allowed me to develop an understanding and a sense of solidarity with my 
neighbours which I wouldn’t have experienced otherwise, or at least not in such an intimate 
way. This approach also helped me to overcome linguistic and cultural barriers which are 
obstacle to someone like me who was born elsewhere and just came to Ireland.  
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Usually, social sciences do not require researchers to work on and investigate themselves as 
part of the project. Indeed there is a belief that scholars “can construct consistent knowledge 
on the situation as long as, and precisely thanks to, their being outside, at a prudent distance 
which supposedly guarantees a certain objectivity” (Situaciones 2003).  However, critique 
has highlighted that this objectivity is authentic and efficacious “to the extent that it is 
nothing but the other side of the violent objectualization of the situation [that researchers] 
work upon” (Situaciones 2003). Indeed what happens in traditional research is that it obtains 
a highly ‘descriptive’ knowledge regarding its object; “but this descriptive operation is in no 
way subsequent to the formation of the object, because the form of the object itself is already 
the result of objectualization” (Situaciones 2003).  
In many occasions the construction of my object has followed a very different process. 
Experiences that I ‘accidentally’ had in my daily life – i.e. outside ‘formal’ research settings 
– heavily influenced my understanding of CD and the places where it developed; as if it was 
my object of study revealing itself in unexpected ways and moments, and at higher level of 
intimacy. To the extent that I can say that my flatmates, the adjacent Chinese family, drug 
addicts, pushers and groups of adolescents regularly hanging out in the square’s park, the 
local social centre, my non-Irish appearance, the initially incomprehensible accent of the 
grocery’s employee, the old men spending their time at the local pub decorated with a mural 
representing Bobby Sands and other IRA volunteers who died on hunger strike, are all 
elements that, despite not having been formally investigated, are part and parcel of this 
research.  
4.2 Ethnographic observation and its role in researching underprivileged populations 
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Although this research does not belong to the established genre of the ethnographic 
monograph, ethnography played an essential role in it. Ethnographic approaches to social 
research have been adopted by numerous disciplines including sociology. They are usually 
characterised by features such as a strong emphasis on exploring the nature of particular 
social phenomena working primarily with unstructured data, i.e. data that have not been 
coded at the point of data collection in terms of closed sets of analytic categories (Atkinson & 
Hammersley 1994:248). To be investigated are generally a small number of ‘cases’, 
occasionally just one in detail. Analysis of data usually involves explicit interpretation of the 
meaning and functions of human action, the product of which mainly takes the form of verbal 
descriptions and explanations, with quantification playing a subordinate role (Atkinson & 
Hammersley 1994:248). 
Ethnographic observation is nevertheless an indispensable tool for researching 
underprivileged populations and their organisation. First of all, according to Loic Wacquant 
(2008:9) - a leading scholar in the field of ‘sociology of deprivation and marginalisation’ who 
set out the parameters of conducting research in marginalised communities – “ethnography is 
useful to pierce the screen of discourses whirling around these territories of urban perdition 
which lock enquiry within the biased perimeter of the pre constructed object, and secondly to 
capture the lived relations and meanings that are constitutive of the every-day reality of the 
marginal city dweller”. 
I nevertheless found the ethnographic approach very appropriate to grasp the complexity of a 
movement such as CD, which developed ‘organically’ (as I will define this concept in 
Chapter 6) in underprivileged areas of Dublin. In order to be successful in researching such a 
‘rooted’ phenomenon, one has to become ‘organic’ as well. So I tried to develop what John 
Law defines “knowing as embodiment” and “emotionality” (Law 2004), i.e. a way of 
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researching through the “hungers, tastes, discomforts, or pains of our bodies [and] opening 
ourselves to worlds of sensibilities, passions, intuitions, fears  and betrayals” (Law 2004).  
At the end of the day what we call ‘participant observation’ should be a mode of being in the 
world typical of researchers in general, since they can not study the social world without 
being part of it. And I think that to some extent I achieved this belongingness, of course, 
without leaving aside my foreign point of view that allowed me to produce some 
interpretations, which I hope the reader will find original.  
As I started to illustrate in Chapter 2 (theoretical section), this ‘embedded’ and subjective 
investigation of the inner city of Dublin and its community organisations has always been 
articulated to the analysis of more objective “macrostructural determinations” (Wacquant 
2008:10) - determinations that I have contextualised through the concept of “state-of-the-
situation” (Badiou: 2007), a broad understanding of ‘State’ that goes beyond immediately 
recognisable bureaucratic structures and apparatuses. Indeed, although in contexts (for 
example) of extreme deprivation some of these structures might be absent or week, the state 
“still govern the practices and representations of [these populations] because they are 
inscribed in the material distribution of resources and social possibles as well as lodged inside 
bodies in the form of categories of perception appreciation and action” (ibid. p10).  
On the other hand one should notice that emphasis on this subjective-objective articulation is 
nevertheless fundamental when it comes to break “with falsely self evident notions, and with 
errors inscribed in substantialist thinking in terms of places” (ibid p.10), which scholar 
frequently apply to apparently self-enclosed contexts such as, for example, underprivileged 
neighbourhoods. Here lies the importance of a rigorous analysis of the relations between state 
structures of distribution of places and functions, and subjective struggles for the construction 
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of spaces of independency “in which the state plays a doubly decisive role as the ground of 
confrontation and as the interested protagonist” (ibid. p10)  
4.3 Personal beliefs/ideology and the politics of research 
 
In relation to the idea of “knowing as embodiment” and to the fact that my research has been 
conducted in contexts of deprivation and resistance I should also emphasise that my approach 
to research and the ideas produced in this dissertation did not develop from a ‘neutral’ 
perspective.  This has had important consequences on the research process and outcomes. For 
example my interest in the themes of equality, social justice and emancipation goes beyond 
the walls of the Academia. Such concerns brought me, just after my arrival to Dublin in July 
2008, to immediately look for realities matching my political and social aspirations. 
Accidentally, the premises of Seomra Spraoi ‘autonomous social centre’ are adjacent to the 
house where I live and this allowed me to participate to its activities on a regular basis22. 
Although this encounter was independent from my research purposes, the fact that I found 
myself hanging out in a place like Seomra Spraoi had important consequences on my project, 
especially in terms of meeting activists committed to the centre, many of whom very 
informed on my research topic and available to suggest useful contacts for interviews or 
interesting events which I could eventually participate to.  
Although there are still many sociologists who insist on the idea of ‘neutrality of research’, 
which they consider to be functional to the production of ‘objective’ and ‘scientific’ 
outcomes, one should recognise that neutrality in this field is just an ideological construction. 
The approaches that define themselves as ideologically ‘neutral’ and ‘objective’ are 
                                                          
22
 Seomra Spraoi is an autonomous social centre in Dublin city centre. It is run by a non-hierarchical, anti 
capitalist collective on a not-for-profit basis. It hosts workshops, gigs, political meetings, language lessons, film 
screenings, a vegan cafe and so on. The centre seeks to be a hub of positive resistance in a city and society 
where public spaces have been eaten away by consumerism, property speculation and the culture of the car. 
http://seomraspraoi.org/ 
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frequently those that entail the most dogmatic logics and intentions. As Carlos Frade 
(2009:29) highlights “social sciences are heavily politicised, and more often than not by the 
worst kind of politics, that which pretends or believes itself to be an apolitical activity but de 
facto serves a very specific politics”.  
Of course this applies to the entire disciplinary spectrum. The series of hypotheses that 
sciences generally implement constitute prescriptions regarding the construction and 
definition of reality. Indeed “however impersonal and ‘formulaic’ the work of the natural 
scientist, it stands in no ‘natural’ relationship with the phenomena and events it describes 
(…)” (Frade 2009). In just the same way “the human sciences draw on common sets of 
conventional devices to construct and convey their characteristic portrayals of social sciences, 
actors and cultural meanings” (Atkinson & Hamersley 1994:254).  That different methods 
produce different representations has been a common argument since Bruno Latour and Steve 
Woolgar’s ‘Laboratory Life’ (1979). For example, in Annemarie Mol’s (quot. by Law 2004 ) 
“The Body Multiple: Ontology in Medical Practice” (to which Law 2004 dedicates an entire 
chapter), the study of atherosclerosis constitutes a not necessarily coherent “object”. Mol’s 
ethnographic study shows that there are different versions of the same disease, depending on 
where and how it is investigated. As Law (2004:143) puts it: “Method is not (…) a more or 
less successful set of procedures for reporting on a given reality. Rather it is performative. It 
helps to produce realities. It does not do so freely and at whim. There is a hinterland of 
realities, of manifest absences and Othernesses, resonances and patterns of one kind or 
another, already being enacted, and it cannot ignore these”. What is not always explicit in this 
process, however, are the underlying politics: “the ethical meaning of each of these decisions, 
in what way they involve a certain life-form, a certain way of perceiving the world for 
instance, experiencing the time of existence as the unwinding of a “genetic program”, or joy 
as a matter of serotonin” (Anonymous). 
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If we take seriously the fact that realities are ‘enacted’ that they are not fixed and ‘natural’, 
then the way in which we actually choose to perform them has important political and ethical 
consequences. In this perspective every study is inherently political because of what it makes 
present and absent, visible and invisible. As Law highlights “the implication is that there are 
various possible reasons, including the political, for enacting one kind of reality rather than 
another, and that these grounds can in some measure be debated”. This is what he defines as 
“ontological politics” (Law 2004:162). In his view researchers should self-consciously reflect 
on those politics as part of how they create their objects of study.  
Also, we should not forget that the environment in which research develops is highly 
bureaucratized and framed by specific political concerns - which strongly influence research 
outputs. Indeed “academic research is subjected to a whole set of alienating mechanisms that 
separate researchers from the very meaning of their activity: they must accommodate their 
work to determined rules, topics and conclusions. Funding, supervision, language 
requirements, bureaucratic red tape, empty conferences and protocols constitute the 
conditions in which the practice of official research unfolds” (Situaciones 2003). For a matter 
of ‘transparency’, these processes should always be object of self-reflection and critique by 
scholars.  
Researchers, according to Law (2004), should always make explicit their position and values. 
This involves a reflection on cultural and political meaning within the field of social science 
and on the way researchers situate their specific work in that context. For Law it is 
fundamental that we develop systematic “awareness about who is demanding which results 
and who is to use them”, in order to bring “to light the actual politics one is pursuing and thus 
the gods or clients, if any, one is serving, and at encouraging a consciously chosen politics” 
(Law 2004). Although PhD research is less affected by these systemic influences, it is out of 
105 
 
doubt that in any research project philosophical, ethical and methodological strands 
intertwine – also in those which present themselves as a value-free exercise. 
Thus, in order to unmask these tendencies, and be clear regarding one’s aims, it is important 
that researchers explicitly acknowledge the relation subsisting between their lives, desires, 
ambitions (also political) and research activity. In this idea, according to preeminent points of 
view in sociology, there is nothing wrong. For example Charles Wright Mills (in Frade 2009) 
asserts that admirable academics “do not split their work from their lives”; and that vocation 
should not be separated from one’s achievements in work. “Only when pursued as a cause 
which transcends oneself may the actual vocational practices induce a certain unity between 
vocation and person which is the condition of all true vocations”. Of course this balance is 
not always easily achievable; “how do we force - asks Weber (in Frade 2009) - burning 
passion and a cool judgment together in the same soul?”. However, without vocation and the 
passion it involves, social sciences would consist in a petrified technical activity, devoid of 
any ‘higher’ ambition. “Vocation – argues Frade (2009) - is therefore a choice which lifts the 
human being out of his animal condition, that condition of exclusive concern with oneself 
and indifference to all causes, and, by so doing, raises life above its mechanical or routine 
everyday course, transforming it into a consciously guided venture”. Thus, it is not only a 
choice of a career, but, as Mills (in Frade 2009) states, “a choice of how to live as well as a 
choice of a career”.  
4.4 Qualitative, quantitative research and the concept of “method assemblage”  
 
Principles and methods that I discuss in this section are inscribed in the field of so called 
qualitative research, i.e. a type of enquiry that tends to be based on non-numeric data, as 
opposed to its quantitative counterpart. Currently, any methodological consideration in Social 
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Sciences is based on this distinction, which I consider as being fundamental - but which has 
been also object of critique. 
For instance, also on the basis of what I have said so far it is clear that a research 
methodology spreads beyond the limits that we normally imagine for it, including for 
example “questionnaires, interview design protocols, statistical or qualitative data analysis” 
or even “laboratory benches, reagents and experimental animals” (Law 2004: 40). Indeed, 
being situated in a specific historic-social context, research also encompasses a variety of 
elements from which it is hard to distinguish the quantitative from the qualitative side, like 
“tacit knowledge, computer software, language skills, management capacities, transport and 
communication systems, salary scales, flows of finance, the priority of funding bodies and 
overtly political and economic agendas” (ibid. p41). Virtually, argues Law in a slightly 
historical-materialist tone, “the hinterland of method (…) ramifies out for ever” (ibid p40) – 
same as the hinterland of our research ‘object’, I would argue.  
So, in this network of processes tools ad actors, the distinction between ‘qualitative’ and 
‘quantitative’ has no objective conditions. Rather, it is related to the aforementioned 
performativity, i.e. the fact that our interactions with the world create specific realities by 
focusing on some parts and ignoring others - meaning that ‘qualitative research’ stays for 
‘emphasis on qualitative aspects of research’.  
By analysing reality we craft boundaries and working relations. Thus “method does not 
provide clarity about or simply describe something that is out there, but (…) in a sense it 
creates the objects or phenomena that it seeks to describe” (Le Grange 2007:423). As part of 
this process, some elements, (including methods and tools that guide people in discerning 
reality), disappear and become naturalized or taken for granted as background assumptions.   
107 
 
Given the multiplicity of “fluidities, leakages and entanglements that make up the hinterland 
of research” (law 2004), methods in social sciences should not be conceived as self-enclosed 
structural units but rather as “assemblages” as this idea has been elaborated by John Law 
(2004). “Method assemblage”, is a term that builds from the Deleuzean idea of assemblage as 
a collage of eventually incompatible parts, which is by definition active and in flux. Thus 
Law (2004) defines “method assemblage” not just as a collection of different methods, but as 
a composition of episteme and technologies which can put together a variety of often 
incompatible components, having the capacity to acknowledge unfolding processes and 
practices, rather than just rigid structures” (ibid. p41).  
Concepts of “method assemblage” are useful when we recognise that the realities in which 
we operate (and therefore our objects) are fragmented, multiple in their nature. It helps 
researchers to “imagine methods when they no longer seek the definite, the repeatable, the 
more or less stable. When [they] no longer assume that this is what [they] are after” (Law 
2004). So, how can we deal with this multiplicity and contingency?  
There is no standard answer to this question, because ‘method assemblage’ is not a ‘model’. 
The notion of method assemblage just raises awareness on the fact that when method is made 
or enacted, it necessarily constructs boundaries between “presence”, “absence”, and 
“otherness” (Law 2004). In my view it is up to researchers to be aware of this 
epistemological process and find creative solutions in order to capture what is generally 
excluded by official methods. Nevertheless, by extending the field of visibility researchers 
should also make “space for ambivalence and ambiguity” (ibid. 90) without attempting to 
distort reality into apparent clarity.  
Law provides us with a list of examples of alternative ways of knowing, which I find useful 
to reflect on frequently forgotten sides of reality. He identifies “knowing as embodiment”, 
108 
 
“knowing as emotionality and apprehension”, “knowing through deliberate imprecision”, and 
“knowing as situated enquiry”. As I said before, knowing as embodiment corresponds to 
knowing through our senses. Knowing as emotionality consists in opening ourselves to 
sensibilities, passions, intuitions and fears. Knowing through deliberate imprecision is about 
reconsidering our conception of accuracy, and about finding ways of knowing the indistinct 
and fluid without trying to hold them tightly. Finally, knowing as situated enquiry is about 
rethinking how far knowledge is able to travel and whether it still makes sense in other 
locations. As I said, these are not ‘models’ but just general orientations on how to broaden 
our awareness as researchers. 
 4.5 Research ‘objects’ as dispositifs 
 
In general, I believe that successful research should inspire new thoughts and open new 
horizons of possibility (see below section 4.7) for future research. Openness to possibility is a 
central feature of academic knowledge itself, which is never entirely closed but constantly 
evolving. As Kappelar (quote by Le Grange 2007:429) puts it “I do not really wish to 
conclude and sum up, rounding off the arguments so as to dump it in a nutshell for the reader. 
A lot more could be said about any of the topics I have touched upon … I have meant to ask 
questions, to break out of the frame … The point is not a set of answers, but making possible 
a different practice …”  
For instance the case studies that I analyse in this dissertation are certainly illustrative but not 
representative of every experience in the field of CD in Dublin. Representativeness of a case 
is impossible to argue when dealing with such a movement. Indeed as I have illustrated in 
previous chapters there is not a ‘totality’ of CD. Nor is representativeness possible in politics, 
which by nature are singular and organic to specific contexts. No doubt there are resonances 
between different contexts.  As I argued in Chapter 2 from a theoretical point of view, every 
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political sequence is itself an assemblage of “infinite multiplicities” (Pozzana & Russo 2010), 
of scenes, places, voices, actors, critical points and so on.  
As the notion of assemblage illustrates, the production of a work exploring a CD/post-party 
approach to organisation, which has assumed different forms at different stages - being 
intermittently political - ends up arousing explanatory and descriptive needs, which go 
beyond sociology’s traditional conceptual frames. The reason is related to the fact that 
organisations are first of all “dispositifs”, as Deleuze (2007) describes this concept.  
Like ‘assemblage’, ‘dispositif’ describes objects that are “not fixed in shape, do not belong to 
a large pre-given list but are constructed at least in part as they are entangled together” (Law 
2004: 42). According to Deleuze’s (1991:159) very visual description, a dispositf “is a tangle, 
a multilinear ensamble. It is composed of lines, each having a different nature. And the lines 
in the apparatus do not outline or surround systems which are each homogeneous in their own 
right, object subject language and so on, but follow directions, trace balances which are 
always off balance, now drawing together and then distancing themselves from one another. 
Each line is broken and subject to changes in direction, bifurcating and forked, and subject to 
drifting. Visible objects, affirmations which can be formulated, forces exercised and subjects 
in position are like vectors and tensors. (…) three major aspects (…) are power, knowledge 
and subjectivity [which] are by no means contours given once and for all, but series of 
variables which supplant one another” (Deleuze 1991:159-160). There are, for example, 
‛lines of stratification or sedimentation” but also “lines of actualization or creativity”, lines of 
“fissure and fracture” and so on. Untangling the lines of a dispositif means in each case, 
“preparing a map a cartography a survey of unexplored lands (…) this is what Foucault calls 
fieldwork”. Thus researchers have “to be positioned on the lines themselves; and these lines 
do not merely compose an apparatus but pass through it and carry it north to south, east to 
west or diagonally” (ibid. p160).  
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4.6 In-depth interviews  
 
With the objective to design a metaphorical ‘map’ of the CD dispositif in Dublin, I tried to 
‘untangle’ some of the lines that made it a singular and unrepeatable social/political reality. 
Fieldwork principally relied on ethnographic observation and in-depth interviews. 
The semi-structured in-depth interview represents one of the privileged instruments for 
scholars who use a qualitative approach, since it allows a big freedom of exposition to the 
interviewed (Poirier et al., 1995:15). The interviewer just provides inputs in order to stimulate 
the interviewed to talk about her own experience, living her free to follow the flux of her 
thoughts and to present facts and ideas that she considers to be relevant in relation to the 
studied context. This way, is the interviewed person who provides elements and introduces 
themes that at second stage will become relevant to the objectives of the investigation. The 
semi-directive procedure also allows the interviewer to ask questions aimed to clarify some 
aspects of the narration or verify pieces of information, which emerged in other interviews or 
during observation sessions. It also facilitates the introduction of still unconsidered variables. 
The construction of a list of key questions (which will necessarily evolve during the course of 
the fieldwork) avoids forgetting important details and the narration drifting to non-relevant 
fields.  
More concretely I have conducted 26 semi directive in depth interviews with people (15 men, 
11 women - a condition of the research was that participants remain anonymous, so they can 
not be named here see annex 1) who since the 1960s were involved in post-party CD 
organisations in Dublin.  I also did 30 sessions of ethnographic observation over a period of 2 
years between 2009 and 2011, and, as I said above, I lived for 3 years in a key area. 
111 
 
Interviewees were all people to different extent related to the CD scene in Dublin from the 
1960s onwards. Interviews lasted from about one to two hours each, having taken place in 
different settings such as offices, public spaces, cafes, community centres and so on. Almost 
all interviews were recorded.  Just a few of them were not recorded, due to recording machine 
failure, short notice, or unsuitable (noisy) venue/context. In these exceptional cases abundant 
notes were taken.    
The first interview was suggested by my supervisor and conducted in a phase in which the 
structure of my research project was still being defined. So this first formal encounter with a 
senior community activist helped me to develop a clearer understanding of the overall topic. 
By providing me with contacts for further interviews my interlocutor contributed to the 
starting of a “snowball effect” type of process (i.e. a process of expansion that builds upon 
itself) on which the construction of my sample has been based. This process was facilitated 
by the fact that Dublin’s CD scene is not huge and people involved tend to know each other; 
so it was quite easy to get in touch with key contributors.  
As I mentioned, the fact that I am an activist also allowed me to get in contact with CD 
people through pathways that are internal to social movements. Indeed many CD people are 
in touch with different types of activists and participate to events that are not necessarily 
related to CD (many were also involved in the recent “Occupy” movement). With a few CD 
activists – after meeting them several times formally and informally - I also developed a good 
relation that lasted beyond the interview and that will possibly survive after my PhD is 
completed. After the completion of this thesis I will contact interviewees who are still 
interested in sharing and discussing my findings. Eventually their feedbacks will constitute an 
important contribution to the writing of two articles out of this work. 
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On what concerns collected data, each recorded interview has been archived and then fully 
transcribed. In order to transform over 100 hours of research sessions into a coherent 
argument, during and after transcription I highlighted and commented key parts of the text 
from which central ideas were extracted and elaborated. I also identified arguments 
resonating in different interviews and I grouped them in various thematic areas. I created 
documents where these sections of different interviews are grouped in clusters, which 
provided me with a sort of basic structure for the construction of the ‘empirical’ chapters (5,6 
and 7).  
The methodological perspective that I considered as being appropriate to in-depth interviews 
and the general aims of this work is “ethno-sociological”, as it has been introduced by Daniel 
Bertaux (2003). Indeed, the ethno-sociological approach does not contemplate a hypothetical/ 
deductive reasoning. Therefore it is not based on the construction of 
formal hypotheses from existing models, with the aim of verifying them. It is instead aimed 
to the study of historical and social realities about which, a priori, the researcher may not 
be sufficiently informed (Bertaux, 2003:39). This way the actual research question may be re-
visited as the research process develops, uncovering underlying needs and dynamics. The 
main objective of the ethno-sociological inquiry is to understand how the ‘chosen’ object of 
study works and how it changes over time. Based on the information collected in interviews 
one attempts to map social configurations, mechanisms, processes and logics of action. An 
original advantage offered by the ethno-sociological procedure is the possibility of taking into 
account the diachronic dimension of the researched context, which obviously lacks in direct 
observation. This allows considering the dynamics of action and the configurations of 
observed social relations from a historical/ procedural point of view (Bertaux, 2003:33), i.e 
from the point of view of continuities and changes. Finally it is also worth highlighting that, 
for not being a statistical method, the ethno-sociologic approach excludes the notion of a 
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statistically representative sample. This is substituted by the idea of “progressive construction 
of the sample” (Bertaux, 2003:44). Indeed, since there is no specific number of interviews to 
determine the scientific nature of a work, Daniel Bertaux (2003:49) suggests a saturation 
approach. The attainment of saturation means that new interviews fail to provide additional 
information but merely reiterate previously noted patterns. 
Beyond interviews and ethnographic observation I also contributed to the organisation of two 
“public” sessions using a format in which CD activists and people interested in the  topic 
(CD) could, with some facilitation, engage in a self-reflexive process. This initiatives were 
not formally linked to my project since they were developed by a group of activists 
(including myself) concerned with issues that are similar to those explored in this thesis. The 
aim of these two sessions was to collectively produce critical analysis on CD. Indeed we 
developed the idea that, perhaps due to bureaucratisation, CD activists were no longer 
familiar with self-reflection and self-critique - which in my view are key elements to the 
solution of the impasse that the movement it is experiencing at present. Exchange and 
production of knowledge taking place in these sessions has been useful for research purposes 
as well as for grassroots activism. In particular I noticed that the presence of people who were 
neither academics nor CD activists has been a means to turn the sessions into a sort of public 
event in which the ambiguous and counterproductive boundary between activism (but even 
academia) and the “outside world” could become blurred. When that is the case, activists and 
academics are to some extent forced to speak a different language, which in my view is 
essential for constructively exchange ideas with people who do not necessarily belong to 
those circles.  
To conclude, I also conducted some archival research in the Irish Times’ (the main national 
newspaper) digital archive and in the Irish Left Online Document Archive (an online archive 
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of materials relating to the Irish left with documents, leaflets, pamphlets, posters and 
newspapers from the latter half of the 20th century placed online in PDF format)23 
4.7 Possibility as a methodological category 
 
A big part of this research refers to ephemeral political sequences and a present in continuous 
and rapid evolution, which compels the researcher to not just refer to what actually happened 
(to fixed patterns) but also to what could eventually happen. ‘Possibility’ as a category is 
nevertheless central to politics; and it has been omnipresent in the accounts by those who 
have been involved in this research, in the form of prescriptions, predictions or just simple 
hopes.  
Although ‘possibility’ is a dimension that is central to political situations, it is usually 
dismissed by social research. As Neocosmos argues (2009a) “social science today is unable 
to rise beyond a description or analysis of what exists and seems incapable of thinking what 
could be. This is why it is in crisis”. Moreover, the difficulty to think in terms of possibility 
in the field of social science “has evacuated politics from its domain of thought” (ibid. p5).   
Through a methodological approach that geographers would define as non-representational I 
tried to counter this tendency in my thesis. During fieldwork I developed a commitment to 
being open to new possibilities, “a kind of witnessing through which we are exposed to the 
potential for being-otherwise” (Dewsbury, in Popke 2008: 2) or, in Badiou’s (2007)  words a 
fidelity to the event as that through which new spaces of thinking and moving may come into 
being (McCormack in Popke 2008:2).  
To let ‘possibility’ emerge in interviews means to emphasise the subjective side of people’s 
enunciations and not just interpreting them in the light of a certain social/cultural context. 
                                                          
23
 http://cedarlounge.wordpress.com/archive-index/ 
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Indeed the challenge posed by a political situation is “how to evaluate a decisive subjective 
discontinuity. For the same reason that thought is never fully absorbed into knowledge, nor is 
subjectivity completely derivable from a culture, political situations are marked by a peculiar 
excess of subjectivity with regards to the surrounding political culture" (Russo 2006:679).  
Social researchers dealing with (past or present) political movements should seriously take 
this point into account. Otherwise the danger is to interpret people’s enunciations from a 
state’s (objective) point of view, from which it is impossible to identify any form of 
subjectivity. In the absence of the ability to think politics independently from a state 
perspective “we necessarily revert to thinking through the prism of the state which is, to use a 
computer analogy, the ‘default position’ of any un-theorised politics” (Neocosmos 2009:266). 
This can negatively affect the way in which politics is studied and theorised in the academia. 
If scholars continue to understand it as state-politics, as determined by objective conditions, 
they will just speculate around what ensures the continuation of what exists. And what exists 
today corresponds to what Badiou (2010:99) terms “capitalo-parliamentarianism”, the rule to 
which every state has to adhere, with “its bastardised notion of ‘democracy’”, and its “rabid 
communitarianisms” (Neocosmos, 2009:2).  
The  themes that qualitative social sciences tend to privilege correspond to people’s ‘aims’, 
‘life stories’, ‘expectations’, ‘perceptions’ or ‘behaviours’. Thus researched populations 
are usually questioned about what they remember of their past, about the way they 
imagine their future or how they react in front of a network of relationships, causes and 
effects that are supposed to be given. In this picture to be eluded is the ‘present’ of social 
reality; i.e. the way in which it is influenced by the words, desires and thoughts of those 
who experience it directly.   
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Moreover, since political situations are characterised by eventfulness and high levels of 
subjective involvement, no scientific/objective approach to the situation is suitable to address 
them. Politics does not follow any historical, objective or mechanical rule. It is not, to put it 
with Neocosmos (2009:293) “a precise investigation of what exists, in terms of 
determinations, causes and laws, which may then permit an answer to the question of what 
may come”. Whenever it comes to existence, politics “proceeds on its own” (Balso 2010:16), 
meaning that its conditions are subjective, intrinsic to itself. These conditions are nothing else 
than the actions and declarations of those who are involved in the political procedure. It is 
only by addressing those elements that research can grasp the subjectivity of a specific 
political procedure. Through a nonrepresentational subjective approach CD in Dublin can be 
analysed as a singularity, as something that exceeded the determinism of objective socio-
economic conditions - and the present conjuncture apprehended by its possibles.  
* 
So by conducting interviews and ethnographic observation I did not just pursued the 
reflection of the real (of objective conditions) but I also explored the field of possibility by, as 
Situaciones (2003) put it “looking into [ideas and] practices for the emerging traces of a new 
sociability”. This does not mean to deny or underestimate more ‘objective’ aspects of my 
object of study, but to subordinate them to their subjective counterpart. Indeed, if we are 
implementing a ‘non-representational’ approach, following Lazarus (cit. by Neocosmos 
2009a: 13), investigation of what exists should be subordinated to the investigation of what 
could be, not the opposite way around. Indeed according to this author investigation differs 
according to whether it relates to the category of the ‘possible’ or to that of the ‘extant’. We 
are confronted with two different modes of thought: the first is analytical and descriptive, it 
asks questions regarding what exists; irrespective of the eventual complexity of its research 
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protocols and discoveries, it proposes the scientific character of sites (lieux). The second is 
prescriptive and has as its principal point of entry the question of the possible (ibid.: 8). In 
research possibles stem from subjective elements such as prescriptive declarations, desires 
and acts by people who inhabit the studied situation.  
‘Possibles’ are important because they can open completely new paths for research in social 
sciences. They help to avoid what Wu Ming (2011) calls a “toxic narration”: a narration that 
does not do its job, that “deletes its conjunctive dimension”, that hides the hypotheses and 
tries to narrow the chances to narrate otherwise, to think other possible stories,  other poetic 
truths for the set of facts it refers to.  
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5 CD’S RELATION WITH THE STATE. THE PROBLEM OF 
BUREAUCRATISATION 
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Previously I highlighted that while community based activism has been practiced in Ireland 
for many years, it is only in recent times that it has become ‘official’ in terms of recognition 
and support as Community Development, or the Community Sector. Along with this shift, 
processes of state-building (what in the theoretical chapter, following Wang, I have defined 
as “statification”) overcame political thought and action, leading to depoliticisation and 
allowing the state to “effectively extend its legitimacy in situations where legitimacy was 
strained” (Meade, 2005) – these “situations” corresponding to deprived urban and rural areas 
and the autonomous organisations that had developed in those areas as a response to 
deprivation.  
I consider bureaucratisation as being one of the main symptoms of depoliticisation in CD. 
Theoretically speaking, bureaucratisation is a complex and multifaceted process which 
cannot be reduced to a single explanation or cause. Indeed it can be described as the 
‘becoming state’ (or entering the field of the state - in a broad sense) of a form of 
organisation - or a social activity in general. Moreover, bureaucratisation of political 
organisations, which is what interests here, takes place in the context of political sequences 
which are singular as well as situated in specific contexts. Therefore it is impossible to give it 
a sociological frame that might be valid for every particular case. What is ‘universal’ in 
bureaucratisation is its outcome; i.e. the ‘becoming state’ and the depoliticisation of politics. 
The aim of this chapter is to give an account and to critically problematize the 
bureaucratisation of CD from different points of view. 
 
In the first section (5.1) I critically address the problem of funding. In particular I criticise the 
consensus that exists among activists and scholars that funding is the main cause of 
bureaucratisation. In my view the fact that funded projects tend to bureaucratise is in itself 
insufficient to demonstrate that this process is a direct consequence of funding. On the 
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contrary, I argue that this is just a superficial argument that could possibly work during the 
Celtic Tiger, but it is now losing its credibility. Indeed, on one hand there are examples of 
groups who receive funding from the state and yet do not depoliticise; on the other hand one 
should notice that in (capitalist, neo-liberal) urban context, economic dependency from 
state/market is unavoidable.  
In section 5.2 the case of Community Response, a project operating in the south inner city, is 
subject to analysis in order to evaluate the way in which bureaucratisation affects CD projects 
in terms of professionalization. Through the imposition of expert, technical knowledge issues 
are abstracted from their socio-political context which alone gives them meaning. To be 
accessed by ordinary people and democratised (which is CD’s mission), they need to be re-
politicised and their technical quality shown to be, at best, only partly independent of socio-
political content (Neocosmos 2007:50). 
Finally in section 5.3 I critically discuss what I define as CD’s ‘institutional tendency’. On 
one hand I will show how CD institutions are innovative, strategic and rooted in the socio-
historical texture in which CD developed. In a context of permanent threat of displacement, 
CD institutions acquired a double social/political value. Not only around them local people’s 
involvement and politicisation has been organized, but they have assume the symbolic value 
of ‘strongholds’ to manifest an irremovable (institutional) presence. On the other hand I argue 
that, for being easily articulated to state procedures, this institutionalising tendency has 
constantly exposed CD organisations to the risk of bureaucratisation and professionalization. 
After providing a number of empirical examples, I conclude by reflecting about CD 
institutions as forms of organisation that go beyond the public/private dualism. 
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5.1 The funding issue. Do CD projects tend to bureaucratise because they are funded?  
 
In 2004, analysing the outcomes of their research, Powell & Geoghegan commented that 
“what is striking about this data is that community development in Ireland is almost 
completely dependent on the state for funds” (p 128), and that CD was almost entirely 
composed by paid workers. In light of recent circumstances this statement sounds like an 
alarm bell. Indeed over the last two years there has been a sustained attack on community 
organizations in Ireland, which has taken advantage of CD’s dependency upon (and overlap 
with) the state. As I illustrate in Chapter 8, cutbacks have been particularly severe and 
endemic, mainly hitting those projects that are viewed as more challenging and 
confrontational. Currently, a shared feeling among activists is that the state wants to 
definitely get rid of the sector. Certainly the best way to achieve this is to cut funding and 
leverage the hyper-bureaucratised relation it entails with CD projects. As I noted in the 
introductory remarks, this situation is paradoxical because although CD did not develop as an 
intrinsic evolution of state apparatuses and functions, nor from a supposed ‘bureaucratic 
rationality’ (a state scheme), cutbacks are seen by many groups as a possible dead knell for 
CD. In my view, this analysis is more emotionally driven than rational. 
In any case the imposition of cut-backs by the government had at least the result to take the 
question of funding back to the mainstream, exposing the numerous ambiguities that shape it. 
The aim of this section is to challenge a consensual view that sees funding as the main cause 
of CD’s bureaucratisation and ‘existential crisis’. This critique will give me the opportunity 
to re-frame the question of funding in a more rational way.  
 
During my encounters with Dublin based community activists the problem of the cuts and the 
question of funding emerged constantly. According to what they refer, bureaucratisation is 
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particularly hard to deal with because of the funding schemes in which CD groups are 
tangled. Emphasis on so-called “performance indicators” (Powell & Geoghegan 2006:857) 
forces projects to time consuming, complex consultative exercises, like writing funding 
proposals, take part in committee meetings, demonstrating the efficient use of resources, 
commitment to achieving targets and the use of outcome measures in order to prove value for 
money (ibid:857).   
When CD activists analyse this situation they give the impression to believe that it was 
money itself that corrupted CD organisations and eroded their autonomy: “projects - they 
argue - can only operate in a certain way, they are restricted because they are funded. And 
organisations that were not state funded and that became funded changed their way of 
working; it changes the atmosphere and the objectives; it affects the energy with which the 
organization was created” (Lisa,activist). Or, as Claire (activist) bitterly observes: “I suppose 
during the Celtic Tiger, when there was money around, in some ways it almost nearly 
destroyed us”.  
I think these quotes, and especially the last one, are revealing of the ambiguities that at 
present shape the question of economic sustainability of their projects. Indeed, on one hand 
there is a sense that funding constitutes the cause of CD’s decline; on the other hand this 
perception strongly clashes with the idea that cutbacks constitute a possible dead knell for 
CD. This ambiguity mirrors in the fact that many CD projects are simultaneously fighting 
against the cutbacks and seeing some benefits in the fact that they are not anymore involved 
in funding schemes since they can now devote more time to independent political initiatives. 
As Lisa highlights “now the other side of cutbacks is that a couple of those senior community 
activists have lost their job, and in some sense this frees them up and they are now involved 
on a full time basis in whatever group or committee they want to be because they do not have 
that responsibility of running a project”. In other cases, “there are also activists that” - in 
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order to resolve this problem - “want now to create something that is not funded by the state 
because it restricts them in what they want to do” (Lisa).  
 
To be sure not having to deal with the state in terms of funding (after decades where this was 
the leitmotiv) might be ‘refreshing’ for many activists. But this raises many controversial 
questions such as: are we sure that the problem is just money itself, and that bureaucratisation 
will vanish after funding schemes are taken off? (Then why should CD be so concerned with 
the cutbacks?) Is autonomy just a question of economic self-sufficiency; or is there something 
else that CD has lost with partnership and that now it has to fight for? And even more crucial 
to the scope of this section: is full autonomy possible in (capitalist, neo-liberal) urban 
context?  
 
5.1.1 The example of Chiapas 
 
At present it is difficult to point to concrete examples of organisations experiencing ‘full 
autonomy’, or full independency from state/capital. Societies are so globalised and processes 
tend to be so interconnected that autonomy sounds pretty much like utopia. Indeed an 
example that is frequently brought up – one of the few that are suitable to this type of analysis 
– is quite exotic and corresponds to the Zapatistas of Chiapas24. To be sure the Zapatista 
experience has strongly resonated in many parts of the world, including western metropolises. 
And for those who were inspired by them and wanted to ‘reproduce’ their experience the 
problem has been that of thinking their autonomy in contexts, such as, for example, western 
                                                          
24
 The Zapatista movement was able to achieve an unprecedented level of autonomy from the state, keeping it at 
such a subjective distance that they were able to neutralise its repressive violence recurring to political more 
than military strategies. Interestingly enough the Zapatistas claim not to be interested in the seizure of state 
power; their aim is the transformation of power the way it is. And in fact they manage to keep themselves – as 
Badiou (crisis of the negative 654) would put it – “in a state of semi-dissidence and conflictual alliance with the 
state” that allows them to keep it at a distance. 
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cities, where living conditions and forms of struggles are completely different. As John 
Holloway (2005) argues “we who live in the cities (…) do not live within the sort of 
communal support structures that exist in Chiapas. We do not have land on which to grow the 
basic foodstuffs necessary for survival, and we are not, on the whole, accustomed to the 
levels of complete poverty that is the daily experience of the Zapatistas of Chiapas” (ibid. 
p170). Of course in cities it is “possible to occupy land for these purposes (as some of the 
piquetero groups in Argentina are beginning to do), but for most urban groups this is not an 
option” (ibid. p173). To make it short, in cities it is actually impossible to reach the same 
level of autonomy that the Zapatistas communities have achieved in Chiapas. Indeed cities 
constitute the core of capitalist oppression and exploitation. Although resistance is constantly 
produced in cities, their environment does not allow a complete independency (especially a 
‘material’ one) from state & capital.  
This simple fact sets the question of funding under a completely different light; in my view 
debates around CD should take it more seriously. 
As Holloway (2005) highlights, “urban autonomous groups survive either on the basis of 
state subsidies (sometimes forced by the groups themselves as in the case of the piqueteros 
who use the roadblocks to force the government to give money to the unemployed) or on the 
basis of some mixture of occasional or regular paid employment and state subsidies. Thus, 
many urban groups are composed of a mixture of people in regular employment, of people 
who are by choice or by necessity in irregular or occasional employment and of those who 
(again by choice or necessity) are unemployed, often dependent on state subsidies or some 
sort of market activity for their survival” (p174). Thus if a Dublin based community group is 
composed by just ‘volunteers’ it is fair to think that they have some source of income (i.e. 
some form of economic dependency) outside the organisation. In this case, the fact that the 
organisation does not depend on any form of direct support by the state/market in terms of 
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funding does not make it ‘objectively’ independent from these forces. But also think about 
activists who were made unemployed by recent cutbacks and yet chose to continue their 
activity while receiving unemployment benefits; this does not make them and their 
organisation less materially dependent on the state than they were before.   
 
 5.1.2 Funding is not an ethical issue 
 
Whenever academics and activists discuss whether it is acceptable or not that CD projects be 
funded by the state, their arguments go back to the question of the ‘nature’ of CD, as if this 
was a sort of ethical question and as if money was in itself decisive in the evaluation of a 
project. For example, Powell and Geoghegan (2004: 123) argue that the issue of funding 
“raises the question of whether community development should be seen primarily as a 
response by indigenous communities to their social exclusion or as a strategy by the state to 
utilise the inherent concept of self-help within community development to get marginalised 
communities to take responsibility for the poverty and other forms of exclusion they may be 
experiencing”. In my view, to frame the problem as Powell and Geoghegan do is misleading. 
Indeed their point of view to certain extent neglects the analysis of the ‘objective’ conditions 
(state, capital, the city) in which people and organisations are situated. And therefore it tends 
not to recognise the fact that economic dependency is to great extent inescapable in cities – 
independently from one organisation’s ‘nature’ and political orientations.  
 
As I emphasised since the beginning of this work, CD in Dublin is a collectively organised 
response to poverty and oppression, which generated unprecedented political outcomes. 
These experimental projects were ‘at a distance’ and ‘excessive’ to any form of state 
rationality. Politics – as I define this notion in the theoretical framework of this thesis – is 
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something that anyone can do, even the poorest person in the world, and it does not 
necessitate of funds in order to exist. Nevertheless, it is not the presence of state funds what 
compromises the politics of a project, because even without funds this project would be 
exposed to other forms of economic dependency. Holloway’s answer to the question if it is 
possible for a movement to be completely autonomous is negative; especially in the context 
of cities which are the quintessential locus of capitalist expansion and exploitation.  
 
So if we think the situation in these terms it is unsurprising that a group might decides to take 
advantage of resources that the state makes available. Especially if this group is, as in the 
context of CD, particularly poor in terms of resources. This simple fact does not necessarily 
equate with the renunciation of one’s politics and search for autonomy. So, in my view Terry 
Robson (2001) is not accurate when he concludes that “such interventions [funding schemes] 
transform the ‘community’- based organisation from one moved by local, neighbourhood 
considerations and accountable to local people, to one influenced by the interests of the state 
and accountable to its stringent financial controls”. Indeed autonomy does not just correspond 
to economic self-sufficiency. Even in a situation of economic ‘dependency’ such as that in 
which almost everyone is constrained in advanced capitalist societies groups can still try and 
“push autonomy as far as possible” (Holloway 2005:173).  
This is not to negate that funding agencies actually frame funding delivery with schemes that 
at the end of the day are aimed to change the way CD should work, and depoliticise it.  As 
Mary highlights “community activism has become dependent on funding and that is not how 
community activism should be; people involved in the area should not need funding”. The 
problem is that together with funding, many other things have changed: “funding has shaped 
more that it should have what people are doing; and people are caught in their day to day 
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struggle to keep their project going”. Funding is not wrong in itself; “if it changes the ethos of 
what you do, if it transforms it in something else, than it is wrong”. (Lisa) 
 
At the end of the day it is important for urban CD groups to be aware that this coexistence of 
economic dependency and the will to develop autonomously forces them into contradictory 
situations (such as for example funding schemes) “in which it is much better to recognise 
those contradictions rather than to gloss over them” (Holloway 2005:173). In my view this 
awareness is fundamental in order not to be exposed to state manipulation and therefore 
depoliticisation. However this awareness should be the result of a self-reflective activity that 
has frequently lacked in the history of CD. Due to this lack, there never was (for example) an 
anti-co-option alliance that attempted to produce collective critique and resistance to the 
pitfalls of systemic funding. On the contrary many groups uncritically accepted funding-
related processes of ‘reform’, while many others were actually born out of this bureaucratic 
frame. 
 
In the context of capitalism, dependency on forces that are difficult to control exposes 
community groups to problems and limitations that should be recognised. “The significance 
of these limitations obviously depends on the collective strength of the groups: in the case of 
the piqueteros, for example, the payment of the state subsidies was imposed by road blocks 
and administered by the groups themselves” (ibid. p174). This is the example of a group that 
despite receiving funding from the state does not bureaucratise; which demonstrates that the 
problem is not money in itself. ‘Bureaucratisation’ points to much broader processes. Money 
might be accepted, but it should not constitute an obstacle to the realising of peoples’ dreams 
and objectives. 
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 5.1.2 Finessing and community work 
 
Unfortunately, due to this lack of collective self–reflexivity, those who try to resist this 
bureaucratic logic, do it as individuals or single groups, and in a way that does not openly 
challenge the system - and therefore with limited or ambiguous outcomes, which certainly 
can not be described as political, or emancipatory. For example, what seems to be a popular 
strategy among CD groups is not to report in funding applications or assessments certain 
activities that funding providers would not consider to be ‘suitable’. As a CD activist refers: 
“As a development worker, they don’t have all the details of the work I do. And I do a lot of 
drama and it would be influenced by the work of Augusto Boal: theatre of the oppressed, 
theatre of change, theatre of education etc… So this project here is done with the people I 
work with, most of them drug users, so this work was very hidden, and I had to find the way 
to do it because I knew that the state would not fund this particular project. It would not see 
the use of theatre and drama as particularly relevant. Maybe they would bring in someone to 
do a drama workshop once or twice, but they would not see drama working with people in the 
community to look at problems related to their health”. 
 
 
Another similar tactic is to finessing in funding applications by telling state-agents what they 
want to hear and then, once funding has been delivered, to do a slightly different work from 
that which was initially agreed. As an activist puts it “my proposal to the state for funding 
says one thing and this thing is what the state wants to hear;  and if I get that funding it gives 
me the space to do the work I think should be done and that the state does not agree with” 
(Sam).  
 
A third tactic is to look for other funding sources. I find this quite controversial because on 
one hand alternative providers are frequently multinational companies, whose intentions have 
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no affinity with those of CD organisations. On the other hand, in a phase that is marked by 
cuts in public expenditure, the state indirectly promotes a dangerous shift towards the market 
– and in doing so it opens new possibilities for profit and exploitation in poor areas of the 
city. As I will illustrate in Chapter 8 this social-economic approach to CD has been 
increasingly emphasised after the recent cuts, with social entrepreneurs developing strategies 
to make community groups more marketable.  
 
5.2 Bureaucratisation as the triumph of “expert knowledge”. The case of Community 
Response (CR).  
 
In order to evaluate the compound ways in which bureaucratisation affects CD organisations, 
more than money itself, it is worth to address the issue of professionalization, i.e. the 
imposition of the rule of expert, technical knowledge to the practice of CD. The case of 
Community Response, a group operating in the south inner city is taken here into analysis – 
for I consider it to be particularly illustrative of this phenomenon.    
 
Community Response is a community project that develops ways of tracking problem drug 
use and its effects in Dublin’s South Inner City. Their aim is to work with local residents to 
determine their own solutions to drug related issues. Having started as a response by people 
who use drug services, Community Response (CR) operates out of the history of local 
activism in the south inner city where – same as in the north - the heroin problem became 
epidemic, with the state having been reluctant to intervene in a meaningful, consistent and 
egalitarian way; showing instead an inclination to marginalise and criminalise those realities 
(see Chapter 2, where I refer to the drug crisis and CPAD). 
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From the late 1970s many community drug teams emerged in the north and south inner city 
in order to deal with this problem on a voluntary basis. In doing so, they occupied a political 
space that was left empty by ‘traditional’ organisations (the republican and socialist left) 
which always tended to ignore or underestimate issues related to health and ‘the body’. Due 
to this lack of concern by both the state and ‘official’ politics, and having to deal with state 
laws and institutions which were particularly conservative and exclusionary in Ireland25, the 
approach of CD to heroin issues has been quite experimental and confrontational since the 
beginning of the heroin epidemic. 
 
During the partnership era the unstructured network of independent local drug teams that had 
emerged in the 1980s underwent a process of structural reform – as I describe it in Chapter 2. 
As a result 13 drug task forces were set up around Dublin gathering statutory agents, 
voluntary agents and community representatives. Following a partnership approach, drug task 
forces (DTF) act as hybrid institutions that mediate between the state, local organisations and 
eventually private entities. They also act as agencies to which local groups can submit their 
applications for funding. Although each DTF carries out the same type of functions, they 
differ from each other, depending by the specific type of approach that individual state agents 
and community delegates impose on them. 
For example, the south inner city drug task force (to which CR is associated) developed into a 
corporate type of entity, being controlled by a restricted group of people who act as a sort of 
executive board. Having been there for quite a long time, this core group got into a powerful 
position, directly controlling people who ‘come and go’ and having the last say on key issues, 
including funding. In other areas, like the North Inner City, task force administration is 
                                                          
25
 For example the state was refusing to set up needle exchanges, where people could exchange used needles for 
clean ones. Or think that prisoners in a very advanced phase of HIV/AIDS related illness were handcuffed to 
hospital beds and monitored by prison guards. (O’Broin 2010) 
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described by activists as more democratic, being organised according to principles that are 
closer to those of CD than to state/corporate management.  
 
 5.2.1 Knowledge/expertise as power-over 
   
As I said, this case is particularly useful for the aims of this chapter, because ‘health and the 
body’ the field in which CR operates constitutes a privileged point of view on the processes 
that I am investigating here. Indeed one should notice that when community groups deal with 
public health related issues, to generate a ‘bottom-up’ CD approach – i.e. a situation in which 
people’s more or less direct experience of the problem constitutes the principal tool for 
collective intervention - is far more complex and challenging than in other cases, like for 
example when dealing with housing or education. This is because issues such as drug 
dependency, HIV, Hepatitis C and so on, require ‘by nature’ a certain level of basic 
‘technical’ knowledge by those who aim to address them. My argument here is that since 
health is quite composite as an area of intervention in terms of knowledge, expertise, 
symbolic implications etc., in a way it results easier for organisations that deal with it to 
bureaucratise (in terms of professionalization), and therefore to depoliticise.  
 
In other words health is a field in which, more than in others, the state can impose its ‘form’ 
and its way of functioning. And this is because in health related issues knowledge/expertise 
can be imposed as power over life: it immediately assumes a bio-political dimension - in the 
sense Foucault (2010) gives to this concept – investing the production and reproduction of 
life itself. As a CR activist argues “there is a problem of representation”, meaning that in 
contexts where a specific type of knowledge can make the difference regard life, processes of 
representation (and ontologically speaking, the state is a form of representation) are more 
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likely to be implemented. Namely, it is more likely that ‘experts’ start acting on behalf of (or 
for) those who have no expertise.  The huge symbolic value ‘bio-political knowledge’ can 
assume in this context, together with the ‘complexity rhetoric’ that experts apply to the issues 
at stake and the necessity to deal with them as ‘professionally as possible’ can be used as 
tools to ‘take over’ the problem and dispossess ordinary people of the control they had 
achieved (or could potentially achieve) over it through independent action and collective 
organisation. When this is the case, “the things the people have fought hard for are taken by 
those who claim to be leaders [or experts] and given back to the people as 'delivery'” (Zikode 
2009). This generates a situation that is “divided between the rulers (the visible subjects) and 
the ruled (the invisible de-subjectified subjects)” (Holloway 2002:19) 
 
Neocosmos (2004) describes this dispossession through expert knowledge in terms of ‘de-
contextualisation’ or ‘abstraction’ and ascribes to it a strong depoliticising power. “Technique 
and science (the bearers of which are experts and state expertise) are thus unavoidably 
abstracted by the state from the socio-political context and conditions which alone give them 
meaning, and thus acquire a life of their own, independent of that context and those 
conditions. To be accessed by ordinary people and democratised, they need to be re-
politicised and their technical quality shown to be, at best, only partly independent of socio-
political content” (Neocosmos 2004:216). This ‘de-contextualisation’ or ‘abstraction’ that 
Neocosmos refers to is a form of representation - a ‘state procedure’, as i defined this idea in 
the theoretical chapter of this thesis. In order to counter de-contextualisation, the “assumption 
of impartiality that lies at the core of professional claims [and that] mirrors the state’s own 
claim to neutrality (…) must be rejected” (O’Donovan & Meade 2002:8).  
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De-contextualisation of widespread heroin addiction and related issues is a matter which CR 
addresses on a daily basis. I find the description by a CR activist of what happens at DTF 
meetings in the south inner city of Dublin quite illustrative in this respect: 
“When you go to the [DTF] meetings there can be 20 people around from different 
backgrounds; and they are talking about a big range of issues, and policy, and services for 
drug users, and services for families, rehabilitation services, methadone program protocols 
and so on. And it is difficult for people from the community to deal with that stuff. You have 
to learn the language of bureaucracy. And now most of the time they are left on their own 
with that.”  
 
This contribution highlights the way in which the abstraction from the context operated by 
technical/bureaucratic expertise can play an exclusionary, depoliticising role. Indeed by 
producing a normative type of discourse which just a few skilled people are familiar with, 
expert language imposes itself as the only one capable to meaningfully refer to the situation 
and therefore to rule it, interdicting ordinary people to effectively engage. This reproduces a a 
depoliticised situation. Indeed according to Neocosmos (2004) under these conditions, 
“frankly political questions regarding the social entitlements and needs of various groups 
which may touch on the transformation of this order, become subsumed and hidden under 
issues of technical expertise, claims for greater access to state resources, and the deployment 
of state largesse within a discourse of state ‘delivery’” (Neocosmos 2004:217). As we have 
seen in section nr1 of this chapter, the emphasis that funding has assumed within discourses 
on CD is symptomatic of a depoliticised mentality.  
 
5.2.2 ‘Power-over’ and ‘power- to’ in CD 
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Bureaucratisation through knowledge/expertise is particularly visible in health related fields 
such as those in which CR operates, but it is a process affecting CD in all its forms. 
According to, a south inner city activist, with the advent of partnership and neo-liberal 
governance, the effectiveness of “everything we do is measured in terms of outcomes. In this 
context, community development becomes specialised, and the result is that power is taken 
from those communities who created the actual organisation”. 
 
I find Susan’s reflection quite revealing - especially her last sentence, which I have 
emphasised in italic. No doubt there is a question of power involved in the construction of 
independent projects and their resistance to de-contextualisation. We can argue that when – 
as Susan puts it – “power is taken by the state from those who created an independent 
organisation”, a shift in power takes place, which in Holloway’s (2011) terms can be 
described as shift from “power-to” to “power-over”. Indeed according to this author power 
“has two opposed senses. On the one hand is power-to, which is our creative subjective 
power, a movement of uniting, of integrating my doing into the social flow of doing” 
(Holloway 2011). On the other hand there is an objectifying power, the same as that 
according to which the state operates (power-over), which is “instrumental power, (…) a 
movement of separating, of dividing the done from the doing, of separating my doing from 
the social flow” (ibid.).  
 
These two forms of power are opposed to each other, because they are driven by two 
different desires. Power-to is ‘positive’ because it manifests itself as power-to-do, as a 
potentiality. When we achieve things together with other people, out of our creativity, that is 
power-to; it is – as Holloway (2011) puts it – “can-ness, capacity-to-do, the ability to do 
things”. In my view, the circumstances in which CD made the best of its potentialities have 
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always been when its singular achievements were expression of this collective power-to. 
When people living in deprived areas of the inner city of Dublin transform a ‘non-place’, 
such as for example a dismissed space separating two estates, into a community garden26 
where they can grow foodstuff and engender new forms of socialization in the area, this is 
power-to. When these same people despite the lack of concern by the Irish state have created 
alternative institutions - such as clinics, family support networks, community self-policing 
institutions and so on -  in order to respond to problems related to alarming levels of heroin 
abuse affecting their neighbourhoods, this was an example of ordinary people’s power-to. 
 
On the other hand, when the authorities, concerned by the existence of independent forms of 
organization in working class areas, intervene trying to control or even to co-opt what people 
have spontaneously created, what they actually do is to reorganise the situation according to a 
power-over type of structure. This intervention corresponds to an imposition, to the creation 
of boundaries, identities, taxonomies, hierarchies etc. - because this is how the state works. 
This can happen in a very explicit way, like for example when the local authority decides to 
bulldoze a community garden and to give the allotment away (back) to a rich developer. In 
that case land is subtracted to people’s creativity and given back to the market; in this process 
power-to turns into power-over.  As a South African community activist highlights “it is a 
kind of theft – to take away the valuable things of the people and to put them to work in a 
system that is against the people but in favour of the powerful” (Zikode 2009). “Doing” 
argues John Holloway “is broken as the ‘powerful’ separate the done from the doers and 
appropriate it to themselves. The social flow is broken as the ‘powerful’ present themselves 
as the individual doers, while the rest simply disappear from sight”. 
 
                                                          
26
 This is the case in many areas of the inner city including some of the most deprived including Summerhill. 
See http://www.photoireland.org/blog/new-work/the-hidden-garden 
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As we have seen, this ‘conversion’ of power can be imposed with bulldozers, with ‘physical’ 
power. But there are also more subtle strategies that the state might put in place in order to 
achieve this shift, such as those that I am describing in terms of bureaucratisation and 
professionalization, de-contextualisation and so on. Technocracy, thanks to its capacity to 
create subdivisions, specialisations, taxonomies, standard procedures etc. is an effective 
instrument to fracture people’s power-to-do. As Carlos Frade (2009:18) argues, “when 
meeting managerial targets is the master motive driving vocational practices, any language 
which deviates from counting, efficiency, ‘quality’ and the like is bound to be dismissed out 
of hand as anachronistic or out of place” – and any political claim is dismissed. This re-
articulation, highlights John Holloway (2002), “means not the capacity to obtain some future 
good but just the contrary: the incapacity to obtain the future good, the incapacity to realise 
our own projects, our own dreams. It is not that we cease to project, that we cease to dream, 
but unless the projects and dreams are cut to match the 'reality' of power relations (and this is 
usually achieved, if at all, through bitter experience), then they are met with frustration” 
(Holloway 2002:18). 
 
 5.2.3 Service delivery, participation and self-activation. Some clarifications  
 
Poor peoples’ politics - and therefore CD politics - should not be conceived as aimed at 
service delivery – at power-over, as Holloway puts it. Something that a CD approach 
perceives as wrong in the system we live is the idea that ‘development’ (political, social etc.) 
is the job of a few skilled representatives who are meant to think on behalf of the majority 
about their ‘development’. Grass roots organizations such as those that are grouped under the 
aegis of CD – when they are faithful to their political raison d’etre - challenge this top-down 
approach that sees people as incapable to think and therefore take independent decisions 
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regards their own lives. As Ruth (activist) says “CD is based on the belief that everybody has 
the ability to do things and that people never fail when they try, it is when they don’t try that 
they fail”. Thus the real challenge for an egalitarian type of ‘development’ is that it accepts 
and assures that people can actually take control over their own lives.  
 
This, one should notice, has become quite controversial in a neo-liberal context where 
‘participation’, ‘engagement’, ‘sustainability’ and so on are emphasised as policy/propaganda 
keywords. Indeed, when participation, empowerment, engagement and so on are advocated 
by the state their meaning and their articulation to real situations can be highly misleading. 
On one hand, “what is called ‘engagement’ or ‘public participation’ is often just a kind of 
instruction, sometimes even a threat. Many times it is done in such a way that all possibilities 
for real discussion and understanding are closed from the start” (Zikode 2009). And the case 
of ordinary people’s participation to DTF meetings in the South Inner City is eloquent in this 
respect. “In these cases what is called engagement is really just a way for the state [or for 
partnership] to pretend to be democratic when in reality all decisions are already taken and 
taken far away from poor people” (Zikode 2009).  
 
On the other hand, one should notice that during the last two decades concepts of 
“exclusion”, “self-activation” and “participation” have been promoted by the authorities in 
contexts of welfare state demolition. They appeal “to Irish and European policy-makers in 
part because of [their] relative lack of content and [their] lack of historical and ideological 
overtones. (Saris et al. 2002:174 ), their vagueness being their strength. Destructing public 
services and ‘mobilising communities’ for their own wellbeing are phenomena that go side 
by side.  
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In order to avoid miscomprehensions I think it’s important to clarify my thoughts on the way 
I oppose ‘delivery by the state’ to ‘people’s self-activation’ - since around this opposition 
rotates the problem of bureaucratisation.  Namely, I should emphasise that when I speak 
about people taking control of their own lives I do not mean that they do not need service 
delivery. Certainly I am not advocating the idea to “let the poor manage their own poverty” 
as Gaffikin and Morrissey (cit. by Robson 2001:235) cynically describe CD action. 
Obviously, everyone needs services and goods that he can not provide for himself. Moreover, 
the problems that local communities experience can be not just internal to them, but they 
have systemic conditions that require ‘systemic’ responses – that CD organisations alone can 
not provide.  
 
What I actually intend to put forward here is that ordinary people should be entitled to have a 
say on the way in which things that affect their own lives are organised and ‘delivered’– not 
necessarily from a ‘technical’ point of view, but definitely from a political one. This 
generally is a very central concern for CD groups that aim to be more than a means to fill 
social welfare gaps. As Zikode (2009) argues, “it is one thing if we are beneficiaries who 
need delivery. It is another thing if we are citizens who want to shape the future of our cities, 
even our country. (…) Some problems are technical. Some problems are political. But we 
find that without our own political empowerment we can not even resolve the technical 
problems. The solving of even very small technical problems, like a broken toilet, requires 
that we are first recognized as people that count”. This argument refers to South African 
shack dwellers and their community organisations. Nevertheless it resonates with what I am 
arguing about CD and independent politics in general. The emancipatory process, which 
should be a central concern for CD, does not pass through delivery by the state because each 
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person’s emancipation is not something that can be done on her behalf. As Holloway (2010) 
says, people need to “assume the responsibility for [their] own humanity” (p19). 
 
The same can be argued for deeper social issues such as the heroin epidemic in Dublin inner 
city. The fundamental objective of movements and institutions that emerged in poor 
neighbourhoods was not just to obtain health services. The problem that they were facing and 
addressing was political to the extent that the state was not just denying the existence of the 
heroine issue, “it was also denying the existence of people and communities who were 
naming that issue” (O’Broin 2010) which can be seen as part of a broader reality in which 
these people were not counted by the state. Obviously this does not mean that the state was 
not informed about their existence; it means that it did not recognise their capacity to think – 
it did not count them as equals. This situation, one should notice, does not have changed after 
the creation of for example methadone clinics, or DTF; and that is why it is still political. 
 
For ideas of ‘participation’, ‘self-activation’, ‘empowerment’ and so on to be meaningful, the 
political vision of the situation should always precede other points of view, including 
technical, economic, and so on. So, as a CR activist argues, “it’s time for them [ordinary 
people, service users] to be effective”; meaning that it is time for community groups to 
challenge this system that conceives CD as a form of decentralised, second class service 
delivery that relegates people to a position of passivity and reproduces a situation of 
inequality and oppression. As I will further elaborate in chapter 6, a few groups (among 
which CR) are actually trying to address this problem, by generating processes that escape 
representation and de-contextualisation: 
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“We work towards mobilising people and we set up a situation (…) On the contrary if we 
elect representatives to enter in the drug task force we are entering into the system, we are not 
creating an alternative. By sending people to go into this battlefield of bureaucracy you are 
putting people who come from very difficult situations in a strange position. It is better to 
create alternatives” (Chris).  
 
This argument is utterly political gathering some of the most essential ‘values’ of CD, as it is 
conceived in the present work. Its central thesis is that representative mechanisms de-
contextualise politics and incorporate it to the domain of the state, where it depoliticises 
inevitably. It is in the interest of community organisations to protect their politics from this 
danger and keep it at a distance from the state.       
 
5.3 CD’s institutional tendency  
 
“But continuity of organisation is a 
rare and complex thing: no sooner is 
organisation institutionalised into a 
form, than it is immediately used by 
capitalism” (Tronti 1979: 6)  
 
 
In the previous sections of this chapter I have described some of the processes through which 
CD organisations bureaucratise, effectively losing their independency and becoming in all 
respects subsumed in state procedures. 
 
The aim of this section is to enrich the analysis of CD’s relation with the state by exploring a 
tendency that community groups had since the beginning, which is that of generating CD 
institutions. On one hand I will show how these institutions are a result of people’s ‘power-
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to’, as well as innovative and strategically rooted in the socio-historical texture of the 
neighbourhoods in which CD developed. On the other hand I will argue that, for being easily 
articulable to state procedures, this institutionalising tendency has constantly exposed CD 
organisations to the risk of bureaucratisation and professionalization.  
 
 5.3.1 CD institutions operating in a ‘grey zone’ 
 
There is a popular belief amongst community activists that “there is a grey zone between 
service provision and activism, and community development plays in this grey zone” (Chris). 
Philosophically, we could paraphrase this statement with the idea that CD is situated in a sort 
of uncertain space between politics and the state. This idea, despite sounding paradoxical for 
the conception of politics and the state put forward in this thesis (is there any hybrid space 
between these two categories at all?), is nevertheless challenging and it deserves to be 
explored since it addresses an ambiguity which is central to CD and the question of 
bureaucratization. Politics, for how I defined it in the theoretical chapter of this thesis, is 
intermittent, or sequential; it is not constant like the state, which always exists – indeed 
“every historical social situation is also given as a state” (Badiou 2005:143) - “despite the 
incessant historical mutations of its [i.e. the state’s] particular forms” (Russo 2006:673).   
So, politics does not always exist, and in the case of CD in Dublin it is clear that historically 
(see Chapter 2) there have been moments of strong politicization (think about housing actions 
and responses to the drug crisis), as well as moments of statification (such as the involvement 
in ‘anti-poverty schemes’ or PPP) where politics was absent – or restricted to the thought and 
action of a minority of activists. It is in this sense that I argue that CD is not ‘in itself’ 
political. In the inner city of Dublin it developed out of political processes and it has 
continuously constituted a possibility for politics (perhaps the greatest possibility in Ireland 
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after the decline of the republican movement) but it is not always political. Sometimes, as we 
have seen, distance from the state - which is vital for politics - is absent, or very limited. It is 
in these phases that CD’s ambiguity is more evident - and its description as something 
situated in a “grey zone” is more pertinent. 
 
As I said, the aim of this section is to explore a feature that I consider to be particularly 
(maybe the most) significant when it comes to address the idea of CD being located in a grey 
zone between activism and service provision, or between politics and the state; namely its 
tendency to generate CD institutions. 
 
Indeed the majority of community organising experiences in Dublin inner city, having 
politicised around a variety of issues related to deprivation, including the absence (or extreme 
scarcity and ineffectiveness) of public institutions dealing with huge gaps in education, 
healthcare, housing etc., came up with the idea to autonomously create such institutions. Of 
course the idea was not that of instituting a sort of shadow welfare state, but to experiment 
with models which were alternative to those imposed by the state, for being rooted in 
contested/conflictual situations and for proposing alternative modes of organisation which 
aimed to be collective, inclusive and egalitarian. So, it should be clear that here we are not 
dealing with the development of “state apparatuses”, as Luis Althusser (2006) would describe 
them, but with institutions that pretend to be the ‘concretisation’ (if this is possible) and 
expansion of political processes - and therefore aiming to operate ‘organically’ (see chapter 
6), i.e. from within the situation, and at a distance from the state.  
 
Examples of CD’s institutional tendency are the already mentioned for instance, drug-
services that since the end of the 1970s were set up in order to deal with the drug crisis. But 
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also think about youth clubs dealing with educational/recreational issues affecting young 
people in the inner city, community policing fora (see Chapter 7) aimed to address issues of 
crime and drug dealing, mutual support groups(see Chpter 6), women groups, family resource 
centres and so on.  
 
5.3.2 CD institutions as counter-institutions 
 
As I said, this institutional tendency can be interpreted from different points of view. On one 
hand CD institutions/services have constituted an experimental (and to certain extent pioneer) 
form of ‘counter-institutionality’, i.e. a rejection of current forms of social organisation; and 
therefore an attempt to build what Negri (cit. by Cedillo 2007) would describe as “centers of 
alternative and independent projectuality, communities of negative labor, completely free and 
antagonistic towards the planning and programming of the reproduction of power of control” 
(Negri cit. by Cedillo 2007). The historical background to which this quote refers are 1970s 
workers’ protests in the factories of Porto Marghera (Venice), which developed in new forms 
of workers’ committees and other innovative political institutions within and outside the 
factories. This context is qualitatively different from the inner city of Dublin in the 1970s, 
where labour was (important but) not the main field of struggle – and where movements did 
not reach such levels of radicalization as they did in northern Italy. However, in my view, the 
strive for autonomy that Negri (cit. by Cedillo 2007) describes was shaping both contexts. 
    
Currently, the notion of ‘counter-institutionality’ has become quite popular within the realm 
of social movements’ theory and practice, the main academic references being Michael Hardt 
and Antonio Negri (2009). In their view, social conflict in order to open a path for real 
change “must be sustained and consolidated in an institutional process” (Hardt & Negri 
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2009:355). Indeed they argue that political procedures “that fail to develop institutional 
continuity are quickly covered over and absorbed within the dominant order, like stones that 
fall into a pool only to see the tranquil surface immediately restored”. This institutional 
process – they emphasise – should not be confused with the seizing by a social movement of 
state institutions or their substitution with homologous ones (ibid. p355). ‘Counter-
institutions’, as these authors describe them, should be shaped by a sort of anthropological 
alterity capable to make them immune to state-related procedures such as bureaucratization, 
professionalization etc. 
 
As I said, a first key component of this alterity is that counter-institutions trigger from a 
political process, or a situation of conflict, and not from a sort of agreement or social contract 
(which is the way institutions are generally created and thought in contemporary societies). 
Indeed, according to Hardt and Negri (2009:355) “whereas the major line [contract] seeks to 
maintain social unity by casting conflict out of society—your consent to the contract forfeits 
your right to rebel and conflict—the minor line accepts conflict as internal to and the constant 
foundation of society” (ibid. p355). Intrinsic conflictuality is so fundamental because the lack 
of it stops institutions being egalitarian.  
 
The way in which institutions can be successfully integrated to a political process is evident 
in many CD experiences that since the end of the 1960s took place in the inner city of Dublin 
–but also in current struggles by South African shack dwellers, in the way the 1994 Zapatista 
uprising in Mexico developed through the creation of autonomous assemblies, ‘caracoles’ or 
basic community structures, and juntas of good government, and so on. There is not just one 
institutional model that can be integrated in a political process. Each situation requires a 
certain level of experimentation, and “the key is to discover in each case how (and the extent 
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to which) the institutional process does not negate the social rupture created by revolt but 
extends and develops it” (Hardt & Negri 2009:357). 
 
 5.3.3 Community institutions as politicising machines  
 
The idea that CD institutional experiences developed as a form of ‘counter-institutionality’, 
i.e. as an attempt to give consistency to and maintain a persistent politicisation around poor 
people’s struggles in the inner city of Dublin is confirmed by community activists 
themselves, and especially by those who have been involved since the early stages. None of 
them sees CD’s institutional activity as just a technical matter of problem-solving or service 
delivery. In their view the link to politics is (or should be) always precedent to any 
professional concern. The need for institutions comes from the necessity that “something 
needs to be done in relation to getting organised and staying organised” (Claire). 
 
For example during the encounter I had with Lisa, she argued that CD institutions have been 
set up not just in order to respond to concrete problems affecting poor areas of the city; but 
also to act as spaces where people could come together and eventually politicise. She 
describes CD services as a sort of strategy put in place by community activists in order to get 
in touch with other residents and generate a sense of collective engagement even where this 
sense was poor or lacking.  
As Lisa highlights, we should not forget that CD operates in extremely poor and marginalised 
situations, which have been frequently excluded from the petit-bourgeois ‘civil society’ and 
its forms of public participation. In such context, from an activist point of view “providing 
services is a direct way of engaging with people. Because people’s lives are difficult and 
sometimes they feel like… I don’t want to talk, I don’t want to go to a meeting and talk 
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because I don’t have time to think about issues. What they need is a focus, and services 
engage people on a regular basis” (Lisa). So, in Lisa’s view, services were thought as a 
means to give continuity to CD experiences of struggle – even when there were no big social 
mobilizations taking place; when people tended to stop thinking collectively and to be 
overwhelmed by their ‘individual’ concerns.  
The political centrality of these institutions/services is attested by the fact that they were the 
place where several activists gained the (in some respects controversial, as we will see) 
reputation to be ‘community leaders’. As Lisa highlights, “all the community leaders in these 
areas have worked in direct provision services and this is where they developed their 
relationships. And this is also where their credibility comes from, and why people believe in 
them. And I think this is the positive side”. As I will elaborate in the next chapter, thanks to 
these alternative direct provision projects, CD achieved a level of rootedness - of being 
‘organic’ to the situation – which is very specific to this movement and which no other 
political organization was able to achieve during the last decades in Dublin. Indeed in 
Dublin’s inner city poor neighborhoods traditional party-style organizations have been 
‘overtaken’ by post-party forms of organization such as CD. Actually there is no left wing 
organization that can claim such a proximity to the ‘proletariat’; and this, in my view, 
constitutes an evidence of both the potentiality of CD’s counter-institutionality and the 
decline that the party-form has suffered during the last decades.  
 
 5.3.4 Counter-institutions and bureaucratization 
 
As I argued, the ‘negative side’ of counter-institutions is that they can quickly bureaucratise 
and assume a form correlated with that of the State. As Neilson and Rossiter (2006:394) put it 
“institutionalization seems to threaten routinization and the closure of possibilities”; and this 
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is because institutions “habitualize and stabilize patterns of thought, feeling, judgement and 
action. The word institution, in this sense, describes a pattern of human relation (…) it 
implies a degree of rigidity or predictability: one that, in the modern context, is (…) 
associated with the operations of hierarchy, bureaucracy, or the Weberian concept of 
rationalization” (ibid. p397). In other words an institution, instead of giving consistency to 
the political process in which it developed, can enter into the dominant form of institution 
(the one Hardt and Negri refer to as “social contract”) which emphasises identity, works 
through a representative type of logic and neutralizes the possibilities opened by the political 
process. In Dublin a quintessential example of this type of process is that of Community 
Policing Fora (CPF). In chapter 7 I will illustrate the way in which institutions such as CPF, 
despite having developed in the context of people’s struggles, bureaucratised quite quickly. 
Particularly significant in this case is the fact that CPF adopted an ‘anti-social behaviour’ 
rhetoric, which on one hand criminalises underprivileged young people and the use they 
make of public spaces; on the other hand, it blinds CD activists in relation to the eventfulness 
and political potential that these young people express. 
 
As I mentioned in the theory chapter the idea that it might be possible to ‘concretise’ a 
political process in the form of an institution is quite problematic, because politics cannot 
crystallise into a stable ‘form’. To be sure, through movement-institutions, society can benefit 
of, and to certain extent incorporate, some of the positivity of a political sequence; but 
institutions can neither constitute the sole basis for the continuation of a political sequence, 
nor can politics spring from or originate in such structures. As Badiou (2005:122) highlights, 
post-party politics should be “organised through the intellectual discipline of political 
processes, and not according to a form correlated with that of the State”. This, at the end of 
the day, is what the political history of the 20th century’s party-state has shown.  
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Some self-reflective community activists like Lisa are completely aware of this problem. As 
she puts it “the negative side [of this ‘institutional’ tendency] is that ‘services’ can become 
the dominant role; they become like people’s job; and activists are tied up in it; and almost 
like in the case of politicians it is easy to lose sight of the bigger picture because your time is 
cut up. And trying to help the people on a day to day basis, and the challenge to keep 
structural change on the agenda become almost incompatible”. I find remarkable the fact that 
Lisa associates CD service-managers (institution-managers) with politicians. This illustrates 
the fact that when one becomes a service delivery professional she is not so different from a 
party politician. In both cases political subjectivity is normalized into bureaucracy. On the 
other hand she suggests that the praxis of ‘helping people’ is not related to structural change. 
And this is because ‘service delivery’ is a form of representation, and as such it tends to 
exclude people’s subjective involvement.    
 
So on the one hand, what the case of CD tells us is that the implementation of autonomous 
political processes in popular situations passes also through the creation of institutions that 
deal with people’s problems and around which they can politicise. Indeed CD did not always 
operate in the context of strong mobilisations. It frequently had to deal with depoliticised 
situations, where collective strengths were weak – being nevertheless their objective to 
organise people’s capacity to collaborate for the solution of their problems. 
 
On the other hand, by entering into the ‘institutional form’, which tends to be based on 
identity and distribution of places and functions according to criteria of personal skills and 
expert knowledge, and which demands “unity and concord in decision making” (Hardt & 
Negri 2009:356), the rupture on which the initial process was based tends to be neutralized – 
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exposing political organisation to statification. According to Badiou (cit. by Power 2006:329) 
“the ossification of force into institution can not be the framework that preserves the initial 
moment of novelty. Structures and organisations are not enough if their participants are not 
gripped by the motive force that catalysed their initial movement. Placing, institutionalising, 
is always on the side of the objective: ‘every force is a subjective force, and inasmuch as it is 
assigned to its place, structured, splaced, it is an objective force”. 
 
5.3.5 CD institutions as struggle for the right to the city, against displacement 
 
Before concluding this chapter with some further remarks on CD (counter-)institutions and 
the possibility or not for them to escape bureaucratization and moving beyond the 
‘public/private’ dualism that sets them into a state/market framework, I would like to 
introduce a further consideration on what I have defined as CD’s institutional tendency. 
Namely that institutions where created by community organizations also as a means to 
maintain a sort of ‘spatial hegemony’ in a space such as the inner city, where the poor 
traditionally live, but whose presence and wellbeing has always been posed under threat by 
the state authorities. As Goyens (2009) argues “the history of (…) oppositional, decentralysed 
movements can be better understood when the spatial implications of their ideological 
practices are critically examined”. 
 
Indeed, in Dublin, same as in many other cities on a global scale, processes that David 
Harvey (2008:33) would define as “urban restructuring through ‘creative destruction’” have 
been implemented by the authorities. This constitutes a result of the fact that urbanization 
constantly plays a central role in the absorption of capital surpluses - such as, for example, 
those which the Celtic Tiger generated - at ever increasing geographical scales. This involves 
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burgeoning processes of particular areas of the city and especially city centers, where life-
style is transformed, and quality of life becomes a commodity “in a world where 
consumerism, tourism, cultural and knowledge-based industries have become major aspects 
of the urban political economy” (ibid. p31). “Creative destruction” corresponds here to the 
dispossession of the ordinary population of any right to access and live in those (to be) 
regenerated spaces. 
 
As we have seen CD in Dublin is a grassroots movement that always had a strong spatial, or, 
roughly speaking, ‘territorial’ emphasis. There are numerous examples of this: it started in 
the context of struggles against removals and for decent housing conditions in the city center; 
it aimed to transform a situation that community activists describe as ‘colonial’, for being 
shaped by the rule of middle class outsiders; it prevented local street traders (mainly working 
class women) from being illegalized or removed from the streets where they were running 
their business; in the context of the heroin crisis it fought for keeping neighborhoods safe and 
free from drug dealers, to the point of having to develop community based forms of policing; 
it fought against the removal of vital public services (such as swimming pools) from the inner 
city, and so on. 
 
The main issue that in a way shapes all these struggles is that since the 1960’s the inner city 
of Dublin is undergoing a process of structural regeneration, which involves the displacement 
of the poor (and their problems) from the city center, which is supposed to be  playing  the 
role of ‘visiting card’ for the attraction of globalized capital and investments. On one hand, as 
Seamus highlights “one of the ways traditionally the state has solved its problems was to 
displace them somewhere else”. So, since the second half of the 1960s large working class 
estates were built in peripheral areas in order to displace working class communities from the 
151 
 
inner city. A typical example is the construction of 7 fifteen-storey high-rises in Ballymun on 
the northern edge of the city. The scheme was completed in 1966 housing nearly 20.000 
people and was separated from areas of non-public housing by a 12 foot concrete wall. On 
the other hand, as Pat (ICP) highlights, “because the inner city is the economic core of the 
country many people argue that getting read of the problem out of it, because of its economic 
importance, one would not have this social problem in the heart of the city, it would be 
displaced outside” and displaced in areas such as Ballymun where new forms of ghettoization 
are produced. I mentioned that this type of process is not just typical of Dublin; as David 
Harvey (2008:33) highlights “it took more than a hundred years to complete the 
embourgeoisement of central Paris, with the consequences seen in recent years of uprisings 
and mayhem in those isolated suburbs that trap marginalized immigrants, unemployed 
workers and youth”.  
 
Already Engels (cit by Harvey 2008:33) addressed this problem in “The Housing Question” 
arguing that “the growth of the big modern cities gives the land in certain areas, particularly 
in those areas which are centrally situated, an artificially and colossally increasing value; the 
buildings erected on these areas depress this value instead of increasing it, because they no 
longer belong to the changed circumstances. They are pulled down and replaced by others. 
This takes place above all with workers’ houses which are situated centrally and whose rents, 
even with the greatest overcrowding, can never, or only very slowly, increase above a certain 
maximum. They are pulled down and in their stead shops, warehouses and public buildings 
are erected” (ibid. 33) 
When the displacement of the poor from the city centre is opposed by forms of resistance – as 
in the case of CD – the battle becomes harsher and the tactics deployed by the state become 
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more subtle and vicious. One of them is that to turn contested areas in unbearable places 
where to live – until eventually residents decide to move out. 
 
Cases of large scale local authority flat complexes such as, for example, Saint Michael’s 
estate, O’Dweney gardens, Theresa’s Gardens and Dominick Street that were seen as 
problematic because of issues of poverty and social exclusion, and inappropriate for a city 
with Celtic Tiger ambitions, and have recently been (or are being) moved to other areas, are 
representative of these processes in the inner city.  
 
  5.3.6 Sean McDermott swimming pool   
 
Interestingly enough, with the economic crisis some steps are being moved forward in this 
process of displacement.  And through cutbacks the state is being particularly cynical in the 
creation of an intolerable environment, transforming poor neighborhoods into a sort of 
“dumping areas”27 (John) and depriving them of basic services and amenities. Emblematic 
here is the case of the threatened closure of Sean Mac Dermott Swimming Pool28, which was 
brought up several times during interviews as an example. This swimming pool is a stand-
alone complex located in Sean Mac Dermott Street, very close to Mountjoy Square, which is 
where I live.  
                                                          
27
 Cars… 
28
 In December 2009, Dublin City Council announced that due to cutbacks in the budget there was no more 
funding available for that swimming pool. 
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Map of Dublin North inner city (area between the Noth Circular Road and the river Liffey; Mountjoy 
Square is located in the upper right part of the map) 
 
This is a place that hosts one of the poorest communities in Ireland and that local activists 
would describe as an area of “huge deprivation, accumulation of disadvantage, low income 
families, drug issues, and a lot of disaffected youths” (Seamus). So, the closure of that 
swimming pool would be a very cynical act by local authorities because with that “you are 
taking away a facility that actually provides an alternative to all this”; moreover “tens of 
thousands of children have learned to swim in this pool” (John). Not to mention the fact that 
that swimming pool was and to some extent still is a bathroom facility for many people in 
that constituency. “Because there were no such facilities in Saint Josef Mansions [a flat 
complex nearby] so every week the kids were brought there by their parents. And this was as 
a result of community activity that those pools were open” (John).  
 
Indeed, the complex was built as a result of people’s demands and the announcement of its 
closure was not well received by the residents. So local CD groups and residents came 
together to fight this decision and keep this amenity open. On Monday 12th April 2010 they 
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protested at the City Hall before the City Council meeting. Also thanks to the support of 
some sympathetic city councilors, the council voted for the preservation of stand-alone 
swimming pools. 
 
Now, apart from this important victory by the local community, “which is a clear 
demonstration of people’s power in that area” (John), what I am aiming to highlight here is 
that the intentions of the state were quite cynical and not just driven by an economic type 
ofrationality (as the cutbacks rhetoric would suggest). As Pat (Seamus) suggests, even from a 
technocratic/cynical point of view such decisions do not make any sense; they “are going to 
cost the state much more in a long term”. Therefore this is indicative of short-term thinking 
and insensitivity of the state in relation to ordinary people’s problems. As Tina highlights, in 
that area kids do not have a place where to spend their free time “their environment is 
reduced to the street, to the traffic”. Such an environment will eventually persuade many 
families to live the area. 
 
I find this case particularly significant to the idea that CD institutions act as a sort of 
‘anchorage’ to the city center for poor people living in the area. In a context of permanent 
threat of displacement, institutions acquire a double social/political value. Not only around 
them local people’s involvement is organized, but they assume the symbolic value of 
‘strongholds’ to manifest an irremovable (institutional) presence. According to Lisa, “this is 
why CD happens and this is why it is so important. Because without CD, people would be 
left behind, and everything would be taken from them, bit by bit; as simple as that”; what the 
state does is “to cut and divide and spread the problem [poor people] out” Lisa. So one could 
argue that the existence of a variety of CD institutions provides a sense of stability and 
permanency to the local community, which goes beyond service provision itself. In this sense 
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“institutions are – as Neilson and Rossiter (2006:397) argue - always related to the question 
of security”. They work as a sort of ‘state within the state’.  
 
In a more positive sense they constitute a sort of affirmation of people’s “right to the city” to 
use Lefebvre’s (2003) famous expression. Since this right is constantly denied or posed under 
threat by the state’s ‘creative destruction’ strategy, it is central to every CD struggle. Indeed 
according to Aine “what we wanted for the poor people here [she refers to St. Michael’s 
estate] was for them not be displaced; that they get to live in their communities (…). We 
wanted recognition that we belong to the city just as much as the rich belong to the city. I 
think that's a really important value”. Indeed, “the right to the city” as it is described by 
Harvey (2008) goes beyond the simple faculty to access urban spaces; “it is a right to change 
ourselves by changing the city. It is, nevertheless, a common rather than an individual right 
since this transformation inevitably depends upon the exercise of a collective power to 
reshape the processes of urbanization. The freedom to make and remake our cities and 
ourselves is, I want to argue, one of the most precious yet most neglected of our human 
rights” (p23). The capacity to generate forms of bottom-up institutionality in popular 
neighborhoods is an important step for those who demand this right to the city. Of course 
‘right to the city’ should always be a ‘universal’ demand – one that can never be entirely 
satisfied by a specific policy or a regulation to be compiled by bureaucrats. Indeed the risk is 
that it turns into a “legalistic issue of 'human rights' to be fought over in the courts of law 
between lawyers” (Zikode 2009); or even that, following the same legalistic logic, it becomes 
a sort of “transcendental guarantee” (Zizek 2004:320) (where the guarantor is the state) that 
ends up turning people into passive uncritical receivers.  
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The collective creation of independent CD institutions as rooted in contested urban spaces is 
in my view a good starting point in the affirmation of people’s right to the city. Their main 
challenge is to keep themselves at a distance from the state. However, this is a difficult task 
for institutions as a form of collective organization in general – and especially for CD 
institutions that, as we have seen, act as a sort of quasi state. The challenge, as I will point out 
in the conclusive part of this chapter is to experiment with new forms of institutionality that 
go beyond the public/private dualism around which organizations tend to depoliticize.  
 
5.4 Conclusions. Towards a new institutionality beyond public and private? 
 
“Why do the most heroic popular uprisings, the most persistent wars of liberation, the most 
indisputable mobilisations in the name of justice and liberty end – even if this is something 
beyond the confines of their own internalised sequence – in opaque statist constructions 
wherein none of the factors that gave meaning and possibility to their historical genesis is 
decipherable?” (Badiou 2005:70) 
 
This question has constituted the implicit corner stone of this chapter, in which I analysed the 
ambiguities of the relation that CD entertains with the state – and which manifest in its 
bureaucratising tendencies. A ‘universal’ answer to it can not but being philosophical, having 
to do with the sequential nature of politics, which does not have a continuity equal to that of 
the state. However, once we have accepted this ontological fact, and we return to sociological 
analysis we should notice that processes of depoliticisation of singular political sequences are 
always different from each other and contingent to the situation and the sequence in which 
they take place.  
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To give a sociological explanation of CD’s depoliticisation is a difficult task because CD is a 
assemblage of heterogeneous sequences, rather than just one. A general hypothesis that I 
formulated in relation to CD in Dublin is that its institutional tendency is central to both CD’s 
political subjectivity and its tendency to bureaucratise and depoliticise. Therefore the 
question here is how to overcome this impasse? How can CD’s institutional autonomy be 
pushed as far as possible? Which features should CD institutions have in order to achieve the 
best result?  
 
I will deal with these questions in the next chapter. For now I should make clear that the 
answer of course can not point to an institutional model which might be implemented in 
different CD contexts. Experimentation is the only possible way forward. As John Holloway 
(2011a) highlights “attempts are always contradictory” and CD activists should constantly 
deal with those contradictions, never putting them aside. As Lisa argues “the service 
approach sometimes takes away from the fundamental challenge and it is important to keep 
the balance, although it is very difficult”. Activists and researchers should also bear in mind 
that this organisational problem, has a historical significance. The 1960s/70s and the 
commencement of a post-party type of politics opened many problems that have not been 
resolved yet. And the situation of political impasse that societies are experiencing on a world 
wide scale is a consequence of this. “The rejection of the party as an organisational form and 
of the pursuit of power as an aim” - i.e. the rejection of the old forms of left-wing politics – 
“leaves us with an enormous question mark. That itself is important. The Zapatista saying 
‘caminamos preguntando’ [by asking we walk] acquires a particular resonance because we 
are conscious that we do not know the way forward” (Holloway 2005:171). 
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Politics without party has inevitably meant the (re)emergence of organisational forms such as 
the council, the assembly and the ‘counter-institution’ – which, as I will further illustrate in 
the next chapter, respond to the need to provide political processes (which are perceived as 
ephemeral and intermittent) with a “concrete structure”. Nevertheless organisational 
structures (despite their tendency to ossify) might be useful in situations where there is need 
to be ‘anchored’ to a contested territory such as the inner city of Dublin.    
 
Since CD institutions are tightly related to this post-party disposition, CD activists should 
follow Neilson and Rossiter’s (2006:401) suggestion to “not escape this fate by any return to 
the state bureaucracies or [uncritical] fidelity to the existing institutions”. Experimentation 
means that a “radically different form of institution” can be developed, “one that can 
intervene and work with this situation of uncertainty rather than simply reacting to it” (ibid. 
p401). Such experimental institutional process allows organisations to achieve some 
consistency in their interactions and behaviours, and to create forms of life that escape 
fixation in identity. The central difference between these and traditional institutions “has to 
do with the locus of agency: whereas according to the conventional sociological notion 
institutions form individuals and identities, in our conception singularities form institutions, 
which are thus perpetually in flux” (Neilson and Rossiter 2006:401). Such institutions are 
perpetually in flux because they are “based on conflict, in the sense that they both extend the 
social rupture operated by revolt [by a political procedure] against the ruling powers and are 
open to internal discord”. So not only they “consolidate collective habits, practices, and 
capacities that designate a form of life”, but they “are open-ended in that they are continually 
transformed by the singularities that compose them” (ibid. p401).  
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6. CD AS A PLATFORM FOR INDEPENDENT POLITICS 
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In the previous chapter I investigated the relationship between community development and 
the state trying to give an account of its various facets and illustrating the key obstacles that 
prevent a full autonomy of CD organisations. The state and the economy -“which is today the 
norm of the State”, as Badiou (2005:144) argues- are categories that any politics is forced to 
deal with. Especially if politics has a strong institutional tendency, like in the case of CD; and 
even more if the context of action is urban, where a certain degree of economic dependency 
is inescapable for everyone. 
 
In this chapter I will investigate this issue from a reverse point of view, a more positive one. 
Namely I will address more closely the way in which CD can be a platform for independent 
politics. This capability is mainly due to the fact that CD develops action on the basis of its 
rootedness in popular contexts – contrary to other political organisations that despite 
explicitly using a ‘working class rhetoric’, do not entertain any meaningful political relation 
with ordinary people – not even in a ‘representative’ fashion.   
 
In the first part of this chapter (6.1.) I develop the concept of ‘organic’ as it emerged in my 
fieldwork. According to many community activists, ‘organic’ is how CD should be in relation 
to a situation. ‘Organic’ means that CD is not a model, i.e. something that can be simply 
‘adopted’ or imposed to a situation by outsiders, but is an idea of organisation that both 
develops intrinsically to a concrete situation (a popular settlement for example)  and that 
generates  unprecedented processes in it. Organic CD is the result of people’s creativity and 
capacity to autonomously organise and take a lead in the solution of their problems. In the 
second part of the chapter I explore the case of mutual support groups, as they have been 
developed by Community Response in the south inner city of Dublin. I consider mutual 
support groups as an interesting experiment in CD, since it constitutes an attempt to counter 
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bureaucratisation and to return to an ‘organic’ approach. A similar analysis is done in relation 
to public consultation meetings, or assemblies. Their potentialities are explored in part 6.4 
where I analyse the case of ‘Community First’, which I consider to be a rare and interesting 
example of community re-politicisation micro-processes from the bottom up. Here I illustrate 
how this political sequence constitutes both an attempt to counter the cuts that the state is 
imposing on CD in the inner city, and an instance of an ‘organic’ approach that some 
organisations are experimenting with in deprived neighbourhoods. I conclude by arguing that 
an important way to push autonomy as far as possible is that of working in order to create an 
environment that is more favourable to it. 
 
 6.1. CD as ‘organic’ politics  
 
As I have been emphasising since the introductory chapter of this thesis the politics of CD are 
aimed to transform people who are not counted, not ‘qualified’ and therefore not allowed to 
speak –as Spivak would put it- into meaningful political subjects whose action can change 
their own lives and the society in which they live. During the last two decades of economic 
boom however, with the bureaucratisation, fragmentation and sectoralisation of CD in the 
frame of public private partnership this emphasis got lost - together with the sense of a right 
to claim collective ownership of community based institutions. As a result – observes Mary - 
many people have started to embrace CD activities “as a sort of charity”. And although “they 
are always grateful for the services that they receive”, they have started perceiving these 
institutions as being separated from their reality; as being introduced from the ‘outside’ (or 
from the ‘top’) and “they became paralysed”.  
 
162 
 
Although at the moment there is a big indistinctness and overlap between CD organisations, 
generic voluntary groups, NGOs, charities and so on – where boundaries are difficult to 
demarcate - I think it is important to always emphasise what historically made (and could still 
make) the difference of a CD post-party type of approach. In my view this point is crucial not 
just for a question of academic accuracy, but also because what is at stake here is nothing less 
than the present and the future of this Irish “homemade” (Sera) form of independent 
organisation. As I illustrated in Chapter 1 the notion of CD itself is not really helpful because 
‘community’ carries ambiguities of every sort. With the triumph of neo-liberal governance 
and its emphasis on ‘community self-activation’, ‘sustainability’, ‘participation’ and so on 
this ambiguity has mounted exponentially.  
 
In my interview with Aine she attempted to make a bit of clarity out of this confusion and 
provided me with a very interesting insight on how, according to her, CD should work – in 
order to be faithful to its origins in the inner city of Dublin. Again, her point of view can not 
be embraced as representative of every activist involved in CD activity. Indeed the lack of 
collective self-reflexive processes penalises CD also in terms of lack of shared perceptions 
and ‘definitions’. However as I made clear in the methodological chapter, this thesis does not 
just deal with ‘opinions’ that are shared by the majority (doxa) of people – and therefore 
related to common sense which (same as consensus) is structural - , but also of ‘subjective 
singularities’, and therefore of the prescriptive and interpreting thought of those who are 
involved in this research as interviewees or observed actors. Politics in Badiou’s perspective 
is irreducible to structure - or to objectivity i.e. the state-of-the-situation -; it belongs to the 
realm of the subjective. Therefore in my view, although sociology is  affected by “a peculiar 
theoretical paralysis concerning the question of subjectivities” (2009), this is something it 
should be concerned with; otherwise, as Russo (2009) argues, this discipline risks to “restrict 
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itself to counting and recounting the inanity of electoral results” and the analysis of the 
opinions regard this or that government. 
   
According to Aine “there are different levels of what we understand as Community 
Development, in the present and in the past. Many community groups grow out of the 
oppression of people in their areas. Especially here [Aine refers to St Michael’s Estate, and 
more broadly to deprived neighbourhoods in the inner city] community development grow 
out organically. In other places you would have the Church coming in and setting up 
community projects who may have been looking to get community development money 
through a community development programme, but this does not automatically mean that 
they were taking up that community development is about the challenging of inequalities, 
standing on the side of the poor, in willing to have the courage to lose (…)”. 
 
I find these reflections very insightful and central to the arguments of this work; in first place 
because they make clear that - as I have been arguing in Chapter 3 (History) - even though 
the state has created agencies that financially support CD groups, this does not mean that 
each organisation receiving those funds operates according to a community development type 
of approach or philosophy. Furthermore it can happen that the state, through its power to 
deliver funds, entitles itself to the faculty of deciding who might be considered as CD and 
who can not. And the state - as I defined this category in the theoretical section, following 
Badiou – does not recognise people’s independent political capacity. The state does not 
recognise political subjectivity because subjectivity is ‘excessive’ and irreducible to the state-
of-the-situation’s counting of the parts or subsets. This is why the state can not recognise CD 
the way it came to existence in Dublin; and it aims instead to represent it (and reorganise it) 
in a normalised, apolitical way, i.e. as service delivery, charity, humanitarian voluntarism and 
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so on. During about the last 20 years this operation has been particularly successful. Indeed, 
Aine highlights, “within the Celtic Tiger, I suppose, people thought that they had the services 
and they were coming in [as ‘customers’]”.   
 
However, things did not always work that way. “In my generation in these areas people were 
living in horrible conditions, and that has shaped the forms of organization that developed 
here. But today if a service does after school or peer education etc. that does not mean that it 
is automatically political”. This discrepancy, according to Aine, has become evident in the 
light of the present situation: “(…) so when we have the crisis in CD and we wonder where 
the [antagonistic] voice is and where that challenge is coming from … it is not there while 
people are trying with their head down to keep their job and their project”. As I argued in the 
previous chapter professionalization can be very depoliticising. “Now you can get a degree 
and work – it has become very professionalized. And you do not have the same motivation 
for change; there is more a charity dependency” (Aine).  
 
“Organic”, the word that Aine used to describe forms of CD which in her view can be 
considered as being attuned to the political ‘tradition’ of CD in the inner city, is a very useful 
concept; especially when it comes to address the question of autonomy in CD. The fact that 
this notion emerged from the field makes it even more valuable, in my view. To describe a 
community organisation as having developed organically within a certain context means that 
it was the manifestation of the ‘power-to’ – to say it with Holloway (see Chapter 5) - of the 
people living in that context. This being organic to a situation -this rootedness if you want - is 
a central feature of any political organisation professing to be ‘autonomous’ or ‘independent’. 
When referring to political processes, ‘organic’ should neither be confused with ‘closed’ or 
‘self-referential’ – like the corporatist notion of society as an ‘organic whole’; nor should it 
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be associated with ‘cultural’ features (such as ethnicity, religion and so on) – i.e. to the 
‘structural’ bond tiding with each other the members of a certain population; nor should the 
notion of organic be confused with that of ‘part’, intended as a part of a unifying body such 
as the state. A political process can be described as being ‘organic to a situation’ just if it is 
the direct expression of the will and creativity of the people inhabiting that situation.  
 
To be ‘organic’ is nevertheless a fundamental challenge that CD has addressed since the 
beginning in terms of liberating neighbourhoods from forms of management that activists 
describe as ‘colonial’. Indeed according to Mark – a leading figure and pioneer of CD in 
Dublin - an important problem that the north inner city was suffering at the time when (‘2nd 
generation’) CD organisations were starting to operate, was that residents were not in control 
of any (formal) collective type of activity taking place in the area. “What we discovered was 
that all the organizations and facilities that were operating in the area were run by people 
coming from outside the area. And it was kind of ridiculous; there was this ‘colonial’ 
scenario” (Mark). CD organizations, according to Fergus, developed (also) as a counter-
tendency to this state of affairs. 
 
As Aine makes clear in her reflections, from a CD perspective, the institution of a service by 
experts coming from the ‘outside’ -or from the ’top’- (which, no doubt, can be very useful for 
people who live in a deprived community, but this is not the point here) is a form of power-
over, for it is based on a ‘service provision’ approach which conceives people as passive 
‘users’, ‘receivers’ or at a maximum ‘participants’. This approach is not concerned with 
ordinary people’s capacity to spontaneously engage with matters that affect them directly. On 
the contrary it tends to anesthetise this capacity. Therefore it can not be considered as 
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following a CD approach, which excludes the idea of ordinary people being just passive 
receivers to be managed.  
 
‘Organic’ community-based organisation is discouraged by those who are in power because it 
is immediately political and politicising. Sometimes – as we have seen in chapter 5 - it is 
discouraged with bulldozers, sometimes with bureaucratic arrangements. “Sometimes it is 
discouraged with contempt. Sometimes it is discouraged with violence. Sometimes it is 
discouraged by making simple issues too complicated for ordinary people to understand. 
Sometimes it is discouraged by just making it too difficult to engage” (Zikode 2009).  
 
This (see chapters 2 and 5) is what happened during the Celtic Tiger era where the scenario 
that Fergus (activist) described as “colonial” has been to certain extent restored through 
bureaucratisation and professionalization. Indeed in this phase community groups, while 
undergoing a process of adaptation to state directives, started to employ skilled workers who 
were generally coming from outside/middle class areas, and who had a low empathy towards 
residents, with insufficient knowledge of the history of CD and no intention to be 
confrontational with the state -  their aim being that to make career. This non-organic process 
has strongly weakened CD.  As Seamus argues “you would have these professionals or 
people from the university who would come and go creating sorts of gaps and vacuums in the 
spaces, and there was a weakness in the community sector developing leadership and local 
leadership (…) If you are coming out a university you come out with that sort of grand liberal 
and progressive ideas but they do not necessarily translate to where local people are and you 
have to be able to be where people are in order to develop. (…) You can’t come in an 
transplant ideas without building some empathy with the people and live where they are and 
be where they are in their shoes. So there was a problem in terms of the community 
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fragmentation”. Professionals, according to Damien, “don’t have any other relation to the 
area except that they work here, they work very hard, they work on good projects, but at 5 
they go home”. ‘Organic’ activists like him are born in the area “I never worked anywhere 
else and never wanted to live anywhere else. And we did have at one stage a policy of 
prioritizing local people into the jobs but with the increasing professionalism we couldn’t do 
that, because the state said: we can not give you the money to pay for that job unless the 
person has these qualifications. And these qualifications didn’t exist there, so you are talking 
about people who have been through the third level and have specific professional skills” 
As Cox and Mullan (2001) argue, “as this process develops, activists are increasingly 
polarised, with the selection out of an elite capable of working on these terms and hence able 
to participate at state and national level and the consequent exclusion of other activists from 
real decision-making (…). As these become full-time and skilled jobs, such activists become 
subcontracted civil servants; and increasingly these positions are given, not to the ‘organic 
intellectuals’ of community organisations, but to middle-class outsiders in possession of 
educational credentials.” 
 
Although these bureaucratic processes have become systemic in CD, some groups such as for 
example Community Response are trying to invert this depoliticising tendency, through their 
daily effort in researching new paths of rootedness in popular neighbourhoods. As I will 
illustrate, these attempts are experimental; they possibly lack a consistent and coherent 
theoretical engagement (which this thesis attempts to provide) by the actors; and their 
outcomes are necessarily ambivalent. Nevertheless, as I should illustrate, their singularity and 
political interest is indisputable. 
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6.2 Mutual Support Groups: Community Response’s attempts to reintroduce an organic 
approach to CD 
 
Community Response’s (CR) activity in the south inner city was introduced in Chapter 5.2 
where I discussed the obstacles that bureaucratisation poses to CD organisations through the 
imposition of an expert/professional knowledge type of frame. I also emphasised that these 
obstacles are even more challenging for organisations that, like CR, operate in sensitive fields 
such as health and the body. As we saw, in this context expert knowledge/discourse operate 
as mechanisms of exclusion interdicting people’s direct intervention in the solution of their 
problem (say addiction) and therefore in the control of their own lives. This generates 
processes of delegation and representation, which de-contextualise the problem and 
undermine CD.   
 
The strategy that CR initially adopted to challenge de-contextualised service provision 
consisted in directly intervening on its ‘weaknesses’. Indeed – as a CR activist explains - “we 
were in a position of recognising gaps in service delivery that the HSE and nobody else were 
able to fill. We came up with modules that did change service delivery radically – training 
local people as community drug workers and designing the type of training that was 
accessible to people, and in the end there were some advances”. For example CR were 
arguing for community drug teams rather than medical led responses to addiction; they did 
not just demand methadone clinics but they claimed the need for a type of response that they 
define as “holistic”; which means that in their view “there is no point in having a service just 
for the person who is experiencing addiction. There need to be services for his family, for the 
future generation that is assisting to the devastation caused by heroin and so on” (Chris). 
Heroin, in this perspective, is not just an individual problem; all the population should be 
concerned and mobilise towards its solution.  
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As I highlighted in my critical analysis of CD’s institutional tendency (chapter 5, section 3), 
the danger with this counter-institutional (or alternative-service) strategy is that it can end up 
creating a sort of second class welfare provision system, which both plays the game of the 
state by replacing it in difficult areas and by requiring lower resources, and depoliticises CD. 
However, I also concluded by arguing that if one is self-reflective and recognise the 
contradictions that are intrinsic to this form of organisation, rather than glossing over them, a 
certain independency can be maintained and interesting outcomes can follow up. Of course 
this approach involves a high level of experimentation, because central to is not just to create 
the conditions for the population to collaborate, but to develop processes that are as organic 
as possible to it. An experiment that I find particularly full of potentialities  - since it showed 
to be capable to generate some political consistency in the south inner city - are mutual 
support groups, as they have been developed by CR. Mutual Support Groups (MSG) may be 
defined as autonomous self-help non-judgemental organisations based on the lived 
experiences of families affected by drugs. Just in the south inner city there are around 13 of 
such groups. The aim of the MSG network is to spread the initiative throughout Ireland, by 
raising awareness of the difficulties faced by families in coping with drug use, while 
recognising the important role that they play in supporting the recovery of the drug using 
family member. 
6.2.1Mutual support groups  
 
From an ‘organic’-political point of view, a first remarkable aspect of MSG is that they allow 
the creation of new and stronger forms of solidarity among the population, in opposition to 
the atomization engendered by a top down service delivery approach, which is dominant in 
western societies. In the case of drug services, ‘atomisation’ means for example 
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individualisation of the cure ; distribution of those who are affected according to the 
frameworks of various state institutions (heroine addict/ HIV patient/ criminal) each one with 
their own set of expert knowledges and exclusionary practices (O’Broin 2010); 
depoliticisation of the problem as reduced to each individual’s health and the body. As a 
result of that drug dependency starts to be seen as just an intimate, personal matter; a “serial 
behaviour falsely presenting itself as individual virtue” as Sartre (2004:351) would put it. 
 
CR put a strong emphasis on MSG because besides being effective in dealing in an holistic 
way with heroin related issues, this form of organization allows people to meet each other, to 
discuss with each other about the situation and perceive their problems the way they actually 
are; that is to say collective, political and not just individual. It is in this sense that I consider 
MSG to be a very effective grassroots platform for politicisation.  
 
MSGs are mainly composed by family members of drug addicts and in some cases also by 
drug addicts themselves. The way they are organised and the activities they do in the south 
inner city are inspired by Boal’s ‘theatre of the oppressed’. According to the organisers, this 
approach is not just effective in relation to heroin. It also allows people to use their own 
creativity and to “develop their ability in social analysis so if there is something to be done 
they can consider it for themselves”. In other words MSGs stimulate people to collectively 
develop critical thought on the situation, and to act accordingly.  
  
According to Chris, MSGs are a form of organization that is currently gaining some 
popularity in Dublin’s disadvantaged areas, since new groups are frequently coming up. 
Some experiments have also been done in prisons and hospitals, an important focus being the 
problem of Hepatitis C. Paradoxically, the state is not really aware of what this activity 
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involves. Indeed it “would have no understanding of what we are doing, nor the prison 
[management]; as far as they know we are dealing with information about Hepatitis C (…) 
but what is happening is an analysis of what is going on and what needs to happen so that 
people are not just more informed about Hepatitis C but can take decisions for themselves. 
And this is also an attempt to change the power of the medical profession over the patient” 
(Chris).  
 
Family support groups and other similar activities in the south inner city have achieved some 
positive results in the struggle to re-establish forms of ‘power-to’ where ‘power-over’ had 
become dominant. Since the last year (2008), when the government started to hold back all 
together with funding for CD, these results started to become tangible. At a grassroots level 
community organisations are increasingly less perceived as ‘charities’, “and what is so 
exciting – highlights Mary - is that now people who use the services actually claim those 
services. We want these services and we have the right to claim them. People feel that they 
can shape what is happening”.  
 
One should be aware that here we are talking about re-creating the conditions for 
politicisation in contexts (Ireland, Dublin’s deprived neighbourhoods) where this is not easy 
at all, for reasons that I illustrated in the introduction to this work.  Activists are aware of this, 
indeed in their view “these are just simple acts of resistance, they are not hugely political they 
are involved in small changes and this is very slow”. However, changes in perception such as 
that described by Susan can not be underestimated. As I will illustrate below, such results 
achieved by MSG can open the possibility for unexpected moments of politicisation. 
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 6.2.2 Public consultation meetings 
 
In my view, a sign that reveals that something is actually starting to move within this hyper-
bureaucratised scenario is the fact that (with the cutbacks) neighbourhood assemblies in 
community centres and other venues are being organised again - levels of attendance being 
quite encouraging according to the organisers. The organisation of open meetings, public 
consultations and assemblies has always been central to a CD approach. However, during the 
last two decades this habit has been a bit put aside because bureaucratisation and 
professionalisation have put a strong emphasis on representativeness and effectiveness in 
decision making – which involves hierarchies, well defined positions, expert knowledge etc. 
The problem, as Cox and Mullan (2001) noticed is that since the 1990s many CD project 
have devoted much time in convincing elites, instead of dialoguing with ordinary people; and 
this has drastically reduced people’s direct engagement. Indeed with the partnership turn, the 
emerging of a ‘deciding’, educated and skilled leadership as representative, and therefore 
separated from the population had made open and ‘inclusive’ meetings out-dated and 
dysfunctional. To the extent that they were not viewed as suitable to ‘effective decision 
making’ processes, or to ‘intricate’ policy discussions. 
 
As Holloway (2005) highlights, the public assembly, as an expressive form, tends to be 
structured horizontally. It encourages the free participation of everyone and aims to reach 
consensus in its decisions. This horizontality, encourages “the expression of people’s 
concerns, whether or not they are ‘revolutionary’ or ‘political’” (ibid. 172) and peoples 
suggestions whether or not they are ‘skilled’. “Councils – continues Holloway (2005) - have 
been a characteristic feature of the current wave of urban struggle: not just of the 
neighbourhood councils of Argentina, but equally of some of the piquetero groups, of the 
Madres de la Plaza de Mayo, of the Centri Sociali of Rome, Milan or Turin, of the 
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altermundista movement in general” (p172). As a form of organisation they differ 
substantially from the party, which is “conceived as a means to an end, the end of winning 
state power. In the council what is important is the effective articulation of collective self-
determination; in the party, the important thing is to achieve a pre-determined goal” 
(Holloway 2010:40).  
 
The fact that, although this was a distinctive feature also in CD, with partnership it has 
nevertheless declined is not surprising. Indeed, as John Holloway (2005:173) puts it, capital 
and the state are “the ever-repeated negation of the council” – i.e. the negation of people’s 
self-determination. From their point of view public assemblies are not legitimate. Of course 
people are allowed to gather and share their opinions; but, as far as the assembly is informal 
(i.e. not located in a state/bureaucratic framework) the decisions that they eventually take 
have no recognised power - unless they have been validated a priori by the appropriate 
bodies, they count for very little indeed. It is for this reason that, according to Aine, many CD 
‘leaders’ “went into policy too much and in the separation of the leadership from the roots 
instead of uniting the two”. In other words the need to be recognised by the state generated an 
irreparable disconnection from the grassroots. However, if one wants to follow a CD 
approach, “you have to bring your leaders along and you can’t have a gap in the middle; and 
the policies have to change from the bottom. A lot of [ordinary] people have been involved in 
policy work over here in St Michael’s Estate” (Aine). In the present scenario assemblies 
constitute an important missing link between ‘leaders’ (or ‘organic’ intellectuals) and 
ordinary people. Their reintroduction can certainly contribute to the re-politicisation of CD. 
 
In the following section I will illustrate how MSG and neighbourhood assemblies constituted 
the cornerstones of a ‘micro’ political sequence which took place in summer 2010 in the 
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south inner city of Dublin. Although this sequence neither attracted the curiosity of the 
mainstream media nor has it had visible repercussions at a national level, it nevertheless 
generated a rupture in the local service system, which is impossible to heal; at least in the 
consciousness of its protagonists, i.e. ordinary people who experimented with their capacity 
to autonomously organise and whose relation with the state and with each other may have 
altered significantly as a result. 
 
6.3 Community First political sequence – outcome of CR’s organic approach. 
 
So, as I already mentioned, some (rare) local initiatives are starting to organise public 
consultation meetings and with a good turnout as I could personally ascertain in one of these 
events that was held in July 2010 in Nicholas of Myra community centre (south inner city). 
 
As I will illustrate in this section, I consider this meeting to be an event of particular 
importance for the aims of this thesis. Indeed it is contextualised in a sort of micro political 
sequence whose principal points I will first resume. This sequence is not just significant for 
the fact that it constitutes an evidence of forms of bottom-up re-politicisation  at local level, 
but also because it provides important elements to understand the ties to which CD is bound 
in a situation of neo-liberal partnership, and the possibilities it would have if only could 
liberate from those ties.  
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6.3.1.Reconstruction of the “Community First” political sequence 
 
The background of this case is again Dublin’s inner city and the austerity measures that the 
Irish state is imposing on the nation - which so far have particularly hit the most 
disadvantaged sections of the population.  
 
For instance, the office of the minister responsible for drug task forces29 was looking to 
reduce the budget. For the upcoming budget (at the time December 2010) they decided for a 
cut of the 10 %. As a means to implement this decision a letter was sent by the drug task 
force to every single project listing the cuts that would have been applied, including the 
redundancy of 2 family support workers positions, the drastic reduction of the community 
addiction training programme and cuts to the addiction services provided by about five 
different local projects. The letter also mentioned that projects had two weeks of time to 
appeal these decisions. 
People were quite shocked by that verdict, their feeling being that “it was like to be dictated 
by a central office; as if you were working in a supermarket. You just got the memo when 
you were told what was happening and you were supposed to deal with that” (community 
activist) 
 
                                                          
29
 Drugs Task Forces were set up in 1997. They were developed to combat the threat from problem drug use 
throughout the country through the use of an area-based partnership approach between the statutory, voluntary 
& community sectors including public representatives. There are 10 regional and 14 local drugs task forces 
covering the Republic of Ireland. While Regional Drugs Task Forces operate from a wider geographic base than 
Local Drugs Task Forces, they follow the same principle operations. The Local Drug Task Forces were 
established to cover areas which statistically had higher rates of problematic drug use. Drug task forces 
composition is as follows: Chairperson (nominated by the Partnership, in consultation with the Task Force and 
the National Drugs Strategy Team); Statutory sector (Departments that participate in the DTF are Health 
Boards, Garda Síochána, FÁS, Probation & Welfare Service, Local Authorities, Youth Service, Education and 
Science, Social, Community and Family Affairs); Community sector (6 community representatives are 
nominated for each drug task force); Voluntary sector (one representative elected for each task force); Elected 
representatives (up to 4 local elected representatives are invited to formally participate in the work of the Task 
Forces). 
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Shortly after they got the letter, a number of local project managers gathered to discuss the 
situation. They decided that it was essential to call a public consultation meeting in order to 
inform the local community and especially service users about what was happening, and take 
a collective decision about what was to be done. They also decided that they would not enter 
in the appeal process because there had been no consultation with the community – which is 
fundamental in a CD type of logic.  
 
The first public consultation meeting had a good attendance (~100), evidencing great 
responsiveness and concern by local residents. Attendees were community workers, service 
users, drug users and in general people who were involved in mutual support groups. It was 
clear that people were very surprised by the fact that the local drug task force (which they 
supposed should act in a supportive way in relation to local projects) was taking up the work 
of the government in terms of implementing the cuts.  
 
Indeed their first demand was to directly talk with their representatives in the local drug task 
force, in order to know how they could possibly justify that attitude. In the South Inner city 
area there are 4 community representatives involved in the drug task force (DTF) and no one 
of them  had made any contacts with any of the projects who were going to be affected by 
that decision. Another outcome of that meeting was the decision that local teams 
(independently from the field in which they operated) would act in solidarity, in order to 
avoid that individual projects would be picked off and targeted – which seemed to be the 
administration’s strategy. The name Community First was finally given to this coalition of 
people and organisations fighting against cuts to drug services in the south inner city. 
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So Community First invited those community reps involved in DTF to another public 
meeting giving them two weeks’ notice and sent a notification letter to the local DTF. As a 
response one community representative apologised that he could not go and the rest of them 
refused to attend the meeting not giving any excuse whatsoever. Since none of the 4 
representatives attended the second public consultation meeting, during its course decisions 
were taken on what to do next independently from them. The idea to write another letter to 
the DTF requesting again a meeting with the community representatives was brought up. 
 
After DTF answered that they were in the position neither to direct community 
representatives to meet anybody nor to decide with who they should meet, CF asked the 
permission to participate at the next DTF meeting itself, which they saw as the only 
possibility left to talk to them. As a response, a form was sent to CF people arguing that that 
was the process to be followed in order to be eventually admitted to their weekly meetings.  
 
Above (chapter 5) I mentioned the fact that the south inner city DTF management is 
characterised by a corporate rather than a democratic style. After the closed and defensive 
attitude it had had in relation to CF, people started to perceive this organisation as even more 
undemocratic and detached from their problems. 
 
So, at this point CF decided to write a letter to Minister Pat Carey asking to personally 
intervene because “we felt that local democracy was being foreclosed, that we did not have 
the possibility to engage with local democracy, that we had no access to our representatives”. 
However, even this effort resulted ineffective – the letter got no answer - and therefore CF 
called a 3rd public meeting which is the last they have had to date. 
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At this third meeting people were hugely frustrated and this is where they finally took the 
decision to take to the streets and protest. A demonstration was scheduled for the upcoming 
DTF meeting. According to one activist “this is something unusual to happen at a local level, 
where issues tend to be resolved more diplomatically through community development 
channels. But we did not have the opportunity to do that and people were quite angry about 
that. Especially because it impacted directly their lives; because services like those which 
were going to be affected like community support and drug services literarily saved people’s 
lives … with huge interventions in families etc. So huge things were at stake; it was not just 
about the cuts and funding but it involved issues at human level, involving locals among 
which there was a very close bond over a period of time” (activist). 
 
So, at the 3rd assembly people took the decision that they would demonstrate outside the 
building where the upcoming DTF meeting was going to take place - in which community 
and state representatives were going to vote the cutbacks. Finally CF also decided to sign a 
petition, declaring that they would not vote their confidence to their community 
representatives.  
 
The day of the protest people gathered very early in the morning at the DTF headquarter and 
they stayed there demonstrating during the entire meeting, which went along for about 3 
hours. While waiting that DTF people would come back out, protesters were chanting slogans 
and singing satirical songs. CF had only one sympathetic person taking part to the DTF 
meeting and feeding back information on what was happening in it. According to his report, 
the DTF presented budget and planned cutbacks, and then they unanimously voted that the 
cuts should go through, except for two people who voted against. Cuts were applied to 
specific projects which were chosen on the basis that they were not considered to be 
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‘frontline’ services, i.e. services that directly engage with drug users (such as for example 
family support networks). 
 
After the demonstration, DTF people expressed their condemnation of what had happened. 
They denounced that they had been afraid to get into their cars after the meeting was over, 
that they had felt abused and that they had never felt so scared in all their life, “almost as if 
they were going to be killed” (activist). However, people who took part to the demonstration 
“were mainly middle aged people who were attending family support: not there to kill 
anybody. Quite the opposite” (activist). Moreover, the HSE representative on the DTF and 
the general coordinator reported to the HSE (the project funder) that there was a ‘health and 
safety’ issue during their last meeting in the south inner city. They also argued that they could 
not carry out their work comfortably because they felt that they were under threat. As a result, 
some HSE workers who took part in the demonstration in solidarity were targeted as people 
who should not have been involved in it.  
 
However a number of the drug services also put in train a legal process, calling for a review 
of the way in which drug task force representatives had conducted their work. Indeed, many 
raised an issue of conflicting interests, since people who had made the decisions about cuts, 
were also sitting on the board of management of projects that were not been cut. Therefore 
people’s suspicion was that they had signed cuts that definitely were going to protect their 
own services.  
 
At the moment of writing this story, the results of CF struggle are still uncertain. However 
what count in my analysis (see next section) are not actual results but the political process, 
which as I will illustrate is itself an interesting outcome.  
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Indeed I will argue that the real success of a political procedure in a situation as the one I 
investigated derives from the degree of collective awareness and aspiration to change that it 
manages to spread among citizens, from the level of creativity that they deploy and from the 
eventual temporal duration or repercussion of the sequence. In a real political sequence this 
creativity/duration, does not exhaust with the meeting of a demand (cutbacks being stopped). 
And it is shaped by an energy that is shared, universal and not imposed by the top.  
 
6.3.2 Analysis of the CF sequence (part 1): ‘eventfulness’ and subjective conditions 
 
The events that I have been narrating in the previous section are quite rich of interesting 
nuances and supportive of some central arguments that I am articulating in this thesis. A first 
point is indeed that the austerity measures taken by the government are in some cases 
contributing to split the previous ‘artificial’ unity shaping both local groups and partnership 
institutions. As CF’s case illustrates, these ruptures are breaking the very idea of a 
community “sector” and constitute opportunities for the emergence of new forms of 
politicisation. However, one should also notice that this politicisation is not just the simple 
consequence of ‘objective’ conditions. By themselves, historical facts such as the crisis, 
austerity measures, neglect, control, repression, the mounting bureaucratisation etc. do not 
constitute a guarantee for politics. Indeed politics - despite being situated in specific 
(objective) contexts - can just rely on subjective conditions that are independent from the 
state-of-the-situation. To put it in other words, politics is not just a matter of frustration for 
adverse material conditions, or a reaction to them. Politics, Badiou (cit. by Neocosmos 
2007:66) argues “is not an opinion or a consciousness” about the state of affairs; but “it is a 
thought which fixes new possibilities”; it is a sort of “invention, irreducible to the state, to 
classes, to the management of the social, to power” (ibid. p66). 
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This disconnection between ‘objective conditions’ and politics is particularly evident in 
Ireland, which despite being one of the European countries that were hit the most by the crisis 
– with disastrous consequences for the lives of ordinary people – it was also amongst those 
who responded more passively to it. On the other hand, this disconnection was also 
highlighted by recent events in Arab Countries, which clearly show that a political process 
can suddenly kick off even in places where sociological analysis would have argued the 
opposite due to the absence of objective (economic) conditions and for reasons related with 
authoritarianism, political culture, religion etc..    
 
In my view, in order to fully understand the singularity of the CF sequence one has to, on one 
hand admit that the austerity measures to certain extent contributed to change many people’s 
perception of the situation. On the other hand however, it is fundamental to recognise that its 
subjective conditions exceeded the crisis and the cuts. In my view these subjective conditions 
are - as always - quite random and ‘eventful’ – in no way they can be artificially produced or 
forecast; but in this case they are also related to (or facilitated by) the organisational work 
that groups such as Community Response have conducted along the years in that 
neighbourhood through their ‘services’ and ‘networks’ (City Wide) - at an adequate distance 
from the state and faithful to an ‘organic’ approach to CD. Indeed, it is not a coincidence that 
such a singular expression of people’s collective will took place in that form, in that specific 
area and not elsewhere. According to a CF activist the reason why so many people were 
involved in organising collective resistance to the cuts “is because through their participation 
in mutual support groups and peer to peer education they had a personal experience in 
community development organisation”. In other words, a grassroots political consistency was 
already present in the neighbourhood thanks to the way in which the common struggle 
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against heroin and other issues related to deprivation was organised. The cutbacks just 
constitute the ‘trigger’ of an exceptional event, i.e. the rupture in the system of local 
representation, and the perception/performance of this rupture by local residents. This 
accidental event opened up new possibilities; i.e. it provided the existing grassroots 
consistency with the opportunity to take a further step in its development. 
 
Thus, the decisive event here is not the economic situation in itself (the crisis, the cuts), i.e. 
something that simply ‘happens’ in the realm of the state and the economy. But it is 
something that interrupts the chain of domination and in doing so sensibly changes people’s 
subjectivity, their way to be in the world. In this case the unpredictable Event, the rupture, 
happened at the intersection of the crisis and the subjective work carried out by CR.  
 
In my view it is important to recognise and emphasise that this day by day organisational 
effort was precedent to the cuts; i.e. it was courageously carried out in a phase such as the 
Celtic Tiger where independent organisation was the last concern for most of the people in 
this country – including many CD activists who were more focused in obtaining recognition 
(formal and material) by the elites. Even more decisively, this effort was not just carried out 
in a representative fashion (as political parties and NGOs would eventually do), but by 
ordinary people in first person. This consistency was therefore the result of people’s 
engagement in the transformation of their relations with each other and in the self-
transformation of each one of them through critical thinking (“using their own creativity in 
developing their ability in social analysis” as an activist puts it) and through a collective 
assumption of responsibility in relation to the situation on a daily life basis.   
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6.3.3 Rupture with representation 
 
As I remarked previously, during the CF sequence, more than the protest itself, general 
meetings played a fundamental role by providing an egalitarian space where the process 
could evolve in a non-representative fashion. The second CF meeting is particularly 
significant in this sense; “everyone who wants to speak can speak” was the opening remark. 
This might sound quite obvious or naïve to people who believe freedom of speech to be a 
consolidated feature of our democracies. However, meeting attendees were people who many 
academics would describe as ‘the underclass’; i.e. people who in Dublin share specific living 
conditions (generally in council estates where rates of unemployment are high) and who are 
stigmatised (in some cases racialised – see Chapter 7) – their desires and their thoughts 
meaning nothing for the rest of the population. In a famous paper titled “Can the Subaltern 
speak?” Spivak (1994) concluded that he can not. What does this enigmatic statement mean?  
Of course subaltern people can talk, they can have their ‘opinions’, as long as these opinions 
have no resonance in the way the situation is officially described and organised. According to 
Spivak (1994), there is a fundamental difference between ‘speaking’ and ‘talking’. In a 
political process such as the one I am describing here, to speak means, as Badiou (2007) 
would put it, to contribute to the construction of a truth process; it means to prescribe an idea 
to the state of the situation. This is very different from giving one’s ‘opinion’ and from 
‘participating’ in a frame – say local governance – as defined by the power players. As 
Zikode (2009) highlights “what is called ‘engagement’ or ‘public participation’ is often just a 
kind of instruction, sometimes even a threat. Many times it is done in such a way that all 
possibilities for real discussion and understanding are closed from the start. In these cases 
what is called engagement is really just a way for the state to pretend to be democratic when 
in reality all decisions are already taken and taken far away from poor people”. In this context 
‘engagement’, ‘participation’, ‘opinion’ etc. do not escape the logic of representation. The 
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statement that “everyone who wants to speak can speak”, which opened the second CF 
meeting is therefore not so naïve as it seems. To speak here means to challenge the neo-
liberal ideology of participation. 
 
The importance of this (second) meeting resides in the fact that on one hand it is in this 
framework that CF was constituted as a concretisation of the decisive rupture between DTF, 
community representatives and ordinary residents/ community workers. This rupture is so 
significant because it took place within the ‘sector’ – i.e. within the governance body which 
presented itself as unitary and coherent. It developed along the border between bureaucrats 
and non-bureaucrats, between people’s independent thought  and the state. The realisation of 
this rupture had the effect to shock some of the meeting attendees, who came up with 
consternated cries such as “the [DTF] budget ignores the people who use the services!”; and 
“the DTF is completely out of touch with what is happening on the ground”; and “how can it 
be that community people are trying to screw other community people” – which by the way 
exposes the idea of ‘community people’ to its ideological vagueness. The fact that 
community representatives were not present contributed to reinforce this rupture; “I don’t 
even know if they are interested; if they were, they would be here” argued an attendee. 
 
So, this specific meeting constitutes the scenario of a collective awareness rising on the fact 
that something got ‘broken’ in the representative mechanism of local community governance.  
As I said previously, it is in this sudden illuminating of a situation and showing new 
possibilities that reside the centrality of the event in a political process. However, the 
consolidation of this awareness was not immediate, since the truth of the situation was made 
invisible by the participation ideology, by the idea of a homogeneous and solid ‘community 
people’, ‘sector’ etc.  
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Indeed, the first reaction to the fact that “we were betrayed by our representatives” (meeting 
attendee) was the wish to elect new representatives. The idea that what needed to be 
challenged was state-dependency itself and that autonomy should be reinforced was not 
affirmed immediately, but emerged progressively.   
 
The elevation of the level of political awareness is attested by the fact that although the 
meeting was devoted to the theme ‘fight against the cutbacks’, discussion quickly developed 
into something more articulated than just a simple outrage/denunciation of the state’s 
financial hostility. Cutbacks are undoubtedly a central issue for CD in the present phase, but 
also a ‘superficial’ one, as I contended in Chapter 5. The ‘real’ underlying issue goes far 
deeper than that and touches the relation between CD and the state, which is not at all limited 
to financial agreements, but involves ties that compromise CD’s egalitarian capacity. 
Interestingly, at a certain point during the meeting the idea that “the situation demands a 
political response” was put forward. And this idea was supported by many remarkable 
statements made by people from the local community, such as “we have to change the way 
the state thinks”, or “people should be involved in the decisions that concern their own lives”, 
which, by the way, is a fundamental principle of CD. These declarations lead to a definitive 
misrecognition of the community representatives’ representativeness as well as to the 
decision to organise a real protest.  
 
6.3.4 Mechanisms of depoliticisation 
 
As I anticipated previously a further element that I consider worth to analyse in this case is 
that it shows that the system of local democracy - so called partnership, or local governance - 
not only interdicts the ‘participatory’ process that it ideologically affirms to facilitate, but it 
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also shows that decision making is only apparently decentralised and inclusive. These 
ambivalences are functional to mechanisms of reproduction of a depoliticised situation which 
governance - on behalf of the state - constantly deploys - especially in popular contexts - in 
order to undermine people’s capacity to independently organise.  
 
In CF’s case, forms of interdiction were clearly applied when people started to politicise and 
to organise outside what activists refer to as “the usual channels” – i.e. when the voice of 
ordinary people started to ‘count’ within a real political procedure, over which 
‘representatives’ did not have any control. At this point the reaction of the state bureaucracy 
was to create boundaries that ordinary people could not overcome and to delegitimize any 
process of organisation that was unsupervised by the state. I am referring here to the way in 
which people’s participation in DTF meetings was prevented; or to the way in which 
representatives deserted the consultation meetings called by the community without giving 
any justification whatsoever. 
 
This is how a CF activist describes this sudden closure of ‘usual channels’: “we [CF] 
discussed what was happening locally and what issues we wanted to bring up to the DTF and 
we tried to set up the usual mechanism [of participation], but there are some older 
organisations there [that have a sort of hegemony within the partnership] which tend to tie 
things to bureaucracy and to be paranoid. And they feel that something open and inclusive is 
a threat in some way”. This sort of bureaucratic self-defensiveness traces a visible boundary 
between politics and the state. Indeed when an issue is political one can neither expect 
openness from the state, nor can one expect that it recognises independent forms of 
organisation around that issue as ‘legitimate’.  
 
187 
 
As an activist argues “the meeting for us was not the scapegoat for community workers but it 
was a means to understand who our reps were. And we realised that there was some fear 
there; they were afraid to come to our meetings”. This is because a political meeting takes 
always place at a certain distance from the state; i.e. in a space where the presence of the state 
is interdicted. Representatives’ fear was therefore fear to engage in an egalitarian 
confrontation with ordinary people; as well as fear to be ‘punished’ by the state for having 
overcome the boundaries that it had built in the situation in order to depoliticise it. Moreover, 
when a political procedure is on, it is impossible for one individual to maintain at the same 
time his ‘institutional’ position and its political subjectivity. It is impossible in other words to 
be state and subject of politics at the same time. As Alain Badiou highlights in such a 
situation, if one individual wants to become a subject, he has to take a clear decision, which 
involves a certain amount of courage. “Nietzsche’s imperative, ‘become who you are’, finds a 
worthy echo here. If one is to become a subject, it is because one isn’t one yet. The ‘who’ that 
you are, as subject, is nothing but the decision to become this subject” (Badiou 2003:73) 
 
Therefore –concludes a community activist - “it is always better if [at political meetings, 
protests etc.] there are people who are ‘community people’ [who do not have anything to 
lose] and not workers [state bureaucrats], because a worker at the end of the day has always 
to report back to its agency and he has restrictions”. 
 
As it happened with CF, the depoliticising power of state bureaucracy can manifest itself as 
criminalisation of dissent; i.e. a sort of bureaucratic ‘terrorism’ aimed to inhibit people’s 
facility to decide to become subjects of a political sequence. In our case this mirrored in 
attitudes such as open condemnation, pinpointing of individuals as responsible for what was 
happening, groundless accusations of violence, use of a ‘health and safety’ type of rhetoric 
188 
 
(which, as we know, is applied when meaningful reasons to forbid are lacking), and so on. By 
the way, the stunningly limited capacity by the institutions (for example DTF) to tolerate 
conflict shows how influenced the situation is by the climate of consensus that was produced 
during the Celtic Tiger.  
 
To conclude the analysis of this micro-experience of CD re-politicisation at a local level I 
would like to emphasise a point that was discussed at a public meeting jointly organised by 
the Provisional University30 and CF in Dublin (03/11/2010). Namely that what other 
community groups can learn from this experience cannot be grasped in terms of a more or 
less successful ‘model’. The political processes that I analyse in this thesis are experimental, 
embedded in specific localities, and always ambiguous in their outcomes. I consider them to 
be not a ‘model’ for transformation to be applied universally, but rather as an example of 
what CD is capable of when it undertakes paths of autonomy and critical self-reflexivity. The 
CF case constitutes also a sign of the fact that - despite the passivity showed by the Irish 
society after the economic downturn - something may be slowly starting to move in the urban 
‘underground’.  
 
Moreover, when we deal with politics, a ‘model’ can not be deemed as a good in itself. 
Indeed a successful model could be exported to other contexts (say other neighbourhoods in 
Dublin) but still not work. This is because models do not entail any ‘magic’ potential in 
themselves. Struggles for emancipation are always embedded in concrete situations; and a 
singular politics is just thinkable from the point of view of the concrete situation in which it 
develops, i.e. from the point of view of the subjects who are involved. As a community 
activist remarked, in each concrete situation “you have to literarily invent something else and 
                                                          
30
 PU is an independent, Dublin based students organisation promoting autonomous education and resistance to 
the neoliberalisation of the University. 
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not repeat old patterns. It is hard because you have to try and re-imagine all this”. This brings 
us back to the ‘nature’ of politics, which, as I described it in the theoretical chapter, is to be 
singular, sequential and always sustained by the subjective creativity of the people who are 
involved in it.  
 
Therefore what I find worth to be ‘exported’ from this Community First experience is the 
aspiration to develop a non-representative type of politics in which ordinary people can think 
for themselves without anyone to do it on their behalf. A politics in which through their 
collective involvement in issues that affect them, people can actually develop independent 
critical analysis and recognise that the structures that are supposed to ‘include’ them (such as 
for example drug task forces, methadone clinics and so on) can contribute to the reproduction 
of their ‘disempowerment’. This would not have been possible without the ‘organic’ efforts 
by CR, especially in terms of MSG and the capacity that this form of organisation has to 
generate collective consistency in poor areas. 
 
Indeed - as Holloway (2005:173) highlights - an important way to produce political processes 
and push autonomy as far as possible is that of working in order to create an environment that 
is more favourable to it. What any particular group can achieve in terms of independence 
clearly “depends on the strength of an entire movement pushing in the same or similar 
directions. The strength of the component groups depends on the strength of the movement, 
just as the strength of the movement depends on the strength of the component groups” 
(Holloway 2005:175). This strength in the case of CD corresponds to the will and capacity by 
every single group or project to break with the logic of representation and to catalyse 
spontaneous ruptures and events that are difficult to integrate into the texture of domination 
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(i.e. state & capital). This could help a fragmented CD ‘sector’ to exit the present impasse 
and liberate from overwhelming forms of state normativity and control.   
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7. CD AND YOUTH. THE PRESENT AND THE FUTURE OF CD 
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After having discussed bureaucratisation, professionalization and latent political events in the 
field of CD it is now time to address a problem that in my view is at the root of the crisis 
affecting this movement at present. I am referring to the ‘youth issue’ or the ‘generational 
gap’, i.e. the lack of a new generation of activists engaging with CD politically. As I have 
mentioned previously, CD is now ‘aging’ and it is difficult for older activists to face current 
challenges. There is a desperate need for young people wanting to take charge and fight for 
CD. In the first part of this chapter (section 7.1) I will address the problem of the failure of a 
new generation of politically engaged CD activists and leaders to emerge. Why, I will ask, a 
movement that since the beginning was so concerned with the politicisation and awareness 
rising among underprivileged young people found itself in this condition of generational 
stand by? Research shows that this problem is related to three main issues, including (a) the 
charisma of Tony Gregory and his group, which generated processes of delegation and 
demobilisation; (b) professionalization/bureaucratisation, which created a generation of 
middle class professionals who are both little prone to struggle and just ‘sympathetic’ with 
the context in which they found themselves working; (c) but even more crucial, the 
ambivalent approach to youth that CD is displaying at the moment – whose ideology is 
condensed in the notion of ‘anti-social behaviour’. This approach, I will argue, prevents a 
meaningful relation between activists and underprivileged young people to be built. For 
finding it hard to politically relate to ‘working class’ youth, CD tends to fail in reproducing 
itself as a political subject.    
In section 7.2, with the purpose of critically addressing the ambiguities that characterise CD’s 
approach to youth I will investigate the places in which CD concretely relates itself to young 
people. At a formal level the two main youth related institutions are youth clubs and 
Community Policing Fora. I will show how in both cases the approach to youth is informed 
by an ‘anti-social’ behaviour ideology which tends to criminalise young people and articulate 
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the question of their development in terms of management, (crime) prevention, diversion and 
control. Very little positivity can be found in this perspective. The CPF case is of particular 
interest to this thesis because it constitutes a partnership version of previous forms of 
community self-policing which were political and independent from the state. In their 
practice the idea of anti-social behaviour was absent: given the conditions in which 
community self-policing developed it did not make sense.  
CPF’s (and youth work’s) policing approach and their actual collaboration with the police are 
very problematic elements in my view. Indeed underprivileged neighbourhoods in Dublin are 
shaped by a particularly tense (not to say antagonistic) relation between youth and the Gardaí 
– with young people being targeted, harassed and racialised in their day to day life. In section 
7.3 I will illustrate how this discrimination and targeting of underprivileged young people 
works. Ethnographic research done at CPF sessions is used to support my arguments. Among 
other ideas, I will highlight the notion of ‘scum’, which has racialising effects on working 
class (especially young) people, playing a central role in dismissing them. To support this 
idea I will do a parallel with the notion of ‘racaille’ (“scum” in French) used by Sarkozy to 
tag young people living in underprivileged neighbourhoods in the outskirt of Paris. This was 
eventually followed by the Banlieue unrests in 2005. In section 7.4 episodes of juvenile 
insubordination such as those which in Dublin culminated with the 2006 Riot will be 
interpreted as a response by youth to injustice and discrimination. To conclude (7.5) I will 
critically address the ineffectiveness of CD to meaningfully deal with such events - and more 
in general with young people’s rage and latent desires. I will suggest that in order to 
overcome the impasse (which is in large part ‘generational’) CD should return to its ‘organic’ 
approach and get meaningfully involved in ordinary people’s struggles - like those informally 
carried out by underprivileged young people. 
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7.1 The youth issue (i.e. the problem of leadership) 
 
I previously mentioned the fact that an important point for CD activists has always been the 
need to counter what they perceived as a sort of ‘colonial’ condition shaping the inner city’s 
underprivileged neighbourhoods. In their view, the lack of a local leadership was an 
important aspect of that problem. Therefore they saw the training of young people who could 
actually have a say on the way in which local projects and facilities were managed as a 
possible solution. In this spirit they started to develop institutions which could both supply 
the lack of recreational facilities for young people in the inner city and be the place where a 
new generation of ‘leaders’ could be trained and politicised. As Lisa refers about a group of 
activists operating in the Summerhill area in the early 1970s, for example, “they wanted to 
develop some activities for young people in a flat complex; but the grounding idea was to 
develop local leadership. It was about trying to involve local young people and develop their 
leadership skills so that they might be able to come through and be the people who are 
running these facilities; because all over the years professionals have always come from the 
outside to run services. And the idea of CD is that local young people should be given the 
opportunity to develop skills in order to be not only service users but to become leaders” 
(Lisa). This strategy follows an ‘inner city style’ CD approach to the extent that – as we have 
seen in Chapter 5 – it involves the creation of an institution (a youth project in this case) 
aimed not just to service provision, but also to the production of a collective political 
consistency around it. For example an early purpose of the North Central Community 
Council (NCCC – see Chapter 2) was to gain local control of summer projects for young 
people in the area. Indeed the Catholic Youth Association (CYC) had the monopoly of 
funding in that field. Changing this situation involved a “long drawn out conflict between 
NCCC (including some of its constituent groups such as Sackville Street Tenants’ 
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Association, North Wall Tenants’ Association), Dublin Corporation and the CYC. A major 
breakthrough came when Sackville Tenants’ Association was given the contract by Dublin 
Corporation to run the summer projects (Kelleher & Whelan 1992:28). 
In relation to the allusion that Lisa makes to the notions of ‘leader’ and ‘leadership’, it should 
be emphasized that with them she does not mean a tiny group of charismatic and skilled 
people being able to influence and lead the rest of the local population. To certain extent such 
a group already existed in the inner city. It was composed by people like Tony Gregory who 
had a strong political and ideological background and a history of engagement in popular 
struggles. The notion of leadership here is not an elitist one. As Lisa puts it “the idea that 
became central in CD was that young people should assume the leadership” (Lisa); thus 
meaning a ‘popular leadership’, with the idea of ‘young people’ being transversal, indicating 
all the youth (i.e. the future adults) and not just a part of it.  
Despite the fact that along the decades CD has set up many youth projects managing to obtain 
good levels of attendance by local young people, by analyzing the present state of affairs in 
CD it is clear that the plan to create a new generation of ‘leaders’ has not been really 
successful. Indeed, as Lisa highlights “if you look at the leadership now it is still an old 
generation, and young people with few exceptions have not come through”. The Community 
First initiative itself (see chapter 6) was mainly composed by middle aged people. This is a 
problem that CD activists are aware of and which they find it hard to deal with; especially in 
a phase such as the present, which is shaped by the implementation of austerity measures 
involving cutbacks and restrictions to CD. Activists agree that resistance to these attacks 
would be much more effective if fresh energies and thoughts were present. However, this is 
not the case. Just a few young activists are actually ready to ‘fight’ for CD. In my view, there 
are three main (interrelated) reasons for this ‘generational’ impasse. I will present them in 
historical order. 
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(a) The first reason is the almost mythological aura that has been constructed around some 
historical leaders. Indeed it is well known that activists like Tony Gregory acquired a huge 
symbolic value for people living in the inner city and beyond. Tony is remembered by 
everyone as a champion of the people. There is a belief that after his death no one will ever 
be able to replace him: “it’s the people’s loss. There will never be another Tony Gregory” 
declared Christy Burke (2009) after he passed away. This charisma, as we have seen in 
Chapter 3 has produced processes of delegation. “It was almost like… the group around him 
became seen as they were the community leaders responsible for anybody else” (Lisa). Under 
this condition, CD became dependent on the performance of leaders operating on behalf of 
the population, with the result to demobilise ordinary people. Indeed “people are not getting 
involved in politics and I think it may be because there is such an charismatic group of 
community leaders, because they have such a ‘success’; and people do not feel the need to 
get involved; they do not feel encouraged to get involved” (Lisa). 
In the 1980s this reputation resonated in the unprecedented electoral success of Tony 
Gregory, which in this sense can be interpreted as ambivalent: it contributed to CD’s shift 
towards state-politics; and it made a single community candidate responsible for the 
emancipation of ‘his’ people. Evidently both these tendencies clash with the political 
innovations that had been introduced by CD since the end of the 1960s.  
This depoliticising trend continued along the years and it is not surprising that the majority of 
today’s recognised leaders are still those who came up in the 1970s. Although their charisma 
still enables them to captivate the mature part of the population31, they fail to meaningfully 
relate themselves to young people, who are not showing much interest to get involved – if not 
in a very ‘practical’ way or as ‘service-users’. Amongst other aspects this is due to a sort of 
                                                          
31
 It is not a case that Maureen O’Sullivan (grounding her electoral campaign on the idea that she is the 
‘Gregory Candidate’) got recently elected as independent TD.   
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generational/cultural gap that CD people find difficult to overcome. Indeed in Claire’s view 
“old leaders find it harder to engage with young people than it was in the 70s because today 
people have passed through different life experiences, including wealth and related things 
which were absent before” (Claire). After the economic boom young people have started to 
see wealth and consumer goods all around them; they have been sold the message that there 
are opportunities for everybody out there - and an infinite range of choices. But reality is that 
many underprivileged young people have been excluded from this wealth and their choices 
are still seriously limited. This makes the experience of ‘being young’ quite different than it 
was in the 1970s; and old leaders are unprepared to deal with this ‘anthropological’ 
transformation. Thus the remoteness of CD leaders “from the everyday lives of young people 
is partly to blame for their inability to relate to and understand how young people view their 
world. It is also the measurements that are used to gauge political awareness that are the 
problem” (Vernell 2010:29). In order to deal with this problem some ‘emergency measures’ 
are starting to be deployed by aware activists. William, for example, is involved in the 
production of a new piece of work using drama, trying to get young people “to talk about life 
experiences and issues that affect them in the area - so that they can at least start to debate 
them collectively”. However, this process is not immediate “and there is going to be a 
generation gap even if they start taking action now” (Lisa). 
2-The second reason why a new generation of activists failed to emerge is 
professionalisation; i.e. the fact that with the advent of governance partnership many young 
people joined the movement as professional workers. Many of them came from other areas of 
the city, having eventually studied social work at the university, which gave them many 
theoretical ideas and little knowledge of the local reality. The involvement of professional 
workers has also produced a sort of fragmentation, with people coming and going, preventing 
long term engagement with the local population. Previously “a lot of the old community 
198 
 
activists who emerged, who were educated and empowered, would have stayed in their 
communities”. Instead, with professionalisation “you would have people coming from the 
university staying and leaving creating sorts of gaps and vacuums in the spaces; and this has 
constituted a weakness in CD developing local leadership” (Seamus). Moreover there is also 
a question of understanding and empathy involved. Indeed “you would have much more 
middle class people coming into the sector, who would neither necessarily have an empathy 
with the people who they were actually working with; nor understanding where CD emerged 
from”. So, whereas before there was a lot of history and understanding of where CD came 
from “with the introduction of paid professionals this understanding and this attachment were 
not obvious anymore” (Seamus).  
From these actors one can not expect that they take charge of CD’s struggles - as someone 
who is seriously committed to CD politics would actually do. Indeed to directly engage with 
marginalised people and create a CD ‘organic’ type of approach is not something straight 
forward; “you have to be able to sit with them, to listen to them and then start organising 
from the point of view of their own experience and so you can actually generate change. Life 
experiences have changed but that has not changed. What is needed is still someone who 
knocks on doors, who gathers people around a cup of tea and get them to talk. (…) So, the 
problem is that we stopped doing what we were doing and look what happened” (Claire).  
This ‘activist’ attitude described by Maura in this quote would be particularly useful in the 
current phase where technical/professional skills tend to become marginal, compared to other 
more fundamental political urgencies. As (Carl) highlights, “the old generation of leaders has 
dealt with this type of problems in first person. But they are now getting retired and in the 
meantime no one got used to take real political decisions”. The professionalization process 
has contributed to the creation of gaps which are now difficult to fill: “many of those people 
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are now 60 years of age so there is a gap and there are no people in their 20s who are ready to 
take over” (Lisa). 
7.2 CD’s relation to youth 
 
The first two causes (representation and professionalization) of what I have defined as a 
‘generational issue’ affecting CD were broadly discussed from different points of view in 
previous chapters. The third cause tightly relates with the first two, but since it refers to more 
recent scenarios its description is less straight forward. In my view it corresponds to an 
ambiguous (conceptual and practical) approach to youth that CD has developed in recent 
times and which is articulated through the idea of ‘anti-social behaviour’. This conception, I 
will argue, is problematic because it is grounded in a state-rhetoric, which is uncritical and 
depoliticised, preventing CD activists to set the basis for a meaningful engagement with 
young people, one that could eventually lead to a solution of the generational problem and 
perhaps the broader crisis affecting CD.   
In order to understand the ambiguities that currently characterise CD’s approach to youth it is 
essential to explore the places in which CD concretely relates itself to youth. At a formal / 
institutional level there are two main such institutions in Dublin, namely youth clubs and 
Community Policing Fora (CPF). 
7.2.1 Youth Clubs  
 
On what concerns youth projects, I find it easy to pinpoint their ambivalences. To start with - 
as I argued previously – it is easy to understand why they did not become the ‘leadership 
workshops’ for which they were thought initially. Indeed in Dublin it is difficult to find a 
youth project whose primary goal is – to put it with Schott-Myrhe (2007) - the liberation of 
the youth and adults who are involved.  In my view the principal cause of this lack is to be 
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ascribed to the fact that youth projects operate as places of sociality, diversion, prevention 
and control utterly devoid of political ambitions. This is deducible from the type of activities 
that they offer and from the rhetoric that organisers tend to display.  
It is important to highlight the fact that as such, notions of ‘youth project’ and ‘youth work’ 
are quite neutral and do not say much about aims and objectives and the ideological horizon 
in which they are articulated. However, as Schott-Myhre (2007:21) points out, “the role of 
the youth worker is constituted at the intersection of a number of cultural discourses” which 
are typical of the historical-social situation in which his activity takes place. Currently “many 
of these [discourses] have to do with the marginalization, categorization, normalizing, 
pathologizing and de-politicizing of youth. Others have to do with the construction of ‘truth 
regimes’ and ‘disciplines’ displayed in discourses about professionalization, maturation, 
progress, rationality, science, medicine, expertise and social control (…) the identity of the 
youth worker is comprised of these intersecting discourses that affect their descriptions of 
themselves, their roles and how they come to understand their relationship to the youth they 
serve” (Schott-Myhre 2007:21).  
Also in Dublin youth work is informed and sustained by different types of ideologies and 
discourses. In my view, amongst them, the hegemonic one32 rotates around the idea that 
youth work is a means to divert those engaged in anti-social behaviour onto other avenues of 
legitimate activity – which are normally lacking in poor communities affected by 
unemployment, early school living and lack of leisure infrastructures.  
Statements like “we need to keep young people busy and off the streets” (Peter), show how in 
reality youth work is embraced as a sort of extension of policing in terms of crime prevention 
and control. The relation youth-work/policing is not just metaphorical. The level of 
                                                          
32
 I am obviously referring to investigated areas in Dublin. 
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collaboration between youth projects and the police is particularly high in Dublin. For 
example, Community Policing Fora (see section 7.2.2) are formally linked to both the Gardaí 
and local youth projects, a great portion of the activity they do involving efforts to “divert 
those engaging in so called ‘anti-social behaviour’ into youth groups or community groups as 
a means of preventing further offending” (Connolly 1997:24). Or think about the Garda 
Juvenile Diversion Programme which involves youth workers and specially trained Gardaí 
called Garda Juvenile Liaison Officers. The Programme is designed to divert young people 
who came to the notice of the Garda from committing further offences. Curiously enough, to 
be admitted to the program the child must accept responsibility for his or her criminal 
behaviour. 
The policing function carried out by CD youth projects and their actual relation to the police 
apparatus is extremely problematic in my view. As I will argue in section 7.4, based on 
personal observations, Dublin’s deprived neighbourhoods are characterised by a particularly 
tense (not to say antagonistic) relation between youth and the police – with young people 
being targeted, harassed and racialised on a daily basis. What both CD activists and police 
officers define as ‘anti-social behaviour’ frequently consists in acts of rebelliousness against a 
situation of oppression felt at grassroots level. To treat this problem as a simple matter of 
‘lack of education’, ‘subculture’, ‘deviancy’ or ‘crime’ is misleading and dangerous. To be 
sure this attitude moves CD away from the solution of its ‘generational problem’.  
A major consequence of this policing and ‘diversion’ approach is that youth projects tend not 
to critically discuss the situation with young people. Youth crimes are constantly re-
conducted to a behavioural problem; as if being involved in a crafts workshop instead of 
hanging out in the streets could really constitute a meaningful solution to the problem at stake 
here. Indeed the way youth workers work with young people most of the times follows what 
Martin (community artist/ youth worker) calls an “educational convention” involving 
202 
 
“outcome expectations” in terms of “learning skills” and “being able to measure them”. Thus 
for young people the choice is reduced to “whether to buy into it or not... and this does not 
realise their potential”. 
As Lisa highlights, in youth centres young people “are involved in practical activities but not 
in the understanding of why there are issues affecting their communities”. The problem is 
that currently the main objective of youth projects seems to be that to occupy young people’s 
free time, to ‘entertain’ them in ways that are not harmful, but without proposing any 
meaningful intellectual or political alternative to rage, depression and self-destruction. On the 
other hand, youth workers operate as state agents; to the extent that as Thomas says “they 
constantly categorise” young people. By doing so they reinforce their identitarian position 
(their belonging to a subculture etc.) instead of exploring their potentialities beyond the (non-
)place they occupy in society. This reproduces a paternalistic type of approach that does not 
attempt to generate a genuine alliance between adults and youth. “So it’s hard to understand, 
because there is a lot of activity in our projects, a lot of leadership training etc., but it 
becomes very focused on doing works in the projects and they are not getting involved in 
politics” (Lisa).  
Obviously here the point is not to evaluate youth centres and youth work from a social/ 
educational point of view. My critiques go beyond the nevertheless sincere and valuable 
effort that is put on a daily basis by many people working in these institutions. My point here 
is political. My aim is to address the question of why youth projects failed in producing a new 
generation of politically organised citizens which was a primary goal for CD when it came to 
being in the inner city of Dublin. The answer in my view is that youth work is almost entirely 
captured by state-procedures. As Scott-Myhre (2004:17) puts it “youth work is permeated 
with this sense of powerlessness. The disciplinary edge of youth work with its rules, 
diagnostic categories, therapies, spaces of containment/confinement and over coded 
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descriptions of youth have constructed edifices of capture which constantly seem to overtake 
and render impotent any effort to crack their surface”.  
On what concerns Community Policing Fora (CPF) the argument is similar but a bit more 
complex. Indeed CPF do not directly deal with youth. personally I have never seen a young 
people at a CPF session. However, ‘youth’ seems to be their main concern. In my view CPF 
play a central ideological role in the way in which both CD and the state represent young 
people. More concretely, CPF are sites where a discourse is produced and reproduced 
according to which underprivileged young people mainly constitute a problem of anti-social 
behaviour management. As we will see, this discourse plays a key role in depoliticising CD’s 
relation to young people. Since CPF are a relatively recent experiment in CD organisation I 
will give a bit of background to them.   
7.2.2 Background to CPF 
 
The overall project started in 1997 when the inter-Agency Drugs Project (IADP) and the 
Inner City Organisation Network (ICON) proposed the establishment of a ‘Community 
Policing and Estate Management Forum’ (hereafter the Community Policing Forum) to the 
North Inner City Drugs Task Force. It was agreed that the CPF, following a partnership type 
of approach, would involve local residents in the north-east inner city, public representatives 
and representatives from the local Drugs Task Force, ICON, an Garda Síochána and Dublin 
City Council. The general aim of the CPF would be to enable these parties to “develop a co-
ordinated strategy in response to drug dealing and drug-related anti-social behaviour in the 
north inner city” (Connolly 2002). The original Board, which was established in April 1999 
consisted of a Chairman, TD Tony Gregory; the Chairman of the local Drugs Task Force, 
Fergus McCabe; a local community representative, Tony Dunleavy; who is also a member of 
the local Drugs Task Force and is involved in anti-drugs groups, two Garda Inspectors, Frank 
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Clerkin and Jim Cannon; and a representative from Dublin City Council, Jim Beggan 
(Connolly 2002). A co-ordinator was also appointed (CD activist Marie Metcalfe), to bridge 
between the local community the Garda and Dublin City Council.  
After about seven months of preparation which involved the holding of approximately 17 
Board meetings and 52 local community meetings and the distribution of four and a half 
thousand explanatory leaflets the first introductory meeting of the CPF was held on the 15th 
of December 1999 at Store Street Garda station – which was attended by over 50 local 
residents (Connolly 2002).  
Officially, CPF meetings are aimed to provide local residents with the opportunity to raise 
matters of local concern to relevant state agencies and to allow these agencies to respond to 
those concerns and to account for their activities since the previous CPF meeting. Eventually 
agreement can be reached between state agencies and local residents as to future actions to be 
taken in relation to issues affecting the area. As it is officially stated, the general purpose of 
CPF meetings is to “provide the community and the state agencies with an opportunity to 
identify and address the local drug problem and related anti-social behaviour in a coordinated 
way”. All this, they say, constitutes an unprecedented opportunity for people to influence the 
way in which issues are prioritised by the police forces on behalf of the state.  
The formal aims of the CPF are: 
1. To reduce local fears and address concerns in relation to drug dealing and associated 
anti-social behaviour. 
2. To improve communication between the Community and an Garda Síochána in 
relation to drug dealing. 
3. To assist in the resolution of difficulties between the Gardaí and the Community in 
relation to drug dealing. 
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4. To improve communication between Dublin City Council and local residents groups 
and to encourage the development of new residents groups. 
5. To promote community  development, particularly in relation to the drug problem and  
6. To improve the quality of life for local residents. (Connolly 2002:6) 
In order to understand how this project could be implemented so quickly and with such a 
good consensus in traditionally police-hostile Dublin inner city areas one has to go back to 
the historical roots of community-policing in Ireland.  
7.2.3 Roots of community policing in Ireland 
 
CPF are considered by many CD activists as a great innovation in the field of community 
development. At first sight this might sounds controversial. Indeed it is well known that inner 
city communities never had a good relation with the police. The way in which issues are 
prioritised by the police on a daily basis tends to enhance this hostility. I am thinking about, 
for example, police officers harassing street traders of fruit and vegetables (a quite typical 
scene in the city centre) and allowing heroin dealers to carry on their business undisturbed. 
But I am also referring to ‘lines’ of police men protecting middle class night life spots such as 
Temple Bar - and harassing working class kids (hoodies), who are not welcome in these areas 
of the city. Or think about the management of traffic and parking spaces in the inner city, 
where poor neighbourhoods are frequently used as dumping areas for touristic buses etc.  
Nevertheless, by considering the social, historical and political roots of community policing 
in Ireland one can guess why CPF exist and why it was not so difficult to involve ordinary 
people in their implementation. On the other hand, for community self-policing has 
independent and anti-state origins, one can also guess why the state could be interested in the 
development of (and participation to) such a projec
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CPF can be considered as a sort of partnership version of previous forms of community self-
policing, an activity that has a wide tradition in Ireland, especially in poor communities that 
were systematically excluded by the post-colonial state. Many of these communities have 
developed over time forms of organisation to combat youth alienation, levels of violence 
against women and children and the threat of drugs - which involved the transfer of control 
over policing away from the state and its localisation it in the community. So, one could 
argue that community self-policing in Ireland comes from the need “for a marginalized and 
neglected community to develop and utilize its own resources in order to maintain cohesion” 
(Connolly 1997). 
In Dublin the main example of community self-policing (one that in my view had a huge 
influence on the development of CPF) were Concerned Parents Against Drugs (CPAD, see 
also Chapter 2.), who organised as a response to the heroin epidemic of the 1980s. The 
CPAD movement can be described as a highly sophisticated community-based self-policing 
initiative: “its local network system of information coupled with the fact that it was not tied to 
the state were its principal strengths” (ibid. p31). Independency was a particularly 
emphasised since residents “were prepared to provide information to the CPAD on condition 
that it would not be passed on to the Gardaí” (ibid. p31). CPAD was temporarily successful to 
stem the heroin epidemic, whereas the state, due to a combination of inability and lack of 
interest had failed. Faced with containment mechanisms, exclusion and injustice 
“communities (…) have organised their own truth finding procedure” (Connolly 1997:24). 
There are many examples of community self-policing organisations in and outside Ireland. 
Comparable developments can be found in Nicaragua, in Palestine, in the townships of South 
Africa under the apartheid regime, and in the areas held today by the Zapatistas of Mexico 
(ibid. p22). 
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Traditionally community self-policing in Dublin has been carried out by several non-state 
organisations33 performing preventive or diversionary roles in the policing activity. In recent 
years the Inner City Organisations Network (ICON) has performed a central role in 
identifying the policing requirements of Dublin’s marginalised communities. Considering the 
central role it played in the constitution of CPF, one could argue that ICON has acted as a 
sort of bridge between this new ‘partnership’ model and previous autonomous forms of 
community self-policing. 
Indeed it should be emphasised the way in which CPF differentiate themselves and break 
with the old approach. By following a governance partnership approach they involve formal 
collaboration and alliance with the state – which was not present before. This alliance 
produced substantial changes in the conception and the practice of community-policing, with 
the police playing now a central role in the process. In my view, this shift had huge historical 
implications in the inner city, since it broke a sort of taboo.  
Indeed one of the problems that the CPF had to deal with initially was to get people to 
actually talk to the police. It was hard to bypass the hostility and distrust that inner city 
residents have in relation to the Gardaí. As Connolly (1997) suggests, policing in the 
Republic maintained a number of colonial features. After independence – he argues - “only 
the membership altered” (pp.60). Moreover, Garda members were predominantly from rural 
Ireland having little familiarity with – and sympathy for – Dublin’s working classes. 
Although today the situation has changed, the attitude of the police towards the urban poor 
has remained ambiguous, alternating the use of force with lack of care.  
On what concern the youth issue (which is what interests the most here), the shift from 
autonomous community self-policing to a CPF model involved a shift in terms of how youth 
                                                          
33
 In nationalist neighbourhoods in Northern Ireland community policing was performed by the IRA only. 
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is addressed at grassroots level. Ideologically this change corresponded to an unprecedented 
emphasis on the idea of ‘anti-social behaviour’ and related rhetoric, which are based on 
criminalisation of the young poor.   
7.3 CPF, the anti-social behaviour ideology and youth criminalisation 
 
I should premise that the ‘ideology’ currently shaping CPF’s (and CD’s) approach to youth 
does not differ too much from a common sense perception of it. This vision can be described 
as depoliticised first of all because it refers to youth as a ‘condition’ which is not associated 
with images of the future (MacDonald, 1999:3), no longer a possibility for change, but 
mostly a problem – a sickness - for which is to find a ‘technical’ cure. Under this condition, 
any form of juvenile insubordination (especially if performed by the poor) is immediately 
condemned as a ‘social pathology’. This attitude often degenerates in the criminalization of 
behaviours, which were previously perceived as being ‘normal’ and tolerable.  
In a CPF (26.05.2010) that took place at a Garda station in central Dublin, a big part of the 
discussion rotated around episodes of ‘anti-social behaviour’ by local young people. 
Paradoxically, attendees repeatedly pointed out young people “gathering” and “hanging out 
without anything to do” in public spaces as being the main cause of this problem. 
The equation youth congregating / anti-social behaviour is particularly sinister in my view. 
As sinister is the fact that CD activists (apart from rare exceptions) tend not to oppose any 
critical argument to it - when this equation comes up in CPF meetings. Paradoxically the 
most known community leaders, those who actually started the CPF project in Dublin seem 
to be uncritical too. A very few of them argue for example that young people in the inner city 
of Dublin have almost no place where to spend their free time; or that except for some youth 
projects (where activities are structured and supervised by adults) and other private places 
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that can only be accessed by those who have money to spend, the only spaces available to 
young people for coming together and socialising are public streets, squares and parks.  
Nevertheless in Dublin groups of working class young people ‘hanging out’ generate tangible 
moral panic and hysteric reactions from the rest of the population. Following this common 
sense perception, discussion at CPF meetings normally lead to few positive ideas and many 
interventions on the necessity to repress anti-social behaviour: people demand more police 
intervention and police officers tirelessly ask attendants to “report suspicious activity”. CPF 
attendants frequently come up with accusations and statements which are symptomatic of this 
moral panic. For example someone in the audience once reported that he had repeatedly 
witnessed a group of young people “drinking cheap alcohol” nearby his house – as if 
drinking expensive alcohol would be different. This says much about the class background of 
this anti-social behaviour ideology. In another case someone demanded police intervention 
against a group of young people – one of them in a wheelchair - who were regularly playing 
football on a central square, bothering the bystanders – as if a police operation was needed to 
resolve this issue. It also happens frequently that people suggest that the police should always 
intervene and disperse groups of more than five people. In other countries such rule has 
actually been applied to some ‘sensitive neighbourhoods’. Another controversial aspect of 
CPF is that they frequently deal with specific cases and pinpoint individuals that both 
residents and police officers seem to know very well. When this is not the case police officers 
insist that they “need the information about who is doing it” whatever case of anti-social 
behaviour they refer to. This custom of pinpointing people at meetings between residents and 
the police is practiced in other countries such as France where, “Anti-Social Behaviour 
Orders [ASBO] have turned the most petty disputes among neighbours into personally 
tailored edicts of exile, banishing a marked individual from a street corner or proscribing the 
wearing of hooded tops within a specific zone” (Anonymous). In the UK young people seem 
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to be the most targeted by anti-social behaviour orders: “the experience to date (…) is that 
ASBOs have been used mainly against children and young people, rather than adults, 
frequently for ‘offences’ such as ‘hanging around’” (Hillyard et al 2005:191).  
In many European countries special laws are being introduced, which in ‘exceptional 
circumstances’ confer ‘ exceptional powers’ to the police forces and institute non-jury special 
criminal courts (similar to those used to repress CPAD) where suspected individuals can be 
judged under non-constitutional conditions. In Ireland, for example, there has been a big 
debate about the so called anti-gang bill34 which foresees the introduction of special 
regulations for cases dealing with ‘gang related crimes’. According to Damien, as the crisis 
deepens rulers “are introducing much more authoritarian laws on the basis of the crime rates. 
So they are introducing laws which will allow them to take people to special courts and non-
jury courts. (…) What they say is that like this we can get rid of criminal gangs (…) mainly 
in disadvantaged areas, where these gangs have developed around drug issues. When they 
bring in the drugs they also bring guns and there is warfare between gangs for who controls 
the territory. And so they have the capacity to intimidate witnesses, to do crime robberies, to 
attack cash delivery vans and so on. So the government argues that ordinary people are too 
intimidated to witness against them, they say that juries would be targeted, so the only way 
we can deal with them is a special court where there are no juries and where the rule of 
evidence are different. This is what they say it is for, but of course they can use the same 
methodology to lock up people for all sorts of stuff later. Groups of youths can be treated as 
gangs”. Not accidentally in my view, these laws have been introduced in Europe after the 
spread of new forms of juvenile rebelliousness that culminated in youth riots all across the 
continent – which I will deal with below.    
                                                          
34
 I am referring here to the Criminal Justice (Amendment) Act, 2009 and The Criminal Justice Surveillance 
Act, 2009. The act provides new legislation for prosecutions of people who are suspected to be involved in 
criminal gangs organising serious criminal, subversive or terrorist activity for the first time. 
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On the other hand, sometimes at CPF meetings there are attendees who, out of frustration 
about what is being said, explode and denounce this ideological distortion. For example, 
someone once highlighted the fact that “kids are let on their own with nothing to do”; that 
they are “stopped, searched and harassed by the police several times a day” which is a reality 
that whoever lives in the inner city can not deny. An attendee once emphasised that “they are 
not animals” – lamenting the condition that I previously describe in terms of ‘racialization’ 
affecting a big part of the underprivileged young population in Dublin. At one CPF it was 
even an older police officer - himself particularly frustrated - who argued against the 
majority’s opinion that “we should not confuse ‘anti-social behaviour’ with ‘adolescent 
behaviour’” – which is something every young person should have the right to.  
These transitory moments of critique, however, are obviously not enough to build up an 
alternative approach to youth for CD. In order to do that, the negative stigma affecting young 
people needs to be challenged. 
7.3.1 Stigma (the notion of ‘scum’) 
 
The problem in my view is that underprivileged young people are the object of forms of 
discrimination that the idea of anti-social behavior enhances, since it tends to tag and 
criminalize specific groups. As Mark Fisher (2009: 21) highlights, it is not “an exaggeration 
to say that being a teenager in late capitalist Britain [but this might be applied to Ireland as 
well] is now close to being reclassified as a sickness”. Especially, I would add, if besides 
being young, one is poor, and lives in certain ‘problematic’ areas of the city. In the inner city 
of Dublin “local penchant for track suits, sovereign rings, and particular hairstyles became 
the uniform of the enemy” (Saris & Bartley 2002a:15) in the eyes of state officers, middle 
class people and often locals too. In order to understand who are the designated ‘victims’ of 
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this ‘war’ one should check at who is “the typical Mountjoy35 prisoner”:  according to 
Connolly (1997:57) he “comes from a usually large family. His family lives in a corporation 
house or a flat in the inner city. He will probably have left school at 14 or earlier. He’ll be 
relatively uneducated in the formal sense. He’ll be likely to be in its early or mid-20, and 
have been unemployed for at least half the time since its 15th birthday and his current 
imprisonment. He will have received its first conviction before he was 16 years of age and 
will have been detained before the age of 18”.  
As I anticipated above, in Dublin, underprivileged young people are affected by forms of 
stigmatisation which tend to be ‘racialising’. If you are dressed in a certain way and if you 
have a certain way of speaking you will always be watched with suspicion by the people. 
You will not be allowed into clubs, and in general you will be kept far from the spots (such as 
Temple Bar) where the middle classes enjoy their nights – and you will constantly be targeted 
stopped and searched by the police as I have been able to observe on a daily basis in the 
neighbourhood where I live.  
In 2005, Nikolas Sarkozy (French minister of the interior, at the time) used the word scum 
(racaille in French) to name what he viewed as French society’s ‘ill’ part, including those 
two young boys whose death would have sparked the big Banlieue uprisings some weeks 
later. Sarkozy’s unfortunate expression is widely used in Dublin. It is commonly addressed to 
underprivileged people living in specific neighbourhoods where ‘anti-social behaviour’ is 
‘endemic’ according to what you hear on TV and at CPF, and where – as I will illustrate 
below – acts of disobedience and generic rebelliousness take place constantly; acts such as 
those that culminated in the 2006 Dublin riot36. One of these neighbourhoods is the one 
                                                          
35
 Mountjoy Prison is located in the north inner city of Dublin. 
36
 In the aftermath of the riot the Gardi spoke of “a scumbag element from local pubs”. The “blog-sphere” has 
spoken of knackers, scumbags, scangers and other endearing terms that middle class bloggers have for people 
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where Terence Wheelock used to live until 2005 ( just some months before the 2006 Dublin 
riot), when he, at the age of 20, died after falling in a coma when in custody of an inner city 
police station (Weelock 2008:3). In my view much of the rage that young people displayed 
during the events of February 2006 was also consequential to the recent death of Terence. 
Indeed the way he was treated by the police is symptomatic of the relationship that these 
young people entertain with the state apparatuses. In an interview with Terence’s brother he 
declared that “the Gardaí show total disrespect for lads in working class areas (…) it 
becomes: these are all scumbags” (ibid. p3).  
I find the idea of ‘scumbag’ quite interesting from an anthropological point of view. Indeed 
like racaille, scumbag is attributed to a type of subjectivity which in Badiou’s (2007) words 
could be described as “uncounted”. Considered from a point of view internal to the situation 
this subjectivity “has no recognizable element or qualities of its own. As far as ‘normal’ 
inhabitants of the situation are concerned these groups seem to have nothing in common with 
the other groups that populate the situation – they seem precisely to have nothing but their 
own be-ing” (Hallward 2003:118). From the point of view of ‘normal’ inhabitants, 
‘scumbags’ certainly belong to the situation, but as an anomaly. They consider them to be 
insiders, of course, but without really being part of civil society. They can not see any 
positivity or potential in this category. Thus the ideology shaping the situation is grounded on 
the belief that no political capacity can be ascribed to them. This belief, as I should illustrate 
below, plays a central role in the way in which acts of rebellion by these people are 
consensually interpreted (as anti-social behaviour). 
According to Badiou, it is a question of stability:  the situation is safe, as long as this type of 
subjectivity can be “safely dismissed under a collectively sanctioned label” (Hallward 2003: 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
from certain parts of Dublin. Eye witnesses ringing newstalk and today fm again talked of “scum bags out for a 
fight”. 
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120) including, depending by the cases, scumbag, racaille, illegal migrant, troublemaker and 
so on. For those who pronounce this word, ‘scumbag’ constitutes an attempt to identify 
something that eventually escapes representation.  
A ‘scumbag’, it could be argued, is a “proletarian” to the extent that, as for Ranciere 
(1992:61), “it is the name of an outcast”, which is not to say “a poor wretch of humanity”, but 
“the name of those who are denied an identity in a given order of policy”. Ontologically 
speaking, this group is located “at the edge of the void”, i.e. in a place “in which it is 
possible, (…) to approach the situation from the bias of its indistinct, or generic humanity” 
(Hallward 2003:118). In Ranciere’s (1992: 61) words this is an “in-between” in relation to 
the distribution of names, statuses and identities: a place in-between humanity and 
inhumanity, in-between citizen and number, and so on. The “intensification of existence” 
(Badiou 2003:141) of this “in between” is what happens in episodes of rebelliousness and 
insubordination – which are commonly dismissed as ‘anti-social behaviour’ -  and which in 
Dublin culminated in riots like the one of 2006, and  others. 
The argument that I will defend in the last part of this chapter is that if CD really wants to 
compensate for its failure to politicise underprivileged young people and build a new 
generation of CD leaders in underprivileged neighbourhoods, should start from these 
ephemeral events of juvenile rebelliousness, i.e. from both the critique and the desire they 
implicitly express. CD activists should be unconditionally by the side of the youth, whatever 
state, media and public opinion say about them. In order to do this however they have to 
reject the anti-social behaviour ideology that they themselves contribute to produce and 
reproduce in CPF and youth projects.  
7.4 Spontaneous juvenile insubordination in Ireland and Europe. Possibilities outside the anti-
social behaviour rhetoric.  
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As I previously mentioned, from the 1990s onwards there has been an intensification of 
collective clashes between what one would generally described as underprivileged, non-
formally-politicized young people and the police, which have become a routine feature in 
many declining post-industrial neighbourhoods in Europe. This does not constitute an 
absolute novelty: as Hardt & Negri (2009:237) highlight, jaquerie [the name they use to 
indicate this type of revolts] is a praxis that cyclically returned, punctuating modern history. 
However, what is striking about the last two decades is what Lagrange (2006:54) refers to as 
the “institutional loneliness” of these actors; that is to say the absence of any relation to 
political parties, unions or other formal political organisations. Because of their lack of an 
explicit political connotation these events were first “barely noticed by the media and tacitly 
accepted by city managers until they jumped outside their usual range in sheer intensity and 
geographic spread” (Wacquant 2008). In the last decades also Dublin has been cyclically 
affected by events of spontaneous youth rebelliousness. Think for example about the youth 
agitations which took place in Cherry Orchard in 1995 and 1996; the first in correspondence 
to the Halloween night and the second following the infamous ‘horse protest’ (Bartley & 
Saris, 1999; Saris & Bartley, 2002a; Saris et all, 2002). In 2004 it was Finglas37, a 
neighbourhood situated in Dublin west, to be theatre of confrontations between local young 
people and the police. The most significant case, however, is probably the 2006 Dublin riot. 
The 25th of February 2006, what was meant to be remembered as the Love Ulster38 march, 
completely run out of the control of the Gardaí after groups of youths from the surrounding 
estates, who according to witnesses did not even know about the march but were attracted by 
the confusion, transformed the counter-demonstration in an anti-police riot of unprecedented 
                                                          
37
 Here an architectural barrier erected by local authorities kicked up the rage of the residents. a night of violent 
riots followed, where petrol bombs and fireworks where thrown against the police by youths from the nearby 
estate (see Irish Times, 2004:3) 
38
 A demonstration organized by Love Ulster, a Northern Irish loyalist group, in order to remember loyalist 
victims of the I.R.A. 
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dimensions39. According to Indymedia reporters this “represents the first time in living 
memory that the very poorest and most marginalised elements in Irish society expressed 
themselves politically, undirected as it may have been” (Indymedia 2006).  
More recently, during Queen Elisabeth’s visit to Ireland (17-20/05/2011) – which mobilised 
an unprecedented amount of police forces – small youth riots broke out during day and night 
in several areas of the city. I personally witnessed a couple of these episodes. They are 
certainly typical to Ireland’s republican anti-imperialist tradition, but they also constitute part 
of a pattern which has developed recently and has been spreading throughout Europe and 
beyond. Last decade’s main events took place in France40 (winter 2005/2006 – two months 
before the Dublin Riot; coincidence that in my view would be naïve to consider as random) 
and Greece41 (winter 2008/2009). After last winter’s youth revolts in the Arab World (so 
called Arab Spring) the political consequences of this ‘chain’ of events are still open. Indeed, 
recently they have inspired new forms of organization as it is the case of the ongoing M15 
movement in Spain42. 
It is not my intention to provide an in depth analysis of these ongoing processes. As I said 
before, my intention here is to analyze to what extent these fragmented and random 
explosions of rage and desire can constitute a ‘space’ that is worth to be explored by CD in 
                                                          
39
 For several hours the very core of Dublin city centre was under the control of local disadvantaged youth. 
 “Every time that the riot squad managed to advance a few metres, they would have to leave a line of police to 
guard any of the side streets that they had passed as more and more locals came out to see what was happening. 
There were crowds massed all along the side streets and most of their sympathies appeared to lie with the 
rioters” (Indymedia Ireland 2006). Overwhelmed by the mob, and especially by its impressive fearlessness and 
determination, the policemen just attempted to protect themselves, as the Loyalist march seemed to be almost 
forgotten. Behind the lines of the rioters, every sort of capitalist symbol became a target and looting broke out. 
“Across the road, a young boy, he can’t be more than 16, uses a length of pipe to smash the windows of the 
Ulster Bank. A cheer erupts…Outside Schuh…a man who looks around 18 uses a rock to bash away at the plate 
glass… After several attempts, the glass on the doors begins to splinter and shatter, metal barriers are hauled up 
and seconds later, young man and women run into the shop coming out with a variety of booty including shoes 
and boots and bags. ‘Have you got size six?’ asks a girl to her friend” (Irish times 2006) 
40In November 2005 a wave of simultaneous riots rocked France for three long weeks in reaction, again, to the 
death of two young boys from an impoverished neighbourhood who were escaping police. (Wacquant 2008:19).  
41
 In December 2008, the killing by the police of Alexandros Grigouropoulos, a 15 years old school student 
from Exarchia, a poor working class area of Athens was the spark that ignited a huge revolt in Greece. 
42
 At the time of writing this chapter the July 2011 London Riots (which spread to other cities in England) had 
not taken place yet. 
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order to resolve its ‘generational problem’ - outside the depoliticizing ideology of anti-social 
behavior.       
In recent years a big amount of literature has been devoted to youth riots. Yet, in my view, 
the most interesting political interpretation of them has been provided by Alain Badiou 
(2005a). According to him what kicked off that large scale process were precisely both the 
racism and police oppression that on a daily basis affect ‘working class’ young people’s lives. 
The description that Badiou does of the situation in Paris presents some similarities with what 
one can observe on the streets in Dublin and in CPF. As he highlights “it is above all against 
the ideology of security [sécuritaire] and against the incessant police harassment that these 
kids are rising up, against the cops in the estates who everywhere and at all times exert their 
control, with insults and intimidations, even of kids of 13 or 14. These days an estate is a 
squad of listless and malevolent cops, an unhinged command centre [commissariat], all too 
happy to throw themselves on a few kids playing football, on small gathering of youths, who 
Sarkozy, their great chief, has personally authorised them to treat as ‘scum’ [racaille]” 
(Badiou 2005a). This is the main point in his analysis: underprivileged young people, who in 
common sense are seen as just troublemakers engaging in anti-social behaviour are rising 
against the police, against harassment and against daily humiliation. In the same paper, to 
illustrate these humiliations, he gives a vivid account of his adopted black son’s life: “I can’t 
even count the number of times he’s been stopped by the police. Innumerable - there is no 
other word. Arrested: six times! In 18 months. What I mean by arrested is when you are 
taken, in handcuffs, to the police station, when you are insulted, latched to a bench, left there 
for hours, sometimes kept for a day or two. For nothing” (Badiou 2005a). This type of 
experience, which is shared by so many young people in Dublin, can be very frustrating for 
anyone. It is not surprising that at the first opportunity this frustration can turn into collective 
rage against the police the state and common people. What the youth riots show, according to 
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Badiou (2005a), is that this politics of police and security, which is shared by all the parties 
(and, unfortunately, CD groups in Dublin) “is not consensual at the level of people [les gens]. 
It is a politics against people and the youth say so by doing what they do, with their own 
means”. 
I find Badiou’s perspective particularly interesting because it helps to understand the 
legitimacy of this form of protest – which is not just expression of impotency as some 
commentators (for example Zizek 2009) have argued. Burning cars and chasing the cops 
makes much more sense if seen as motivated by pride – by a desire to respond to police 
harassment, demonstrate one’s power and restore respect – than if motivated by economic 
victimization, cultural fanaticism, or political manipulation as many sociologists have 
argued. ‘We are not victims, we are masters of this area, and we do as we please’ this is 
young people’s implicit message. This is why Badiou gives them his support. No matter how 
misguided the riots may be when it comes to organise politically, the pure and simply anger 
at the daily insults and humiliations and the desire to respond is enough to justify them.  
As Baudrillard puts it (2006:7) “all the excluded, the disaffiliated, whether from the 
banlieues, immigrants or ‘native-born’, at one point or another turn their disaffiliation into 
defiance and go onto the offensive. It is their only way to stop being humiliated, discarded or 
taken in hand. In the wake of the November [Paris 2005] fires, mainstream political sociology 
spoke of integration, employment, security. I am not so sure that the rioters want to be 
reintegrated on these lines. Perhaps they consider the French way of life with the same 
condescension or indifference with which it views theirs. Perhaps they prefer to see cars 
burning than to dream of one day driving them”. 
In Dublin – the same as in Paris - the people who took part in the rioting were largely drawn 
from the urban poor, mostly marginalized young men from impoverished estates; people that 
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the middle classes normally write off as ‘scumbags’ and that sociologists define as the 
‘underclass’. No wonder that after the 2006 Dublin riot what implicitly emerged from the 
flood of journalistic analysis and prominent declarations was the consensual idea that those 
young people alone would have been incapable of any spontaneous and independent 
initiative. Indeed, as a backdrop to the canonical blame game between politicians, one of the 
most pressing mainstream questions regarded the (political) identity of the obscure mind that 
orchestrated the riot – and this question continued to divide the opinion for the weeks to 
come, never having been definitely answered. Ordinary people’s incapacity to independently 
organise is a consensual belief in the ‘West’. It is strongly ideological for it reveals a general 
inability/unwillingness to interpret phenomena in a way that does not reflect a dominant top 
down worldview. Kaulingfreks (2008:2) recently observed that in this kind of circumstances 
the idea that events were orchestrated by an obscure authority, capable of controlling the 
ignorant masses is much cosier then the idea of a spontaneous uncontrolled explosion of 
popular anger. However, young people’s achievement was to organize what Badiou would 
call an “immanent overturning of the laws of appearing” (2003:143); which is to say a 
powerful subversion of the dominant idea according to which subaltern young people are 
affected by a permanent collective incapacity. Indeed, for a moment they showed to be able 
to overcome the depoliticizing forces acting against them and to deploy an unknown and 
unprecedented power.  
As Badiou argued in relation to the events of 2005, “we have the riots we deserve” (Badiou 
2006:114) – and an unexpected, angry, unorganized and decentralized explosion as the ones 
we have witnessed in Europe during the last decades is what one can expect from a society 
where the youth of popular classes have been abandoned to their own plain exposition to neo-
liberal capitalism and the police. 
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7.4.1 Depoliticised organisations 
 
The idea that I would like to put forward here is that by addressing the youth issue in terms of 
anti-social behavior, and by not being able to meaningfully engage with underprivileged 
young people’s rebelliousness, CD manifests a loss of its old capacity to be ‘organic’ to 
popular situations. This loss is the main cause of their present crisis. 
Some activists seem to be completely aware of this situation in which they kind of act more 
as policemen than educators or ‘organic intellectuals’. However, they also seem to have no 
idea of how to organize in order to overcome this impasse. As Peter argues “if we disappear, 
in this area there would be massive explosions and violence, and the government just gives us 
sufficient money to keep a lead on the problems in the area”. Indeed, we have already 
illustrated the approach of youth work’s, with its rhetoric of keeping young people off the 
streets and replacing ‘anti-social behavior’ with (according to them) more ‘meaningful’ 
activities. “It might be that working this way we are not doing the country a service in the 
long term – continues Peter -  because the anger should be here, it should be coming out, as it 
happened in Paris recently, and the government responds, the people respond”. 
However, community workers are frequently unwilling to operate in ambiguous 
circumstances. Many of them have embodied the anti-social behavior ideology. Others  are 
afraid that the state might punish them by withdrawing funds - as it actually happened in 
Wheelock’s case, where, despite a big popular movement had come up, CD organizations 
maintained an extremely cautious attitude.   
However, despite the politics of police and security being shared by all parties, NGOs and 
CD organisations, the spread of juvenile rage and antagonism shows that among young 
people there is no consensus on this policy. On the other hand, what is dramatic in this 
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situation is that young people find themselves alone in front of the police (Badiou 2005a). 
This fact shows the level of depoliticisation of existent political organisations, which are 
incapable to capture the completely different compositions, desires and realities which seem 
to be seeking a new consistency in these neighbourhoods (Invisible Collective 2009). 
Depoliticized CD organizations, not only demonstrate themselves unable of assuming a moral 
and ideological leadership43.  Paradoxically they do not even manage (or attempt) to oversee 
the return to normal when disorders start. Depoliticized politicians and community ‘leaders’ 
take distance from radical acts and criminalize the youth who perpetrate them. In the name of 
‘integration’, ‘security’, ‘legality’ and ‘stability’ (in the name of the state-of-the-situation on 
behalf of which they operate) they contribute to the ‘policing’ of the situation. Indeed at the 
end of the day they are unable to articulate any positive approach to juvenile insubordination, 
but they keep dealing with it as a sort of ‘technical problem’ for which is to find a ‘solution’. 
Councillors and elected officials, associations and local administrations organise actions 
against the youth in the name of civil society. As Badiou (2005a) asks: “for how much longer 
can adults and parents remain silent? The youth must not be left to face the police alone. It is 
necessary to rise up against the police harassment of which they are the object. Parents must 
stand side by side with them”. And so in my view have to do CD activists, rejecting both the 
anti-social behaviour ideology and the state’s blackmail in terms of funds. This would allow 
them to link up with those youth from which they have lost contact during the last decades – 
and perhaps build up a new generation of ‘organic’ activists who might be able to reactivate 
CD’s valuable struggles. 
7.5 Conclusions (alliance youth adults) 
 
                                                          
43 Young people neither vote nor go to their demonstrations.  
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As I said, a point that I find noteworthy in Badiou’s perspective is the total and absolute 
support he gives to the young ‘troublemakers’; unlike left wing parties, whom he accuses of 
paralysis. “Why do they not try to organise a great demonstration to protest against what has 
happened? Because they share the same vision, save for a few nuances (the police, but a 
"neighbourhood" [de proximité] police)” 
In my view CD activists should (following Badiou’s metaphor) act as young people’s 
‘political parents’ and be with them in the face of injustice and state repression, not against 
them. “At least – says the philosopher - those [activists] who do not let themselves be 
organised by the theme of the defence of material goods, because they know that burnt cars 
or buildings mean nothing when compared to the question of what will become of the youth. 
A huge question which, after these youth riots, has become a question posed to everyone, a 
question for everyone” (Badiou 2005a). 
In my view cynical and dismissive attitudes towards young people and their rebellions are 
symptom of a huge generational gap shaping society. The fact that CD finds it difficult to 
reproduce itself politically is due to the lack of links between present and passed struggles. 
As I am trying to illustrate from both a theoretical (Chapter 2) and an empirical (Chapters 3 
and 7) point of view, on the one hand today ‘adults’ make 20th century’s struggles 
incomprehensible to young people. On the other hand they despise present youth revolts 
dismissing them as acts of hooliganism or anti-social behaviour. They are unable (or 
unwilling) to positively engage with the rage of thousands of young people in European 
deprived urban areas. The worse side effect of this ‘dismissal’ of young people’s subjectivity 
is that those who are responsible for the political orientation of young people abandon them, 
depriving them of that generational alliance which is fundamental for an effective 
critique/negation of the world as it is. The lack of such an alliance complicates the things for 
the younger generations. As Thomas (community artist, youth worker) says “when you are 
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young sometimes you are not able to articulate what the problem is”. With the result that rage 
might assume a nihilistic orientation – like for example destructivity for its own sake or self-
harming through the abuse of drugs and alcohol.   
As Schott-Myhre (2007) puts it, a collective subject “can only be found in the intersections 
where we come together to produce the world. Certainly one place where that occurs is in the 
sets of relations between the social categories called youth and those called adult”. This is 
evidently a pedagogic problem. ‘Political fathers’ urgently need to meet with young people in 
“encounters that produce subjects” (Situaciones 2005:604); they need to generate new 
affinities and finally construct a new virtual bridge between past and future political 
sequences. In order to do that, adults have to realise that young people “are critical and 
interactive but it is just difficult to see that” (Martin). To build meaningful relations with 
them and share those criticisms “is a very slow process” for no one of the two parts is used to 
do that. As Martin suggests “for this to happen people have to tell their own stories. It is 
almost therapeutic: by sharing our stories we might be able then to see some new possible 
stories”.  
To conclude, echoing Hardt and Negri (2009) I argue that CD should pedagogically embrace 
events of youth rebelliousness as actual “schools of organization” (238). Indeed, on one hand 
these are very fertile sites where young people whose independent capacity to think and 
organise is constantly undermined find the determination to rebel against this situation and 
expose it to its contradictions. On the other hand this “intensification of existence” (Badiou 
2003:141) opens new possibilities for activists to build new bridges with the younger 
generation. Obviously there is no universal model for this, but just possible experimental 
practices in situation. And situations always differ from each other. “We only know how to 
start” argue Colectivo Situaciones (2005:609) “and that very relatively”.  
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Although ephemeral and limited, the sense of victory rioters have experienced most be in a 
way elaborated and preserved as a possibility, or to put it with Situationes, as “memory as 
potencia”: a mise en perspective that goes beyond the dialectic victory/defeat. After the 
Copenhagen riots of 2006, for example, the youngsters from immigrant backgrounds who had 
seemed to display an emotionally inspired protest without formal political claims, with the 
help of a local youth worker were able to communicate their motives in a letter sent to the 
press (Kaulingfreks 2008). CD activists could definitely learn much from this type of 
initiatives. 
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8. CONCLUSIONS 
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8.1 The nature of the state and the cutbacks  
 
In the present context of crisis and depoliticisation, an essential feature of the nature of the 
state has emerged clearly, whereas under previous conditions (political dynamism in first 
place, then – in Ireland - the economic boom) it was partially covered and more difficult to 
discern. Namely that the nature of the state (the state ‘in itself’) is not egalitarian. 
Ontologically speaking, it operates as a mechanism of “distribution of the sensible” – as 
Ranciere (1992:58) puts it – assigning individuals to places and functions and “making one” 
of the subsets of what is presented. The nature of this distribution is ritualistic/bureaucratic, 
hierarchical and militaristic.  
On the other hand emancipatory politics is rare. When it comes into being, it has the capacity 
to limit this tendency, forcing the state towards more egalitarian ways of operating. However, 
by definition44, politics can not be generated by the state itself. On the contrary, when 
emancipatory politics is absent or weak, state powers tend to expel - to literarily get rid of - 
egalitarian rules and institutions (such as for example those created by movements like CD), 
or to submit them to bureaucratic, apolitical logics. It is actually what has happened at global 
scale from the 1980s onwards, a historical phase that has been affected by depoliticisation. A 
key consequence of depoliticisation has been the wiping out of previous political 
achievements, including the destruction of public services and “and all forms of solidarity 
and social protection that guaranteed a minimum of equality in the social fabric” (Ranciere 
2012), erosion of workers’ rights, privatisations, reorganisation of national education systems 
according to neo-liberal concerns and in general unprotected exposition of ordinary people’s 
lives to the rule of capital. 
                                                          
44
 This refers to the theoretical approach informing my research, which in this paper has been just briefly 
introduced. 
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On what concerns CD, during the Celtic Tiger due to extensive provision of funding people 
had the illusion that ‘the sector’ was experiencing a positive and flourishing phase. However, 
as we saw, affluence covered the bureaucratising and depoliticising tendencies that CD 
groups were getting through while assuming forms which were increasingly correlated to that 
of the state. This lead to a loss of independence that in the present economic crisis proved 
deleterious for CD. Indeed since 2002 (but more drastically since 2009) the Irish state by 
considerably reducing funding provision to CD, exposed the sector to its accumulated 
dependencies and weaknesses. However it is also evident that CD’s impasse is not just 
related to the austerity measures implemented by the state. Rather it has to do with processes 
of bureaucratisation and the failure of groups to ‘reproduce’ themselves as political subjects.  
Previously, in 2004, analysing the outcomes of their research, Powell & Geoghegan (2004) 
commented that “what is striking about this data is that community development in Ireland is 
almost completely dependent on the state for funds” (pp 128). They also observed that CD 
was mainly composed by paid workers. In the light of recent events this analysis sounds like 
an alarm bell. Indeed the sustained attack community organizations have experienced in 
recent years has taken advantage of CD’s dependency from the state – which can be 
considered as one of its major weak points for the time being. Policy-makers discount CD as 
a disproportionate body, which needs to be drastically shrunk, or at least submitted to as 
much bureaucratic control as possible. Cutbacks have been particularly severe and endemic, 
mainly hitting those projects that are viewed as more confrontational in terms of challenging 
government policy. However, as a youth worker (Steve) has noticed, organisations can also 
be affected indirectly by cuts; especially those who rely more on networking with the others. 
When it comes to quantifying cutbacks to CD, some interesting figures are provided by a 
recent report by Brian Harvey (2010), who found that the community and voluntary sector 
228 
 
has already taken a disproportionate45 share of on-going budget cuts. A precise assessment of 
the cuts to CD is very problematic due to the difficulty to frame CD as a specific ‘object’ (see 
chapters 1 and 2) and the fact that cutbacks are still being applied following an approach that 
is differential and difficult to track. According to Harvey (2010:10) the analysis of the 
cumulative effect of the funding cuts for the voluntary and community sector over the two 
years 2009-2010 is broadly in the order of the 15% mark.  
Austerity manoeuvres started with the “withdrawal of funding from the national Community 
Workers’ Co-op46 for its independent research and evaluations and from Pavee Point47 for its 
poster campaign for equal citizenship for Travellers. Then Pavee Point was publicly 
threatened for its perceived support for a homeless sit-in by Roma at a motorway in Dublin” 
(TR 2010). Year 2009 concluded with the sudden termination of the Community 
Development Programme (CDP). This programme dated to the European Poverty 2 
programme (1984-9) which funded a number of local community development projects 
against poverty, including family resource centres, which are informed by a similar ethic and 
approach (Harvey 2010).  Under the management of the Combat Poverty Agency, the CDP 
expanded to a programme of 180 projects, typically with a core of 2-3 staff and a budget of 
€20,000 to €40,000 (ibid. p9). Previously to 2009 CDPs “received a letter from their funder, 
the Department of Community, Rural and Gaeltacht Affairs, not only warning them not to be 
associated with political organisations but also bluntly telling them they were funded to 
implement Government Policy” (TR 2011). At the end of 2009 the government announced 
the closure of the Community Development Programme, to be integrated with the Local 
                                                          
45
 The view that the voluntary and community sector has been identified for disproportionate attention in cuts is 
not a polemic, but a factual observation, indeed, according to Harvey (2010) in 2010 the headline figure for the 
reduction of funding in the voluntary and community sector is in the range of 9% to 10%.  This is the typical 
percentage which recurs most frequently. This figure nevertheless contrasts with the national budgetary cut of 
only -1.8%.       
46
 See Chapter 3 
47
 Pavee Point is an NGO supporting Irish Travellers, an indigenous minority ethnic group in Ireland. Pavee 
Point is a partnership of Travellers and settled people. 
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Development Social Inclusion Programme. According to Harvey (2010), as part of this 
process, 31 projects were selected for closure, with the right of appeal to officials in the 
department. The remaining 149 CDP voluntary boards will be wound up, with staff and assets 
transferred to the partnerships. Although CDPs had the right to refuse transfer, the minister 
had made it clear that by exercising it they would never receive departmental funding again 
(ibid. p9). A disproportionate number of CDP closures were in Dublin inner city. “Two of 
these were managed by Seánie Lambe and Mick Rafferty, two nationally known community 
leaders for more than thirty years. Both had been active supporters of Tony Gregory from the 
beginning” (TR 2011). Also many state organizations concerned with social policy and 
important to the work of community groups were closed, merged, abolished or integrated 
(e.g. Combat Poverty Agency, Office of Active Citizenship).  Others were severely cut (e.g. 
Equality Authority, Human Rights Commission) (Harvey 2010:14). 
These and other measures according to some activists (TR 2011) reflect a strategy well 
documented in Naomi Klein’s book The Shock Doctrine: use any crisis, whether human-
made or natural, to undo social gains achieved by mass social action over decades. This 
process, I would add, is far smoother in a context of depoliticisation, where those 
achievements are not supported by an independent political effort. According to Harvey 
(2010), likely consequences will include a reduced policy and representational capacity for 
the sector, “which may be one of the purposes of government in applying such differential 
savings. There will be a loss of voice. In a country which has the lowest level of social 
protection in western Europe, the civil society voice for an enlightened social policy will be 
even smaller in the future”. Cuts will also imply a reduced capacity to respond to social 
issues that are growing and qualitatively evolving in times of financial crisis and austerity. 
And so on. 
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As I noted above, the situation is paradoxical because although CD’s origins are independent 
from funding schemes and bureaucratic concerns, cutbacks are seen by many organizations as 
a possible dead end. In my view this perception of the situation is distorted and apolitical. It 
constitutes the outcome of a process of depoliticisation which the sector has undergone with 
particular intensity during the Celtic Tiger years. 
Currently, a shared feeling amongst activists is that the state wants to definitely get rid of the 
‘sector’, and curently, the best way to achieve this is to cut funding and dismantle the hyper-
bureaucratised relation it entails with it. The consequences are seen as irreversible: “it is 
really difficult to try and predict, but if I am a little bit philosophical about it, - argued an 
Inner City Partnership worker - everything has a cycle and in this field we are coming to the 
current end of this community cycle (Seamus). Many CD activists (Paul, Tina) describe this 
situation as a “limbo”; others refer to a sort of “state of shock” that many of them 
experienced after the first attacks:  “there was a situation of shock at the beginning with 
people thinking ‘this can not happen; these projects can not be shut down’”. This shock 
produced some months of actual paralysis: “people for a while did not know what to do, but 
now there is a sense that they need to respond”. Indeed the state’s cynical attitude has ended 
up kicking off a wave of indignation among activists.  
For example, according to Mick Rafferty (2010) the McCarthy report48 “in a most dismissive 
and arrogant phrase to probably ever have been used in the field of social policy states that 
these programmes have shown no evidence of positive outcomes. This is an insult to the 
thousands of people who have struggled to ensure that their communities have decent 
services and equal opportunities to those who are better off”. Cynicism and lack of 
recognition from state authorities are strongly denounced in this quote. 
                                                          
48
 Sort of policy guideline for the reorganisation of the voluntary and community sector 
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Activists have also been disillusioned and disappointed by the public private partnership 
model, which can be considered as dead after the crisis, with private investors suddenly 
holding back and the state bailing out their debts. The engagement and efforts of CD groups 
in planning, crafting and implementing processes of partnership regeneration have been 
extensively documented by John Bissett (2008). After a twelve years long struggle the 
regeneration project of Saint Michael’s Estate (Dublin) died with builders walking away and 
new proposals being introduced, which were actually the shadow of their former. “The 
experience of regeneration in St. Michael’s Estate – argues John Bissett (2008) who was 
himself involved in the process as a community worker - would suggest that the actions of the 
state have done more to maintain and consolidate inequalities of power than they did to 
change them”.  
At the minute, CD groups are attempting to absorb cuts through a series of measures and 
responses aimed to avoid dismissals and redundancies. However, as Harvey (2010) 
highlights, their performance and outputs will fall as they attempt to do more with less and 
respond to the social distress that follows economic collapse. In my view, there is a 
fundamental task that goes beyond saving CD service provision. It involves rethinking and 
reorganizing egalitarian politics capable to resist and eventually reverse the processes that 
have submitted CD to state (depoliticised) logics. Funding and economic resources should be 
considered as secondary to political priorities.  
8.2 Two discourses and two responses to the crisis of CD  
 
Currently there are two ideological perspectives or discourses describing and articulating 
possible responses to the crisis of CD. One could define them as (1)‘liberal’ and (2)‘social-
democratic’. Although these two perspectives are distinct, there are overlaps between them. 
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Like for example the fact that none of them emphasise the political roots and potential 
intrinsic to CD; relating it instead to state/market logics. 
(1) From a liberal/neoliberal perspective CD’s market/business possibilities are emphasised. 
For those who advance this idea CD has to turn into a virtuous agent of economic 
development, otherwise, they say, it will not be able to survive the present economic 
conjuncture. Therefore, for them ‘the sector’ has to get in line with the changing economic 
climate. They say that activists must look to the market in order to save CD. Paradoxically, in 
their beliefs destruction is placed alongside the promise of a bold future made of innovation 
and entrepreneurialism.  
For example, at a public meeting organised at SIPTU, supporters of this idea were arguing for 
the construction of a social economy (which they described as very weak to inexistent in 
Ireland) in order to create jobs in a context of community business and community enterprise 
where service provision would be just one of the various “products”. “We need – they argued 
- people with engineering skills, with construction skills, etc. In the community services 
programme the focus is just on services… people are just social workers and we need to go 
beyond that. For example the community business has a big role to play also in the green 
economy (…)” (SIPTU discussant). This of course would involve a process of advanced 
skills building, where workers’ expertise and managerial capacity are developed in terms of 
commercialisation.  In this process government money “would just play a secondary role”. 
Moreover the supporters of this perspective lament that “community enterprises are currently 
not able to access money that are available to modern business ventures”. So “they should 
have access to the city enterprise board (…) but the enterprise culture is quite weak. We need 
people who create jobs and people who create enterprises. There are tonnes of highly skilled 
people who could contribute”. Thus, to conclude, they see the marketization (and therefore 
gentrification) of the ‘community sector’ as the only possible option: “we need to 
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reinvigorate communities as enterprise and wealth creators and employers. Social service 
provision on its own will not be sufficient”. This is in few words the neo-liberal, market 
oriented approach to dealing with cutbacks and the crisis affecting the ‘community and 
voluntary sector’. Of course the idea of re-inventing the social economy should not be 
considered as an absolute novelty in the field, since experiments of this type were already 
being developed previously. There are for example companies like “Business in the 
Community Ireland”49 who for years have been organising workshops for community groups 
in deprived neighbourhoods on how to build up a “positive engagement” with businesses by 
developing community investment strategies which support business objectives. On a broader 
scale, the public private partnership project itself can be seen as an attempt to ‘creatively’ 
reorient the sector towards the market and the economy.    
(2) The perspective that I described as ‘social-democratic’ presents itself as opposed to its 
neo-liberal counterpart. Indeed it attempts to subtract CD from market forces claiming that 
‘the sector’ has to work for the public good, not according to private interests. Therefore, they 
argue, it needs to be funded by the state and managed as a sort of aggregated public sector. 
According to them the state needs to protect CD. And in their view there is no alternative to 
state-funding, since “alternative independent sources, like Chuck Feeney’s Atlantic 
Philanthropies, are rare and are very specific about what they fund” (TR 2011). Behind this 
approach is the idea that “because community projects do the state’s work in matching its 
own deficiencies they should be funded and resourced by the state. Indeed it does this more 
effectively and more efficiently and with better value for money” (TR 2011).  
However, there is a problem with the argumentation that CD should work for the ‘public 
good’. Namely that currently the hegemonic idea of ‘public good’ happens to coincide with 
the market. It is just through economic growth – reads the current ideology - that public good 
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 See  http://www.bitc.ie/ 
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is possible. Thus, paradoxically the ‘social democratic’ argument needs to justify its 
opposition to the cutbacks with an economic type of argument; namely with the idea that they 
would be deleterious for the economy of the country. As they put it “the challenge for the 
community sector is to show the government and the general public that it not only delivers 
essential services, but also has economic benefits for the country” (SIPTU speaker). And of 
course the best way to ‘demonstrate’ this is to present concrete facts; figures like for example 
the value of the voluntary and community sector to the economy which is €6.5bn; with a 
level of state funding in the order of €1.89bn (Harvey 2010:14) - altogether, the financial 
value of volunteering to the Irish economy has been estimated at between €204m and €485m 
(ibid. p14). These numbers are aimed to support the idea that also from an economic point of 
view (which is now the default point of view of the state - its “rule” as Badiou would say) 
cutbacks make little sense.  
Cuts to the community sector – ‘social-democrats’ argue – evidence a lack of vision since 
“economically they are going to cost the state much more in a long term. In terms of prison 
places, community fragmentation and disintegration, health services and drug abuse” 
(Seamus). “The combination of heavy job losses and reduced services in the area will create a 
toxic legacy that will affect the next generations” (Speaker Siptu). Which means “more 
poverty, more exclusion (…) more pressure on health services and criminal justice. Crimes 
related to poverty will soar. Why will the government cut this sector now?”. And this job of 
prevention, according to them, can not just be carried out by volunteers. Indeed “a well-
functioning volunteer force is dependent from professional staff to recruit, induct, train and 
retrain. Cuts are likely to lead to a loss of volunteers”, who will drop out a not enough 
supportive environment.  
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These are in general the arguments that ‘neo-liberals’ and ‘social-democrats’ put forward 
when it comes to critically address the cutbacks issue and devise alternative approaches to the 
question of CD’s future sustainability.  
There are substantial differences between these two perspectives: in the first case emphasis is 
placed on market forces and entrepreneurialism, whereas in the second case to be emphasised 
is the role of the state in supporting community based service delivery. However, both these 
approaches share the implicit assumption that CD is something ‘objective’ (a sector, a 
welfare-apparatus) which needs to be managed based on external and structural forces (state 
& capital). There is little doubt that the world of CD is influenced by structural constraints 
and forces that constantly tie it into a net of objectifying relations. Labour division, market, 
profit, exploitation, hierarchies, bureaucracy, personal interest etc. are all elements that, to 
variable degrees, operate within CD, since they shape the collectivity as a whole – and CD is 
not external to it. However, by totally identifying CD with these ‘objective’ forces and 
tendencies something central gets lost. 
Namely, none of the two introduced perspectives seriously takes into account the roots of CD 
as an independent, organic movement, reflecting ordinary people’s creativity and capacity to 
organise themselves. They do not emphasise CD’s subjective side, its being a platform for 
emancipatory politics, which is what historically (see Chapter 3) made it so popular in 
Dublin’s deprived neighbourhoods and beyond.  
Without acknowledging these features as well as other still unexplored potentials intrinsic to 
CD – this is the argument of my conclusions – it will be extremely difficult for anyone to re-
imaging and experimenting with forms of CD at a distance from external interests and 
powers. I will also argue that this ‘distance’ is essential if one pretends to be funded by the 
state without being co-opted by it. Before doing that however, I will need -from a disciplinary 
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point of view- to ‘justify’ me as a researcher providing these ‘political recommendations’. Do 
social sciences have any legitimacy to give suggestions to political actors? How should this 
debate be framed? 
8.3 Political recommendations versus policy recommendations 
 
In the methodological section (Chapter 4) of this thesis I have argued that social sciences and 
politics are linked since their ‘evolution’ and ‘renovation’ depend on subjective processes in 
the realm of possibility – that is to say outside “what there is”, i.e. the “state of the situation”. 
However, a question that I have not answered yet is to what extent social sciences can be 
meaningful when it comes to addressing political issues; what kind of ‘feedbacks’ can social 
sciences provide to political movements and actors? 
Today, when academics discuss the political role of social sciences they place a big emphasis 
on research as a source of ‘policy recommendations’. They argue that we should provide 
policy makers with high quality and ‘objective’ analysis for them to produce ‘more accurate’ 
protocols and regulations. As Erik Swyngedouw (2007) highlights, a consequence of this idea 
is that “while considerable intellectual effort goes into excavating the practices of instituted 
policies, very little attention is paid to what constitutes political democracy as a political 
configuration associated with a particular public space”. Thus, researchers produce a self-
declared neutral/objective type of analysis that is policy-oriented, but that does not really take 
into account the structural context framing policy-making. As if that context operated on a 
technical, structural/functionalist basis. In this ideological frame debate is reduced to disputes 
“over the institutional modalities of governing and the technologies of expert administration 
or management” (Swyngedouw, 2007). 
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Under these conditions academic debates on management and policy recommendations, more 
than creating links between social sciences and politics, end up linking these disciplines to 
the state. This is depoliticising. Pierre Bourdieu (2002) himself referred to this activity as 
“policy of depoliticisation” for it relegates political thought to the terrain of capital and the 
state. Emphasis on policy recommendations submits research to concerns related to 
bureaucratic management. In this perspective the work of researchers does not differ much 
from that of advisors of state bureaucrats or social engineers. “Against this policy of 
depoliticization - argues Pierre Bourdieu (2002:31) - our aim must be to restore politics, that 
is, political thinking and action, and to find the correct point of application for that action”. 
On the other hand, I think that my research outcomes clearly show that the formulation of 
policy recommendations aimed, for instance, to ‘rescue’ CD would be a pointless exercise. I 
consider this argument to be valid for two obvious reasons: the first is that policy makers (no 
matter how post-structural is our conception of neo-liberal governance) are state agents and 
their current attitude towards CD is deeply hostile: it would be pointless to advise them to do 
the opposite of what they are actually doing50. The second reason is that -as I have been 
arguing along this thesis - a ‘revitalization’ of the sector can neither pass through a new 
partnership (i.e. the delivery by the state of new funding schemes), nor from alternative forms 
of bureaucratic regulation, i.e. new ‘policies’. Recommendations which could eventually help 
CD to overcome the present impasse need to be subjective and political in nature. This means 
that they need to be addressed to CD groups and activists themselves. In my view, 
recommendations should encompass questions and reflections aimed at generating prolific 
debate amongst them. To be politically meaningful recommendations should not in any way 
restrict thought to the terrain of management/administration.  
                                                          
50
 This is something that only social movements, with their strength could possibly achieve. 
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However, as we have seen in chapters 1 and 2, at present Social Sciences find it particularly 
hard to get beyond this loop. And the state constitutes a sort of default position of any attempt 
to think and research politics. Under this condition, “sociology today, especially political 
sociology, (…) often restricts itself to the inanity of counting and recounting electoral results” 
(Russo 2009); or the “endless measuring of rates of circulation of preferences and behaviours 
conducted in the service of spurious interests and in conformity with the taste of the day” 
(Frade 2009:10). These are symptoms of the fact that these disciplines are “affected by a 
peculiar theoretical paralysis concerning the question of subjectivities” (Russo 2009) – a 
question which, as I have been repeatedly emphasising is nevertheless central to politics. As 
Frade (2009:29) argues, “by privileging deterministic explanations and reducing politics to 
social engineering” social sciences have historically contributed to the general depoliticizing 
of society. “And yet, the question must be posed, is social science meant to reflect society or 
is its task rather to think it through? For the latter, let us admit, cannot be done in the context 
of the former” (ibid. p12). 
My aim in the last part of these conclusions is therefore not to provide policy 
recommendations based on supposed ‘objective conditions’ of CD and the social realities it 
operates within, but, based on the findings of this thesis, to think through the situation 
politically, towards the re-creation of a space of independency for CD. The following 6 
recommendations are presented as a list of separate items. However they are obviously 
interconnected and overlapping with each other. They are not ‘prescriptions’ but just 
suggestions based on the singular point of view of my study, attempting to open a debate 
more than to provide dogmatic answers.  
8.4 Recommendations  
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The independent political experiences - the “points of autonomy” as Badiou would call them 
- that CD repeatedly introduced in Dublin during the second half of the 20th century are under 
serious threat or have been incorporated into the domain of state politics. Cutbacks are not the 
‘cause’ of this process. However by breaking the previous surface of consensus, their 
introduction has contributed to uncover contradictions, which along this thesis I have 
described in terms of bureaucratisation, professionalization and depoliticisation.     
One should start by noticing that a time of crisis is also a time of opportunity. But one should 
also be aware that for such opportunity to ‘materialise’, it is not enough for these favourable 
circumstances to be there. If previously the situation was muddled by the abundant profusion 
of funding - which had the effect to accommodate many activists – now, in the new scenario, 
with contradictions becoming clearer, conflict tends to rise again. In the meantime also the 
struggle to resist and reverse cut-backs has started and is constantly evolving. As I have 
illustrated in chapter 6 small victories are possible, encouraging, and much can be learnt from 
them - like in the case of the opposition to the closure of a public swimming pool in the 
popular area of Seán MacDermott Street; or like the Community First campaign, opposing 
cuts to drug services in the south inner city (see Chapter 6). Although some positive signs are 
easily detectable, as I argued in Chapter 7, the cutback/fight-back logic is insufficient and, in 
general, there are no predetermined outcomes. And the result of the struggle in which CD is 
involved will depend by the imagination and creativity of activists themselves.  
The following 4 points are recommendations/reflections that I would like to address to 
activists and groups who are interested in redeveloping independent forms of collective 
organisation and resistance in a CD context.  
1 Be independent  
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As I repeatedly argued along this thesis from various perspectives, currently I consider being 
vital for community organisations that they re-conquer the old space of independency, i.e. a 
political space at a distance from the state. The lack of a clear separation between 
(emancipatory) politics and state-politics in the praxis and thought of CD is central to the 
impasse that this movement is currently experiencing.  
CD politics have entered too much the domain of the state and its agenda - having lost that 
“distance” which, in the theoretical perspective of this thesis is referred to as vital for the 
creative production, or continuation, of an emancipatory political process.  
Of course the structural relevance of the state needs to be acknowledged. Independence, 
according to Ranciere (2012), “does not mean losing interest in or acting as if these agendas 
did not exist. It means building one's own dynamic, spaces of discussion and ways of 
circulating information, motives and ways of action directed, first of all, towards the 
development of an autonomous power to think and act”. 
As we have seen, independent politics operates outside institutional legitimate areas, because 
it consists in the opening of new possibilities that are overlooked, or considered to be 
impossible from a structural point of view. Emancipatory politics is made by the uncounted, 
not by those who count, so called ‘stakeholders’. As Ranciere (quot.by Butler and Ntseng 
2008)  puts it, we should oppose a politics "that makes decisions on the people, for the 
people, instead of the people; a politics that holds that in the political order, all sections of the 
community have been assigned their proper place”. A space where independent emancipatory 
politics can actually emerge “is constituted in the moment when people's movements and 
actions proceed from the brutal truth that “we are on our own” and move forward only once 
they have clarified that we are finished with the (anti)politics of the state project”. 
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This, one should notice, is nothing new for CD. Indeed, I have illustrated how in Dublin this 
movement is rooted in spontaneous popular protests (late 1960s) addressing issues of 
housing, education, healthcare and other problems affecting people living in underprivileged 
areas of the inner city. The heterogeneous composition of these struggles reflected the 
political dynamism that in that phase characterised many movements on a worldwide scale. 
Their political subjectivity was “in excess” to the surrounding political culture, including that 
of the orthodox, state-centred left.  
In times of crisis CD activist should take inspiration from those pioneering experiences, 
remembering that the problem is not just to react to adverse state policies (such as the 
austerity measures currently being implemented by the government), but to produce powerful 
collective processes irreducible to the state and to any form of dependency from it.  
In order to achieve this, the CD movement should not just look to what happens ‘outside’ (the 
crisis, the cuts, etc.) but constantly refer to and analyse its own history and its own 
engagement in on-going struggles.   
2. Be self-reflexive 
The analysis of some interesting politicising experiences has suggested (Chapter 6) that an 
important step in the construction of people’s “power-to” might pass through the opening of 
in-depth self-reflexive processes51, which might be beneficial to define the present situation 
from an independent (subjective) point of view. Introducing the Community First case we 
have seen that a crucial moment has been when people involved in the local CD scene 
understood that unity within the “community” was just an illusion. This realisation triggered 
an irreparable fracture between people and “bureaucrats”. 
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 A processes is self-reflexive when action or analysis goes back to, refers to, and affects the entity perpetrating 
the action or analysis. 
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In my view, that was a positive outcome since, as Richard Pithouse (2006) puts it, “sustained 
collective reflection on the experience of struggle continually advances the understanding of 
what has to be fought and how it has to be fought”. 
Self-reflexivity is nevertheless important after a phase dominated by Public Private 
Partnership where bureaucratisation has heavily affected CD activists’ capacity to read and 
think the situation from a point of view that does not correspond to that of the state.  This in 
turn has deteriorated their relation with ordinary people, especially underprivileged youth as 
we have seen, which might experience a sense of betrayal. Self-reflexivity can be also useful 
to separate those ‘components’ of CD that have managed to ‘preserve’ some of the original 
spirit, and those which have irreparably depoliticised. Although this is something that a 
number of CD groups are starting to do by organising public assemblies, as it has been the 
case of Community First and the Spectacle of Defiance and Hope52, these rare initiatives 
constitute just a first step towards a new process of change to be developed from within the 
CD movement. 
3. Do not just demand. Build people’s own power-to. 
A key element to the organisation of a movement aiming to operate with a certain degree of 
autonomy is not just to make demands upon rulers, but to build up people’s capacity to (even 
just in part) ‘accomplish’ those demands.  
In Chapter 5. I criticised the state delivery logic for it tends to develop processes of 
professionalization and bureaucratisation amongst CD groups, which generate 
depoliticisation. Indeed, expert knowledge (on which state delivery is based) has the capacity 
to abstract issues (related for example to poverty) from the context and conditions that give 
them meaning, and in which they might be addressed politically. After acquiring a life that is 
                                                          
52
 The Spectacle of Defiance is broadly based alliance of Community Organisations from Dublin and beyond, 
which came together in 2010. 
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separated from their social context, those issues can be technocratically managed by the state. 
I also argued that to be accessed by ordinary people and democratised, these issues need to be 
re-politicised and their technical quality shown to be, at best, only partly independent of 
socio-political content (Neocosmos 2007:50). 
Interestingly enough a question that politicians and state authorities keep posing to 
movements that are ambiguous in relation to why they are rebelling or what they are 
protesting for is: “what are your demands?”. As Robert Jensen (2011) suggests referring to 
the on-going “Occupy Wall Street” movement, “the demand for demands is an attempt to 
shoehorn the Occupy gatherings [and, in general, independent political organisations] into 
conventional politics [i.e. state-politics], to force the energy of these gatherings into a form 
that people in power recognise, so that they can roll out strategies to divert, co-opt, buy off, 
or – if those tactics fail – squash any challenge to business as usual”.  
Likewise, in the experience of South African community activists “the language in which 
people’s struggles are turned into ‘delivery protests’ is a language that has been imposed on 
our struggles from outside – it is not our language”. Indeed this demand-delivery logic  
allows those who claim to be leaders (like politicians, policy makers, NGOs and so on)  to 
take the things people have been fighting for and give them back to them as delivery. “You 
fight for justice – for equality and for the world to be shared - and you end up with the 
promise of ‘service delivery’. (…)To call our struggles ‘service delivery protests’ is a way of 
making them safe for our oppressors”.  
Therefore, in Jensen’s (2011) view, an appropriate response to the demand for demands 
should be “we demand that you stop demanding a list of demands”.  
For example, CD’s anti-austerity campaign is mainly based on the demand to “stop the 
cutbacks”. This is completely legitimate.  However, the fact that a claim for funding is the 
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only point around which collective action and thought are organised is the symptom of a very 
strong dependency from the state. Moreover, to frame the problem in those terms does not 
help to understand that the real cause of CD’s crisis goes beyond the cutbacks - being related 
to its failure to reproduce itself as a political subject, as I illustrated in Chapter 7.  
As French activists (Anonymous) put it “the problem with demands is that, formulating needs 
in terms that make them audible to power, they say nothing about those needs, and what real 
transformations of the world they require”. Moreover, “there is no set of demands, which, 
once met, would bring politics to an end” (Anonymous). Indeed, would additional funding 
provision resolve CD’s crisis? 
Of course underprivileged people constantly need to fight for land, housing, education and so 
on. But this should be embraced as just part of a major struggle for equality and dignity. 
Since  “the politics of equality, justice and freedom runs far deeper than the question of 
forcing the government to keep the promises that it has made to us on service delivery” 
(Abahlali baseMjondolo 2010) 
4 Be close and real to the people 
CD’s philosophy is not about representing people who are affiliated to the movement. This is 
what NGOs and political parties usually do. On the contrary, CD’s principal aim should be to 
provide a space in which people represent themselves and organise collectively towards their 
own emancipation. Whereas representative politics is concerned with obtaining state power in 
order to be able to bureaucratically manage it “for the people”, CD’s philosophy should 
follow the idea that nobody can emancipate people on their behalf. Since emancipation can 
only be the result of people’s courage, direct engagement, and creativity.  
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However in order to achieve ordinary people’s direct engagement a movement needs to be, as 
we have seen, “organic” to their lives. It needs to support a “home-made politics” (Zicode 
2010) – a vital politics that everyone can understand and identify with. In my view CD 
politics should be directed by underprivileged people for underprivileged people. Therefore it 
needs to be practiced in places where these people live or that are accessible to them, at times 
when they are available, and in a language that they can easily understand. This is not to say 
that middle class people (like activists, intellectuals etc.) should be excluded. But that they 
should be respectful, not trying to impose a pre-conceived political line based on their 
professional skills or ideological knowledge. Indeed a “politics of what is close and real to 
the people” (Zikode 2009) is to be understood as a politics that does not start from an 
“external” theory but from what people may say, think and do from a point of view which is 
internal to a concrete situation or process. This approach is not adverse to theory, it just 
emphasises the necessity to start from real life experiences of suffering and resistance. In my 
view, that’s where the ‘real’ of a situation is to be found.  
Finally, another important aspect of this “living politics” is that it needs to be elaborated in 
common and democratically; i.e. in opposition to party politics and other top-down 
approaches like those practiced by most NGOs. It is a popular egalitarian project that does 
not involve profit, individual success and power.  
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LIST OF INTERVIEWS  
 
Interviewees were anonymized. In the following table I just indicate the fake name I used 
(gender is unchanged), the broad “fields” in which each of them operates and when the 
interview took place. 
Aine  
 
CD activism, family support, 
urban regeneration. 
09-09-2010 
Aine + Edward CD activism, family support, 
urban regeneration  
17-06-2010 
Lisa CD work, addiction 23-09-2010 
Damien Pioneer community activist  22-09-2009 
William Pioneer community activist 24-03-2010 
Mark Pioneer community activist 03-03-2010 
John Pioneer community activist - 
politician 
14-03-2011 
Seamus  Partnership worker  20-04-2010 
Mary Addiction CD worker 15-05-2010 
Claire  CD project coordinator, 
training 
19-04-2010 
Sam  CD training 03-02-2010 
Chris CD activism, addiction 07-04-2010 
Ruth CD worker, after-school 13-04-2010 
Carl  CD project manager 11-06-2010 
Peter  Youth project worker and 
manager 
05-03-2010 
Martin  Youth worker, artist, Cd 
activist 
17-12-2009 
Steve Youth worker, project 
manager 
04-05-2010 
Paul  Youth worker 10-07-2010 
Marion CD activist, politician 21-03-2011 
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Erik Activist, migrant rights 12-02-2011 
Tina CD worker, addiction 10-02-2010 
Monica CD worker, youth, addiction 28-04-2010 
Sera CD project manager, 
addiction 
12-05-2010 
Sorcha CD worker, addiction 24-05-2010 
Rebecca Youth worker 25-07-2011 
Ronan  Activist 02-09-2011 
 
LIST OF MAIN EVENTS AND INITIATIVES I ATTENDED AS 
OBSERVER/ETHNOGRAPHER 
 
Public meeting on community activism, involving actual community activists, Seomra 
Spraoi 3 Feb 2010 – participant observation, 2 hours. 
Community Policing Forum, Fitzgibbon Street Garda station 21.9.2010 - participant 
observation, 1h, 30min. 
Community Policing Forum - Store Street Garda station 26.05.2010 participant observation, 
1h, 30min. 
Community policing forum, Fitzgibbon St. Garda station 30.6.2010 - participant 
observation, 1h, 30min. 
Community Policing Forum, Store Street Garda station, 27.10.2010 - participant 
observation, 1h, 30min. 
Community public meeting, fight the cutbacks, St Nicholas of Myra community centre 
26.7.2010 participant observation, 1h, 30min. 
Community sector “A Cut Too Far”, Siptu 15.9.2010, participant observation, 2h 30 min. 
Youth concert and performance, at Bradog youth centre. Participant observation, 1h  
Future arts event, 08-05-2010, Exchange, participant observation, 1h  
Guided visit at Saint Michael estate 24.6.06, 1h observation 
Guided visit at Fatima mansions 24.6.06, 1h observation 
Launch of the “family support network” at Nicholas of Myra community centre 22.09.2010 
participant observation, 1h, 30 min 
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Demonstration against cutbacks 29.09.2010 participant observation 1h, 30 min 
Reel Youth, young people’s arts event, Film Base. 1hour participant observation 
Panel discussion and open discussion on urban regeneration at Anti-Poverty Agency, 14-07-
2009. Participant observation 1hour 
Event on social centres and community activism organised in Seomra Spraoi. 2 hours 
participant observation. 
Theatre of the oppressed event – on peer support for parents of drug abusers - Community 
Response 17.6.2010,  participant observation 1h, 30minutes 
Guided visit at Fatima mansions, 20.05.2010, observation 1h 
Visit at Smithfield Police Station where an art project was taking place, being run by a 
community artist and youth worker, observation 2hours 20-10-09 
Community First and Provisional University joint event, open discussion 04/11/2010 
Anti Racist Network and Provisional University joint event, open discussion 6/11/2010 
NGOs Alliance against racism meeting, activist meeting, participant obsrvation 19/04/2010 
Seomra: Beyond the Crisis, public meeting on Social Movements, Seomra Spraoi. 
7/5/2011participant observation 
Spectacle of defiance meeting 21/06/2010 participant observation, 1h and 30 min. 
Visit to city community garden, 18/04/2011, participant observation 2h 
Spectacle of defiance meeting 12/07/2010, participant observation 1h and 30min 
Anti Racism Network meeting on aging migrant communities in Ireland 29/06/2011, 2 hours 
Spectacle of defiance demonstration 15/12/2010 participant observation 2h 
Spectacle of defiance demonstration 16/12/2011 participant observation 2h 
Workshop on CD at Occupy Dame Street with Cathleen O’Neill, CD activist, open 
discussion. 1h 
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